PHILOSOPHY LOGIC & LANGUAGE

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

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Another topic dealt with in many of the essays in this volume is *self*. The author has been particularly interested in the study of the *status* of the self, called 'I', and its relation to other selves.

Prof. Bhattacharyya has also sought to tackle the problem of *freedom* in its diverse aspects practically in all the essays, more particularly in those on *self* and in "Formal and Actual Freedom" and "Approaches to the Spiritual Life".

As regards the concept of *God*, the Author has touched it incidentally in different essays, as the occasion has demanded it, and only in two essays, *viz.* "Rabindranath on Religion" and "The Concept of God in Indian Philosophy" he has discussed in some detail a few representative views on God.

In most of the essays, Prof. Bhattacharyya had to face Logical Positivism and the Philosophy of the modern school of Analysis. The author has done his best to justify this new philosophy and at the same time has suggested possible ways of countering it. Indeed, his endeavour has always been to pave the way for a metaphysics that cannot be assailed by positivism.

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PHILOSOPHY, LOGIC AND LANGUAGE

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by

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA



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Preface

THE ESSAYS collected in this volume deal with diverse topics. But the first seven essays, and, to some extent, the eleventh one, though published at different times in different journals and, therefore, of different interests, have, I find, an identical theme, *viz.*, the nature and method of philosophy. In that connection I have in all these essays, particularly in the first five and the seventh, discussed the distinctive character of philosophic reflection and, as occasions have arisen, the roles of language and logic therein. This justifies the title of this volume.

Another topic dealt with in many of the essays in this volume is *self.* I have been particularly interested in the study of the *status* of the self, called 'I', and its relation to other selves. The problem of the nature of the self and its relation to the body and the world I have either avoided altogether or treated only historically in the essays "Modern Psychology and Hindu Thought", "Self and Others", "The Concept of Self in Buddhism", "Classical Philosophies in India and the West" and "An Outline of Indian Philosophy".

I have also sought to tackle the problem of *freedom* in its diverse aspects practically in all the essays, more particularly in those on *self* and in "Formal and Actual Freedom" and "Approaches to the Spiritual Life".

As regards the concept of *God* I have touched it incidentally in different essays, as the occasion has demanded it, and only in two essays, *viz.*, "Rabindranath on Religion" and "The Concept of God in Indian Philosophy", I have discussed in some detail a few representative views on God.

In most of the essays I have had to face Logical Positivism and the Philosophy of the modern school of Analysis. I have done my best to justify this new philosophy as far as it can be justified and at the same time suggested possible ways of countering it. Indeed, my endeavour has always been to pave the way for a metaphysics that cannot be assailed by positivism.

The essays collected in this volume were all written from 1950 onward. Those I had published earlier presented

alternative approaches to different concepts—subjectivistic and objectivistic so as to indicate how both these treatments could be equally valid, though, to repeat what I have just stated, alternatively. Only one essay in the present volume, *viz.*, "The Given and Its Appearance" is the legacy of that line of thinking. The reason why I have included it here is that it is of a piece with the essays published here.

I am grateful to Messrs. Allied Publishers Private Ltd. for the interest they have shown in publishing this volume. Indeed if they had not undertaken this venture these essays could never have come out together in one volume.

I also take this opportunity to express my gratitude to two of my colleagues, Sri Santosh K. Basu of the Department of History and Sri Bimal K. Sarkar of the Department of English. It was Sri Basu who introduced me to Sri Chatterjee and induced me to get the book published. Sri Sarkar helped me in correcting proofs and also suggested improvement in English. I only regret I did not approach him earlier.

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Is Philosophy Linguistic Analysis?

I

THE PROBLEM

ANALYSIS is *of* something and *by means of* something. Linguistic analysis may, therefore, mean either

(*a*) analysis of language by means of something which is not itself language, or
(*b*) analysis of language by means of language, or
(*c*) analysis of anything, but by means of language.

Logical positivists and philosophers of the school of Analysis are all agreed that it is analysis *of* language. Whether it is also analysis by means of language is not, however, evident. Analysis by means of language is a difficult concept. Whatever be the analysandum, philosophical analysis, as it is commonly understood, is made by thought, and though thought may involve language the two are not for that reason identical. If thought is to be identical with language, that would be from a new point of view altogether which neither Logical positivists and Analysts nor old-world philosophers would readily accept. 'Linguistic analysis', then, means analysis *of* language, whatever be the method.

The proposition 'Philosophy is linguistic analysis' may mean one of two things: (*a*) it is nothing but linguistic analysis and (*b*) it involves that analysis but is in itself something else. It should be noted that if philosophy is something more than analysis, the additional feature must come out of a critical consideration of analysis itself, not *abextra*, and those who hold that philosophy is nothing but linguistic analysis have not sufficiently analysed this 'linguistic analysis' itself. Such analysis is my main task in the present paper. Only toward the end it will be seen what idea of philosophy my discussions lead to.

II

ARGUMENTS FOR LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

Those who have identified philosophy with linguistic analysis have first dispossessed philosophy of its traditional status and then, having shown that it cannot have a task equal in dignity to its old one, have concluded that the only business left to it is linguistic analysis.

They have assumed that the only criterion of reality is untutored common experience and argue that if in old days philosophy had been chastening and systematising it, this task has now devolved on science which is more rigorous and systematic, so that nothing of common experience is left for philosophy to manage. Common experience means solid sense-experience.

Philosophy cannot claim that though common experience is excluded, there is still uncommon experience left which it might explore. Uncommon experience cannot be verified, verification being always in terms of common experience. One cannot say that it needs no verification, for this would mean that philosophy is an esoteric pursuit worth no serious attention. If, on the other hand, a philosopher seeks verification, the so-called uncommon experience would just be a scientific hypothesis which science with its thorough hold on common experience is more competent to verify. The uncommonness of experience is, therefore, no distinguishing mark of philosophy.

Philosophy does not, also, deal with *concepts*, except in a restricted sense. The concepts that are traditionally reserved for philosophy are all postulates either of science or of the common world-view, and in either case it is science which alone is competent to study them, because it alone is conversant with the situations that called for those concepts. Philosophy is not, again, a special type of study—speculative, as it is called—of these concepts. No one knows what this special study is, unless it be clairvoyance which is unverifiable.

Yet it is true that if philosophy has got any business, it is with concepts, facts of sense-experience being all monopolised by science and commonsense. But the only way it can deal with concepts is to find, through the analysis of the corres-

ponding terms and sentences, what are genuinely meant. This is the only course, because philosophy has nothing to do with matters of experience, and even with this experience itself. The genuine meanings, again, that philosophy is to discover are precisely those which science and commonsense refer to through those words, and as the real is only that which is experienceable through senses, and, further, as concepts themselves are not reals, the genuine meaning is in the long run simple reals of sense-experience to which, therefore, all pseudo-meanings have to be reduced.

Philosophy is sheer analysis of language, in both its semantic and syntactical aspects. So far as the semantic aspect is concerned, it analyses a complex word or sentence into simple reals; and so far as the syntactical aspect is concerned, it discovers the linguistic relations that cemented those reals into a complex concept.

Some of the Analysts have proceeded further. The meaning of a word W is not, according to them, any real but just another word or a set of words which can adequately replace that W, and these replacing words are ultimately primitive words that stand for data of sense-experience. According to them, therefore, an expression, or, better, the idea corresponding to it, is verified not by reference straight to data of sense-experience, but by reference to primitive words that stand for those data. This, though an extreme form of linguistic analysis, appears more consistent with the thesis 'Philosophy is linguistic analysis', the analysandum and the analysans being both language. It is consistent, however, only internally and does not debar external questions as to the very basis of positivism itself.

III

CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Linguistic analysis is the analysis of words and sentences. When the analysandum is a complex word or sentence it is analysed into elemental words or sentences which stand directly for ultimate reals—sense-data or sensed facts. Obviously here the syntactical and the semantic aspects are inter-twined: to break up the complex expression into ele-

mental words and their relations is the same thing as to find out its meaning. When, however, the given word—or, as some claim, the given sentence—is itself elemental, there is no question of syntax, and no question, therefore, of analysing it. The sole task of philosophy here, as also of common sense, is to appreciate its meaning, to appreciate, in other words, what it stands for; or if meaning be understood as only a word or a set of words that can adequately replace the given word, there is no *task* here, whether for philosophy or for common sense.

The specific task of philosophy, then, is to find out, through analysis, the meaning of a *complex* word or sentence. We begin our criticism from here.

Is the meaning in question *actual* or *ideal*? Is it what people actually mean when they use the word or the sentence, or is it what they *should* mean? To find out the actual meaning is one task, to find out what should be meant is *prima facie* another. Phenomenologists, for example, are for actual meanings, they scrupulously avoid all theorising. The attitude of Logical positivists is different. They are not impartial narrators. They have already a notion as to what meaning in general *should be*. They distinguish genuine meaning as what is at least conditioned by verifiability.

To insist on what *should be* meant is theorising or putting forward a proposal. Every theory or proposal has to be backed by arguments. But have Logical positivists offered arguments for their theory or proposal regarding ideal meaning, *viz.*, that it is what is verifiable by sense-experience? Many of them have not. They have quietly passed the ideal meaning as the actual. Many, however, conscious of the difficulty, have denied the distinction by arguing that the ideal meaning is precisely what an untutored commoner actually means. But this is a wrong argument. Common people do indeed often mean what is so verifiable, but often also they mean other things; and even when they mean the former it is doubtful if they mean it consciously as so verifiable. Often, again, they would reject what the Analyst wants them to mean by certain words and sentences.

It cannot be said that in these cases the so-called common people are not genuinely common because they are not un-

tutored. The only conceivable way to decide whether these men are untutored or not is to enquire whether they recognise 'verifiability by sense-experience' as the only criterion of reality, whatever be their idea of meaning. It is true they rely much on this type of verifiability. But they equally admit other types. Occult phenomena, for example, are taken as verifiable through mystic intuition, not through sense-experience. They also believe in laws, say, of science, which are not completely verifiable in the way of the positivist, and when they *postulate* something they take it as real only because of the self-consistent system of knowledge it has led to.

A positivist might argue that by 'verification' he means *public* verification, so that occult experiences are excluded from the beginning. But there are two points against this.

(*a*) There are at least one class of entities which are not public but yet taken as real even by positivists themselves. These are mental states. They are always private, being experienced by their possessors only, and there is no conceivable way to demonstrate them publicly. Yet not merely their possessors, but others also ungrudgingly admit that at least many of them are real.

They can indeed be inferred, and inference, one might contend, is a legitimate method of public demonstration. But for Logical positivists to allow inference would mean a risk. If mental states are allowed as real because inferred, why should the metaphysical truths which old-world philosophers derived through inference be dismissed without an examination of the inferences concerned?

One cannot, in favour of positivism, argue that as what is inferred is always perceivable, inference is a legitimate method of demonstration. The logic in question may be correct, but my mental states are never to be perceived by others who infer them.

Neither can positivists argue that others do perceive my mental states. Even if I as a person, or some of my mental states on certain occasions, may be directly known by others through sympathy, empathy or clairvoyance, a great many of my mental states ever remain private, and the way others are said to perceive some is decidedly un-positivistic.

(*b*) The second point against the positivistic claim that verification is to be public is that the sensuousness of the verification and its publicness are not internally related. The point, in other words, is that what is non-sensuously intuited may yet be public in the sense that it is directly assented to by others. Basic moral values belong to this category. Possible denial of basic values is as much an empty conjecture as that in Mars and Jupiter there are sentient beings who might not be sensing as we do.

Basic moral values are aprioritics of a type, and aprioritics are all *intuited* and yet public. They are neither wide-area conventions nor generalisations from empirical data. Naturalistic interpretations of them, as much as of the values, are arbitrary, because there is always a surd left over, and to dismiss it as a mere psychic state or attitude betrays failure of the reduction. Aprioritics are not also generalisations for the further reason that generalisation itself is impossible without them. Unless they are presupposed we cannot pass from a first case to a second. One cannot here argue that the very first case is generalised (and that the generalisation stands accepted till it is contradicted). Such peculiar generalisation, if there is any, is already *intuition* of the generality. Obviously, this intuition is not sensuous, though it may go in association with that.

We are often told that aprioritics are nothing real. *A priori* propositions, we are told, are wholly analytic and, as such, meaningless in the sense that they refer to nothing that is real. But this is wrong. Analytic propositions cannot be meaningless. They assert as real at least what their subject terms stand for, though that assertion may be in the form of a tautology. Hence *a priori* propositions should be understood as asserting reals corresponding to their subject-terms. Only the subject-terms here are very wide, standing for *all* things in an extensive field, often covering the whole universe. Such '*all things*' cannot be experienced through sense. They are intuited non-sensuously.

The self-complete 'all' is no figment of speculative imagination. It cannot be said that there are only the particulars A, B, C, ... and that where the class is taken as yet closed the closure is no objective fact but only my colligating, a mere

subjective attitude, a mental function. Such closed classes, each of an infinite number of particulars, stand asserted as real, and unless there are reasons to the contrary one has to put up with them. "All X's" might indeed be replaced by $X_1, X_2, X_3, \ldots\ldots$, but never by A, B, C, ... X_1 is not A unqualifiedly, nor X_2 B, and so on. X_1 is A, but understood merely in the light of X-ness, *i.e.*, merely as an instance of X, and similarly with X_2, X_3, *etc.* The entire group containing A, B, C, ... up to infinity cannot, it is true, be intuited, because each member presents a unique empirical feature. But there is no such difficulty in the way of intuiting the group $X_1, X_2, X_3, \ldots\ldots$ up to infinity, every one of these members being equally anticipated by X-ness, as just an instance of X. There is nothing so far against the self-contained 'all' being real and intuited.

It cannot be said that such 'all X' is nothing but X-ness. The denotative reading of 'all' is more primary than the connotative, as is evident from the historical fact that neither realists nor conceptualists nor nominalists have denied particulars. We have only added that the particulars in question that are meant by the word 'all X' are $X_1, X_2, X_3, \ldots\ldots$, not A, B, C, ...

Nor can it be said that because $X_1, X_2, X_3, \ldots\ldots$ are but A, B, C, ... *in the light of X-ness*, they, as depending in whatever manner on X-ness, are less primary. We have just shown that denotation is the more primary meaning. To maintain this its primary character one has to understand X-ness as either a subjective method of colligation or an immanent—may be, half immanent and half transcendent—objective character defining the particulars under 'all X', no wholly transcendent objective feature.

It follows that *a priori* propositions are not even analytic in the sense of being tautologies. They are significant statements about all X's, neither derived from nor verifiable by sensuous matters. Not derived from, for two reasons. We have already shown that they are no inductive generalisations, and, secondly, though in the case of ordinary classes, called empirical, one has somehow to start with some empirical particular or particulars—for otherwise the cow-class could not be distinguished from the horse-class—there is no such

start in the case of apriorities. They are not also verified by sensuous particulars, for the verification is destined to be incomplete. Though empirical general propositions also share the same fate, the incompleteness of the verification of *a priori* propositions is more profound, because they cover extraordinarily wide fields. Apriorities, thus, are not verifiable in the positivistic manner, but yet universally assented to.

Common sense admits not merely sweeping apriorities but also empirical laws which, as already noted, are never completely verifiable. It admits also postulates which are verified only with reference to the consistent system of knowledge effected. In neither of these two cases is simple verification by sense-experience possible. Empirical laws are at best *incompletely* verified by sense-experience. But incomplete verifiability is, to whatever extent, absence of verifiability. The absence, it is true, is only privation, no denial, but the privation here being ever present is as bad as denial. *Probability* is of no help here; if a large number of cases have verified the law to whatever extent, there is always a larger number that privationally *do not* verify it.

It cannot be said that because some actual cases have verified the law and because no case has yet contradicted it, therefore future cases also may with confidence be taken as capable of verifying it. This cannot be said, because once the logic in question is permitted the *number* of verifying cases would be beside the point, *one* such case being enough. The increasing number of such cases would, on this view, only eliminate chances of error, but such progressive elimination of possible errors—even of actual ones—is no *logic* unless the corresponding thesis has been already established. The thesis here is the empirical law which, we contend, is established through a type of non-sensuous intuition (though in association with the sensuous), unless, of course, it is a mere postulate—a concept, formula or equation just postulated in order that certain phenomena may be neatly packed in a system.

Such postulates are verified by their efficiency to form self-complete consistent systems, never directly by sense-experience. It cannot be said that in their case there is indirect sense-

verification—verification, in other words, just in so far as deductions from them are verified directly. All postulates are not so indirectly verified. Often a system of knowledge, a theory, is based on several postulates one or two of which may be so verified, but the rest are allowed because they stand systematically connected with those so verified. Even with regard to one from which deductions are said to be drawn, there is no assurance that they are drawn from it alone, and not from any of the others without which the deductions could not be drawn. The test of a postulate is, therefore, as much systematic connexion as sense-verification, if this latter is allowed.

Even if the sense-verification of postulates is allowed, it is doubtful if it is sense-verification in general, another name of which is general predictability. General predictability is perhaps an analytic feature of postulates and theories. If a theory is improvised for accounting for a certain type of situations, it and the postulates involved must be capable of predicting such situations; and if one insists on predicting *other types* of situation, this is possible only when the theory in question has been combined with other theories. Even there when the combination is made the required prediction follows *analytically*. The more general a hypothesis the newer and newer cases it is bound to cover. It follows that even *crucial test* is useless, because it follows analytically. Either, then, there is no significant empirical test of theories and postulates or, if there is any over and above the formal test of systematic connexion, it must be something other than predictability—general or crucial. We venture to suggest that it is the nearmostness of a hypothesis to a known agency (or behaviour), nearmostness depending, of course, on the advance of science already effected.

IV

CRITICAL CONSIDERATION CONTINUED

If meaning is what is real corresponding to a word or sentence, we have seen that it need not be sensuously verified. One may even ask if meaning is at all the *real* that so cor-

responds. Some positivists, we have seen, understand by 'meaning' a word or a set of words that can adequately replace a given word or sentence. One may also hold that meaning is just what is referred to without any implication as to whether it is real or not.

Philosophy, we are told, is the analysis of words and sentences into genuine meanings. Can the two meanings of the word 'meaning', given above, substantiate this view ?

The former of the two is still a theory—or, if one likes, a proposal. From the point of view of actuality, we as much mean this by 'meaning' as often the *facts* referred to by the words or sentences in question, so that to insist solely on the replacing *words* is a piece of theorising. The word 'man' often —perhaps most often—means actual men or their class, not always a certain word or words replacing it. One may even hold that *dictionary meaning* consisting of more familiar synonyms or conceptual elaborations is vicarious, what is really meant being the actual things or classes conveyed through those synonyms and elaborations. The original word and these synonyms and elaborations refer in a parallel manner to the same actual fact. Even when one says 'X means *that which is such and such*' (where X is the name of certain particulars), the clause 'that which is such and such' is really referring to those particulars or their actual class. If meaning is what is *referred to* it is the particular facts or their classes, not synonyms or conceptual elaborations. The latter, it is true, is often called meaning, but a more appropriate term would perhaps be *synonymity* or *linguistic substitutability*, and nothing of philosophical importance could be deduced from it.

The second idea of meaning stated above is that it is just what is referred to, it mattering little whether it is real or unreal. But this too is of the nature of a theory. In actual common usage meaning is always a reality. Even when on correcting an error one declares the meant to have been unreal, there is no denial that it was nevertheless *taken as real*. Unreality, further, is co-ordinate with reality. Except in clear cases of supposal and mere entertainment, there is nothing that is meant and yet not definitely real or unreal. The subsistent or the irreal is either sheer verbal abstraction or a sub-reality in the form 'if it were *real*', so that no significant supposal

or entertainment is without all reference to reality. Intrinsically the meant is taken as real; and between something taken as real and it being objectively so there is not much of epistemological distance: what is taken as real is objectively so, provided it is not contradicted. This small but significant *proviso* is an epistemological bridge that easily covers the much advertised distance between objectivity and egocentricity. From the egocentric point of view, contradiction, unless it is merely formal, is the fact that in a given knowledge some defect is discovered or believed as existent; and the defect is detected, or believed as existent, by the knowledge that reveals an object in place of the object of the former knowledge.

V

PHILOSOPHY CONCERNED WITH THE REAL

The real is not merely what is meant by a word or sentence, it is also revealed by knowledge, including non-sensuous intuition. Not merely that, unless something is already known as real through any of the *pramāṇas*[1] it cannot be meant by a word or sentence.

Often, indeed, we mean a possible, and often, again, fictitious entities like dragon, fairy, *etc.* But the possible, if it is not purely formal, is what is possibly *real;* and fictitious entities are either not known to be fictitious, and so taken so far as real, or self-consciously constructed, when they are really objects-as-so-constructed. The word 'dragon', for example, when consciously constructed, means the *constructed dragon*, where construction as a process is a psychic reality. The dragon as constructed borrows the reality of this psychic process.

If meaning has to be already known as real it follows that language is only a way of stating the real. It may state the real precisely or not precisely, precision being determined by the use of standard words and rules of syntax acceptable to the community to whom the expression is directed. From this point of view, language is secondary. If philosophy is

[1] Meaning sources or methods of knowing

granted only this secondary task of expressing what is known not only would this be undignified for philosophy, really there would be no task left for it, because every science and concrete discipline is under an equal obligation to express its points precisely. If certain expressions are clumsy or misleading, or if they give rise to puzzles and contradictions, it is for the respective sciences to be on their guard against them and correct them. Philosophy can do nothing here, because precision is to be effected by reference to the reals accepted as data, or established, by those sciences themselves. A philosopher to sit in judgment on the expressions would presuppose that he is the master of all those sciences. In the absence of such mastery a philosopher can at best make grammatical and lexical corrections, which, however, is an empty formal business, never in the past recognised as philosophical. Or, he may correct by reference to sense-perceived data which are common properties of all men and monopolised by none (or he may do both).

In the second case there would arise a serious difficulty. If philosophy is to interpret all propositions in terms of sense-experience one might ask 'Why philosophy alone?'. Is not science also under an equal obligation to do this? If yes, there is no task left for philosophy. If no, if, in other words, science is allowed to use other *pramāṇas*, why should philosophy be prevented? In any case, there would be no distinction between science and philosophy. A consistent positivist ought, then, to deny all philosophy, not metaphysics only.

If, however, philosophy is allowed the secondary task of lexical and grammatical corrections, still then all difficulties would not be over. Even lexical correction is impossible unless one is already aware of the facts of sense-experience that the words to be corrected and the replacing words stand for, and this, obviously, is going beyond formal linguistic business. If some positivists argue that the facts in question are involved *in a second-dimensional way* in the words in question, so that there may not be any direct reference to facts, this would be like saying that sense-perceived facts are only *functions* of words, much as the old-world Kantio-Hegelians understood the empirical as only a function of thought. This does not, also, help much. Either the so-called functions

are a second dimension necessarily involved in the words or thoughts, or a certain degree of combination of words or thoughts is expected to be exactly equal to the sense-perceived facts. The latter is definitely wrong and at best a fond hope. The former does not deny facts of sense-experience; it denies only their independence. Material meaning cannot abdicate itself and get completely merged in the formal, and the question is still open whether the present inseparability of the material is final.

Even granting that it is final, there is another difficulty. If there are only words and words and if the business of philosophy is only to reduce complex words or sentences to elemental words, one might still point out that the standard elemental words are relevant only to the community that uses them, and similarly with regard to the standard syntax. It would follow that meaning, and, therefore, philosophy itself, is relative and wholly conventional.

But as much with meaning as with philosophy, one cannot rest content with relativity. There is at least an implicit faith in universal philosophy. How, otherwise, could one think at all of defining philosophy? One may not successfully define it by pointing to the exact common character of different philosophies. But the implicit faith in a common pursuit is there. Do not people of one community understand the philosophy of another? Similarly with regard to language or meaning.

General language has to be admitted. This does not necessarily mean that the actual general language, the medium through which different peoples understand one another's meanings, can itself be described. It may operate in a pure functional manner, without ever being posited in itself. Some positivists are aware of this. They never take upon themselves the impossible task of describing the general language. But they propose constructing a symbolical language that would stand for this. This is decidedly a good proposal, provided it could be worked out to the end, and God only knows whether it can be. There is, however, another alternative, more practicable and natural. People speaking one language do actually treat another language as superior and, therefore, more comprehensive, if in picking

up the latter they feel that some forms of expression not explicit in their language are explicit in the latter. Comparison may proceed this way, and through mutual understanding (without any initial bias) we can arrive at the best actual language and then suggest improvement even on that.

VI

PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

We conclude that philosophy is no mere linguistic analysis, if by that term one means analysis *of* or *by* language or both. Philosophy has indeed to analyse linguistic expressions, but through that it studies the *reals* that are so expressed, and these reals are known by *pramāṇas*. Philosophical analysis may also be taken as *by* language, provided that language is used as a means to carry on reflection and is, therefore, subordinate to thought. The method of philosophy is principally the *pramāṇas* and conceptual analysis. 'Conceptual analysis' does not mean analysis of concepts. It means thinking analysis as a result of which concepts may emerge to our view as ulterior realities. Philosophy is concerned with real objects of *pramāṇas*, as much as science is, and neither of them is wholly concerned with expressions. Some objects are sense-perceived, some others are inferred either in a straight manner or as valid hypotheses. Some are, again, discovered through analysis. So far science and philosophy belong to the same order.

With regard, however, to the types of analysis they employ, they develop differences. The analysis that science employs is empirical. What it discovers as *such and such* through analysis is immediately believed as having already been present *in the same form* before the analysis began; or sometimes the analysans are postulates claiming no intrinsic reality but acquiring it on account of the empirical system effected through them. In the first case the validity of the analysans depends directly on sense-perception, they being either sense-perceived when the analysis is made or taken as what was sense-perceived, however vaguely, when the analysis began. In the second case the validity depends formally on the sys-

tematic character of the system, and materially on the system being empirical. The analysans in this case may also be taken as inferred in a way. In both the first and second cases the analysans are 'empirically real'.

The additional, if not the specific, task of philosophy is to discover, through a specific type of analysis, entities, often indiscriminately called *concepts*, *categories*, *idealities*, *essences*, *etc.*, which need not be empirically real, but as autonomous entities claim reality of their own. When they are analysed out they stand in a form in which they cannot be said to have remained before the analysis began. Substance, causality, the Sāṅkhya *tattvas* in their *tattva*-forms, the Brahman of Advaita, God, Hegel's Absolute, *etc.*, even pure space, time and number, are in one form to pure philosophic speculation and in another in unreflective life. This is true with regard to values also. How and why this is so I have discussed elsewhere and have no space here to repeat. But this is a fact. On the ground that they are not bound to be 'empirically real' one may dismiss them. One may also condescendingly recognise them if and only so far as they are empirically real. But there is the inevitable fact that in spite of all positivism they go on pushing in their claim as much to recognition as to intrinsic reality, and it would be wiser, therefore, to admit a type of mystic intuition—transcendental perception, as it is sometimes called—than dismiss what cannot be dismissed. Nor would it be wiser to consider them unavoidable (transcendental) illusions, for they cannot be adequately replaced. An illusion is that which is or has to be replaced by a claimant to identical recognition. But the philosophical analysans claiming non-empirical reality cannot be replaced by empirical reals. The philosophical essence is *over and above* the empirical fact. If there is at all a question of replacement it would be of the empirical by the philosophical, not conversely. But we are not concerned with that here. Some hold that transcendental philosophy confuses reality with value. But there is no such confusion here: non-empirical reality need not be value which is only one type of non-empirical reality. These people are probably under the phenomenologist's illusion that the non-empirical is only a *presupposition*. We contend that every genuine presupposition, *i.e.*, one that is not a dead

postulate, claims intrinsic reality (no mere 'empirical reality'), and till it is shown that it is contradicted or that there is no possibility of coming up to it we have to admit it as real, though that reality may be non-empirical.

The mystic intuition of idealities is, we admit, a private affair to one who so intuits. But it should not be rejected on that ground. Empirical perception is equally private. We may be told that empirical perception is confirmable by inference. But, first, it is *not* taken as valid only on that ground; and, secondly, what exactly is this confirmation? Is it showing the compatibility of the percept with other such percepts, or is it the situation that the percept can be inferred much as fire is inferred from smoke? If the former, we reply that the mystic intuition that reveals an ideality comes also to reveal, when the intuition is deepened and sustained, a whole system, or a hierarchy, of idealities. If it be argued that still the whole system, or the hierarchy, remains esoteric, we reply that then there is the second alternative: the ideality in question may also be inferentially demonstrated much as an empirical percept is done when it is challenged. Only, the inference here is peculiar. It is from data that are sense-perceived to one that is not so perceivable.

Those who allow idealities in so far only as they are 'empirically real' appear to have misunderstood their transcendent autonomy. Even as autonomous these idealities are not as removed from empirical facts as these philosophers apprehend. One must not blink at the fact that they are after all analysed out of concrete empirical situations; secondly, as we have just shown, they can to a considerable extent be inferred—either in a straight way or postulationally—from empirical situations; and, thirdly—and this is the most important point—in spite of their transcendent autonomy they are also functionally present in—another name of which is that they remain undistinguishedly fused with—empirical situations. They are not as opposed to the empirical as they are commonly thought to be. They are immanent regulative principles of the empirical. When, as autonomous, they are distinguished out through philosophical analysis, what remains over is not the dead empirical, the empirical as such, for this latter can never as such be distinguished out. If the starting-point

is the concrete empirical situation which, as concrete, is a homogeneous amalgam distinguishing neither the empirical as such nor the ideality as autonomous, what remains over when the latter is distinguished out is still the same amalgam, not the dead empirical. There is no dead empirical anywhere and at any stage.

As contrasted with science, philosophy has this additional or specific business of dealing with autonomous idealities. In recent days another discipline has developed under the name 'philosophy of science' which also appears to deal with like entities, called concepts; and the names of the subject-matter of both are often the same, *viz.* causality, substance, matter, motion, space, time, *etc.* But there is a fundamental difference between it and philosophy proper. Unlike philosophy proper, the so-called philosophy of science never studies the concepts *in their autonomy.* It is concerned with the concepts in so far only as they are functional. If science had just postulated them the philosophy of science reflects on them-*as-postulates.* The validity of these concepts is still understood as conditioned (formally by their compatibility and materially by their place in the systems effected). There is no question of a philosophical intuition of their autonomy.

VII

LANGUAGE IN A NEW PERSPECTIVE

We have throughout treated language as secondary to thought. This is why we have rejected the two theses—(*i*) philosophy is the analysis *of* language, (*ii*) it is analysis *by* language. There is, however, an intelligible possibility of rehabilitating both the theses, but never in the line of Logical positivism.

One may hold that language (speech) also is one of the *pramāṇas.* A sentence heard produces a cognition of what it means, and it is also conceivable that a speaker points to a reality directly through his speech. To consider the second case: the speaker does not *first* think and *then* express the thought in language. Language is not a ready-made cloak for thought to pick up and wear. The very thought that is said to be cloaked is already speech implicitly. Thought and

implicit speech may not be different, and obvert speech may be self-concretion of the implicit. As for knowing something through a speech heard, this is possible presumably because speech could directly refer to realities. Particular words as conventions have indeed no intrinsic capacity to refer to specific particular things, and similarly with particular conventional rules of syntax. But that the word or the syntax means *something*, whatever it may be empirically, is an *a priori* law. If words and syntaxes had not this intrinsic function they could not be utilised by thought; and, further, this function of words and sentences cannot be explained by empirical association, association explaining only that the word means a *particular definite* object, and the syntax a *particular definite* relation.

If language itself be a *pramāṇa* there would be nothing against the thesis 'philosophy is analysis *by* language', for on this hypothesis thought and language are identical.

It would be difficult also to resist the other thesis, *viz.* that it is the analysis *of* language, for 'analysis of language' may mean, like 'analysis of concepts' in the statement 'Philosophy is the analysis of concepts', that pure antonomous forms of language, in their inter-connexion, emerge to our view through philosophical analysis.

All this is by way of tentative suggestion which it is impossible to develop here. Its implications and requirements, however, should be clearly perceived. One will have to prove in more rigorous details that speech and thought are identical, prove also that memory, inference, *etc.*, are only ways of speaking, and decide also whether perception is mere speech or something more. A *prima facie* case has, however, been established, for the semantic business of language and its syntactical forms stand very close respectively to thought's reference to objects and the operational forms of thought. Add to this the possibility that the object meant is only a function of language, much as it was of thought in the old-world philosophy, and we have an idea of a full-fledged ontology of language which was probably in the mind of the older-world philosophers of Logos or *Śabda*.

The Business of Philosophy

I

THAT sense and imagination are two (it may be, among other) avenues to reality is unquestionable at least at the start of philosophy. By 'imagination' is meant what is often called *association,* that attitude of the mind which, not being explicitly logical, anticipates a real—past, present (though distant) or future—when something is presented to the sense. Whether this imagination is implicitly logical and, if so, what the implicitness means will be seen later.

There is a third attitude of the mind called thought or reason—the explicitly logical attitude; and the question is whether it is a method of *knowledge* and, if so, to what extent. By 'knowledge' is meant the awareness of the *real.*

According to some, thought is only a way of interpretation (expression), having as such nothing to do with reality, its goodness consisting only in neatness, clarity, economy, *etc.* Some others treat it as not entirely without metaphysical import, but as only a substitute formula, a convenient short-cut to reality where the actual living process is elaborate and complicated *imagination.* Still others treat it as not by itself giving anything real, but capable of doing so in collaboration with sense-given data which are real. There is a fourth group of thinkers according to whom thought runs counter to reality.

Now, philosophy, whether different or not from sciences, cannot do without thought. Even intuitionists, mystics and irrationalists have to seek recourse to thought at least in exposition. To determine the exact function of thought is, therefore, a primary problem for philosophy.

Not that this cannot be determined. It cannot be said that this determination being itself a business of thought, epistemology is impossible. Epistemology has, as a matter of fact, been possible, and there is also an elaborate science called Logic. If these two disciplines have been possible we have to admit that pure thought is self-evident, in the sense

that *another thought* is not required to probe it. It is not, however, impossible that the mysteries of thought are unravelled in some super-thought attitude. But of that later.

Thought may be understood as either subjective thinking with its different modes, or the system of objective idealities. In either case we have to recognise grades, for (*i*) not all details and inter-relations are discovered all at once and (*ii*) definite groups of details and inter-relations are revealed at definite stages.[1]

(The above is true whichever way thought is understood—whether as a method of interpretation or as a substitute formula or a genuine spiritual or semi-spiritual process and as such revealing realities or not.)

We have said that philosophy cannot do without thought. This does not immediately mean that thought, whether as subjective thinking or as objective idealities, enters into the constitution of reality or forms a part of it. The truth or otherwise of this doctrine has to be found, we cannot start with it. In spite of what others have said, it is not impossible, at least at the start, that reality is thought-less. Reality may well be known in terms of sense and imagination only, sense offering data and imagination connecting these.

II

Thought is not a mere way of interpretation. X can be called mere interpretation if corresponding to it there is no X in the world of reals. But at least not all techniques of interpretation in philosophy are of this type. By 'technique of interpretation (in philosophy)' we mean pure words—words other than 'red', 'green', 'sweet', *etc.* which obviously are (conventional) names of actual reds, greens, *etc.* Words which are not such names are the techniques in question. It has been claimed that these techniques do not represent exact realities corresponding to them, they are only (conventional) formulae for representing a host of sense-given reals.

1 That thought itself is a grade removed from empirical reals follows, as we shall see, from the fact that (*i*) it is autonomous and (*ii*) yet *constitutes* the latter. Autonomous A as constituting B cannot be on a par with that B.

But are all techniques of this type? Contrast three sentences—'This is blue', 'This blue exists' and 'I am disgusted with the world.' There may not be any difficulty with regard to primary sentences like the first. But what about the word 'exists' in secondary sentences like the second? It is not true that they are only repetitions of corresponding primary ones, for they are not used that way. Predication of existence is most often significant. Nor is the significance merely subjective. Modality may have considerable subjective import, but this is not the whole story. In modal awareness existence and like categorial features are asserted as objective in their distinctness. Modal assertions are really the beginning of the discovery of objective idealities. Yet the subjective side is not to be under-estimated. The subjective side is there only because ideal objectivities do yet, in an important sense, as we shall see later, hang on to the subjective distinguishment.

If existence and like categories stand as objective entities in sentences like 'This blue exists', the world as a whole stands similarly distinguished in sentences like 'I am disgusted with the world'. The world as a whole, *i.e.*, the infinite entirety, is a genuine objective ideality, no mere name. Relative entireties like 'all men,' 'all dogs', *etc.*, as objective entities are evident in general sentences like 'All men are mortal', and also in negative sentences like 'This is no man.' In neither case is the 'all' wholly reducible to the detailed particulars. The particulars being infinite in number can only be colligated through the genuine 'all'. Such 'all', no doubt, is also subjective, but that is because it, though objective, yet hangs on to the subjective distinguishment of it. Relative 'all's, again, are not reducible without remainder to negations. They may be *translated* in the language of negation, but translation is only a second-hand representation. What, now, is true of relative 'all' is true all the more of the absolute 'all', the world. Negative language is here absurd, there is nothing with which the world as a whole can be contrasted.

Existence, other categorial features and the infinite entirety are thus no mere techniques of interpretation. These at least are metaphysical entities, and similarly a host of other

so-called techniques. Some of the expressions used in philosophy are, no doubt, mere linguistic devices, but this ought not to be generalised, specially when most of the expressions used in common sense are genuine.

It is true that all expressions whatsoever are in an important sense conventional and, therefore, technical. But this is not the point here. 'Red', 'green', *etc.*, are no doubt conventional expressions ; but they represent realities. The question is whether the expressions branded as mere techniques are all to be tabooed. We have shown that not all are so, and we claim that most of them are genuine.

This would follow from an analysis of the expressions like 'red', 'green', 'sweet', *etc.* It is true that these words mean certain definite realities because of their association with them. But that they should mean *some* entities is no business of empirical association. Reference to objects-in-general is an intrinsic function of words. Such objects-in-general are divisible *a priori* into certain classes, studied in the Logic of Term. Particular words like positivity, negativity, generality, singularity, *etc.*, representing these classes, are, therefore, significant. These words are no mere techniques of interpretation. They possess genuine semantic import.

A whole sentence also has similarly a semantic import, both empirical and *a priori.* But the semantic side is possible here through the syntactical relations of the terms. The syntax-words, like the terms, have also semantic import—they refer to pure relations studied in the Logic of Proposition. The relation between syntactical and semantic imports is too intricate to be studied in the present essay. It is enough that we show that there are objective idealities represented by most of the expressions which the thinkers under consideration propose to ban as unmetaphysical.

One more point against the verbalisation of pure philosophy. If the words that represent the sense-given are significant, equally so must be those which represent their associational connections. The reals include not merely sense-data but also their system as apprehended in imagination. Were it not so, reality would have been reduced to the present and past data only, and those even as wholly discrete and unconnected. Such a view stands self-condemned. If

discretes alone be real, each discrete would be absolute and we should have had no right even to speak of *two* discretes.

III

So far against those who treat thought as only a way of interpretation. Those who regard it as only a working substitute for elaborate and increasingly complicated processes of imagination fare no better ultimately. They do not indeed treat the real world as a conglomeration of insulated sense-data. But they are in the same predicament with the first group of thinkers so far as they hold that thought has no metaphysical import.

The third group of philosophers who hold that thought by itself gives nothing real but does that in collaboration with sense-given data are substantially right. But the point requires clarification.

Does thought as such point to anything at all, though that may not be a *reality*? Or does it point to nothing whatsoever? The second alternative is untenable, for then no inference would lead to a new reality and judgment would be scarcely distinguishable from non-judgmental perception except as a way of interpreting the same content. It cannot also be said that thought representing, in collaboration with sense-data, a reality is an ultimate fact the why and the how of which need not trouble us. For, we might ask—Does it in that collaboration represent those very sense-data or something else? If the former, there is no improvement on the first view dismissed before. If, however, it does represent something else, thought must have a business, and that has to be specified. If the business is not pointing to anything (though not real), what may it be? As a matter of fact, many of those who hold that thought in that collaboration yielding a new reality is an ultimate fact pay scant attention to *thought* and are satisfied with the mere passage *through imagination* from one reality to another. They either do not notice or deliberately ignore the logical side. But that there is thought is evident from the fact that there are intelligible sciences like Formal Logic and Pure Mathematics, and our task is just to find out the business of this thought.

There might be a view, in this connexion, that thought is neither a linguistic device nor a short-cut substitute for imagination, but only the awareness of inductive generalities. The view, however, would be no improvement. An inductive generality is neither a sense-datum nor apprehended through imagination. Not the former, because, as already shown, all 'all's—relative or absolute—are (objective) *idealities* and as such unamenable to sense-intuition. Nor the latter, because imagination passes from one particular to another particular. Some believe that sense can apprehend idealities. But that is because according to them idealities as such are bodily present in particular reals. We shall show later that this their idea is wrong.

Thought as such, then, does point to something. But it is not real, it is only an objective ideality.[2] It is not real, because nothing that is distinguishable in itself and yet real can constitute another reality. Real wood constitutes a chair, but that wood is never distinguishable in itself; it is always a wooden thing—a log or plank—which is equally constituted by wood. Real threads, again, constitute a real cloth. They, however, constitute it so far only as they are *parts* of the cloth which is the *whole*; as separated from the cloth they are no *parts*, because there is then no cloth as the whole. They are then only threads—as absolute as the cloth was. A real quality, again, constitutes a real substance, but no quality is distinguishable in itself, except in name. Idealities, however, even as idealities, constitute reals. Hence they themselves cannot be real. That the empirical particulars are real is beyond doubt, because we start with this notion, and till it is sublated there is no question of denying or even doubting it.

But does an ideality *constitute* the corresponding real? Have we not already maintained that no ideality is bodily present in the real? We reply—both are true, only there should be proper clarification.

[2] The first group of thinkers should not here object that as these are mere idealities, not real, the words representing them are non-significant. Their notion of 'significance' is unduly restricted. These words are certainly not tautologies. Moreover, we shall show later that objective idealities have a necessary *demand* on reality.

When thought discovers an ideality the question may be asked—Was it there before that discovery? Before the discovery there was only the real. Hence the question may be re-stated as—Was it present in the real? We cannot answer either way. For if it was not there we have to say that thought created it for the first time, but this is not what we feel. Nor can we say that it was there, because had it been already present there is no reason why it could not then be discovered. There was no defect on my part, nor was there any intermediate obstruction. It cannot be said that on my part there was a defect in as much as I did not then *think*—just as when I do not perceive a real thing is not revealed, so when I do not think the ideality is not discovered. This cannot be said for the following reason:

My perceiving capacity being all right, when the object appears (supposing there is no obstructing medium), it is revealed. So if my thinking capacity were all right and if the ideality were present, it too ought to have been revealed. As a matter of fact, however, it was not revealed. Where was the defect then? It will not do to answer that the thinking capacity was not all right, that it was in a latent form and that I had not the proper make-up for making this capacity patent, just as a man not up to the mark has the appreciative (aesthetic) capacity in a latent form. That this cannot be said is evident from the fact that it involves illegitimate double latency. Capacity by itself is already a latent phenomenon, and it would be meaningless to regard this latent phenomenon as having been further latent.

It would be useless, again, to urge that there is no *capacity*—whether of perceiving or thinking—and that the appropriate object being present perception or thought occurs. This cannot be said, because as a matter of fact idealities, by supposition, were present even before discovery and yet they were not discovered. Nor can it be said that the failure to discover was due to a subjective defect, *viz.* that the man was not up to the mark. What does this 'being up to the mark' mean, unless it be rousing up a sleeping capacity, which, we have just seen, is absurd? It may, of course, be said that the man by culture attains such a make-up of the mind that the idealities reveal themselves by grace. There

is nothing against such revelation by grace. But it is useless to speak of the vague make-up, unless it be an *ad hoc* hypothesis just to account for the fact that the idealities are only sometimes revealed and sometimes not. It would be more candid to admit that on account of the difficulties mentioned we *cannot assert* that the idealities were present before their discovery, just as we *cannot deny* that. So far as we cannot assert, the idealities were not bodily present in particular realities; and so far as we cannot deny they were present. This account is not anomalous if we put it in another language. We may say that idealities as such, *i.e.*, as idealities, were not bodily present in those reals, they were present there—we might even say 'bodily'—in *another* form, *i.e.*, as undistinguishedly fused with the reals. It is thought that distinguishes and posits them in their proper form, as idealities.[3] 'Undistinguishedly fused' means that at that stage they did not retain their pristine identity intact. It cannot be said that even as idealities they were present there, though hidden from our view. That would unnecessarily bring back the question of *defect* due to which it was hidden. There would be the further complication as to whether the defect was in the subject or constituted by an obstructing medium. It may no doubt be urged against us—Why were they not discovered if there was no defect? Our reply is that if every cause of non-discovery (supposing the object is present) be called a defect, we have to seek one here; but our central point is that it is to be traced in the object itself. The object, in other words, was not as it ought to have been. The ideality was not there as ideality. It was there as a generic shape or schema.

The net conclusion is that thought as such points to something which is not yet real—the ontic ideality that as essence constitutes the existent particular, 'constitution' meaning that even as autonomous it is also present in the particular real, though not as ideality, but as undistinguishedly fused. It would be too much to claim that even as ideality it is bodily

[3] That idealities are not real follows also from this consideration. A real is that which existed before it was discovered. But idealities cannot be said to have so existed.

present there, and too little to say that only its *reflection* as separate from it is present in the particular real.

The view, therefore, that thought as such gives no reality but does that in collaboration with real sense-data is only half correct. When all this is said it is clear also that the view of the fourth group of thinkers—the anti-intellectualists—is untenable. There is no ultimate conflict between idealities and reals. Any question of conflict would arise only when one fails to notice that even in the world of reals there are representatives of idealities—representatives, however, which are not wholly other than the originals. The representation here is self-representation, not deputing another. At every department of the real world—scientific, historical, social, political, *etc.*—there is some such appropriate self-representation.

IV

Now that anti-metaphysical views are disposed of we may venture to offer an outline of metaphysics, an account of the world revealed by thought. This world consists not merely of pure logical entities that are referred to by pure language—the entities, as we have noted, discussed in the Formal Logic of Term and Proposition, it is peopled by other entities also, *viz.* space, time, number and material idealities, and also by categories which are but concretions of logical entities in relation to space and time.

To explain. That corresponding to semantic and syntactical sides of language there are logical entities we have already seen. Those, therefore, who believe that there are only logical *relations*, *i.e.*, propositions (with dead symbols as terms), no logical *entities*, are mistaken. Those, again, who propose replacing logical entities by mathematical ones are doubly mistaken, first in denying the former and secondly in misreading the status of the latter. Space, time and number alone are mathematical entities and they are never so elevated as the logical. They should be followed in all their genuine intricacy and complex construction by reflective magination. They are classed with idealities only because imagination is a hybrid that partakes of the nature of both

thought and sense-intuition. Self-conscious imagination is a bed-fellow of thought. But the same imagination as blind associational passage is the handmaid of sense-intuition. The relation between blind and self-conscious imagination is not like that between undistinguished and distinguished ideality, for while the undistinguished ideality is and yet is not the distinguished, the reflective and the unreflective imaginations are absolutely identical. Space, time and number as distinguished (reflectively apprehended as autonomous entities) are present in the world of reals not in *another form*, even though fused with real particulars as their extension, presentness, togetherness, *etc.* Material idealities (universals) and logical entities and relations, on the other hand, are in particular reals as only their generic images or thinly pictorial schemata.

Mathematical entities are to be followed by reflective imaginat on. This truth is missed equally by those who make unauthorised generalisation of mathematics through a false freedom of thought as by those who, unable to follow the ever-increasing complexity of imagination beyond a certain limit, too easily employ the language of thought, forgetting all the while that thought in this sphere is legitimate so far only as it is a short-cut to elaborate imaginal passage.

As for *categories*, they as necessarily applicative are but logical entities selecting for their media of application the imaginal idealities of space and time. Without such media which are the contents of the hybrid imagination they could not apply to the reals.

Material ideality is an enormously difficult topic. Not merely are the universals *cow*, *dog*, *etc.*, such idealities, to this class belong also entities like *this shade of blue*. What do not belong to this class are the pseudo-universals like *house* and *colour*. *This shade of blue* is an ideality in the sense that it is predicable in the same sense of all such particular realities. An ambiguity has here to be cleared away. Those who admit its ideality have often in their mind that blue-in-general is no genuine ideality but a mere name and to be replaced by all the shades of blue which are genuine idealities. But this is a wrong idea. It would have been correct if the different shades of blue were not intelligible as also in a continuous gradation

from the lowest shade to the highest. The different shades are all felt as shades of *blue*. Blue-in-general is therefore a genuine ideality. Colour-in-general, however, is no such ideality, because different colours are not shades of colour-in-general, nor all in any genuine manner in continuous gradation. If the spectral gradation or the physical theory of colour is allowed, spectral colours alone would come under a genuine ideality, but not white, black and grey and mixtures of these with the spectral colours. These latter, however, are all colours, unless the word 'colour' is used in a restricted sense. It follows that colour-in-general is no ideality.

If, now, blue and a definite shade of blue are both genuine idealities, there is no distinction in status between *this blue* and *this shade of blue*. Hence by *this X*, where X stands for blue or shade of blue, we mean something else. The novelty meant is all constituted by the adjective *this*. 'This' is no doubt an ideality, but it is at the same time a reality also, in the sense that it constitutes the uniqueness of that reality and as such belongs to the world of reals. It should be noted in this connexion that there is no 'this' as other than the particular reality in question, so that the very particular reality X is, even as such a particular, an ideality also. This is the farthest conceivable extension of the realm of idealities, beyond even *infima species*, to the very particulars. Those who deny the ideality of *uniqueness*, admitting at the same time a special status of it as distinct from the real which is unique, have done that arbitrarily. In fact, in *this particular* the ideal and the real worlds coincide.[4] It is useless to postulate a special relation between the two, and too easy to mystify it.

Logical idealities and the material ones like *blue* and a specific shade of blue come to be related to *this real shade* through the *ideal* 'this shade of blue', this last being an inhabitant equally of the ideal and the real world. *As in the objective ideal world*, however, all idealities—logical, categorial, mathematical and material—are co-ordinate and equally original, though in no way prejudicing their hierarchy. One

4 We have seen that imagination is also another bridge.

to be subsumed under another does not necessarily mean that the latter is deducible from the former.

A special difficulty regarding material idealities is that they are discovered in what is ordinarily called empirical thought. This, however, is no difficulty *in the province of objective idealities*. Any question of empirical thought or material ideality being deducible from (*i.e.*, a modification of) pure thought or pure ideality arises only at a higher level of reflection to be discussed in the next section.[5]

V

The possibility of this higher reflection follows from an important character, as yet unnoticed, of objective idealities. With a self-complete objective status of their own they yet bear a close relation to the apprehending subject—they necessarily hang on to the subject. They cannot be spoken of except as *as discovered* : any statement about them is about them-as-discovered. This is not the petty ego-centricity scoffed at by realists. What we mean is this: When a table is spoken of as brown we say 'The table is brown', not 'The table *as perceived* is brown'; but such unqualified statement is impossible with regard to idealities. We have to say 'The ideality *as discovered* is such and such'. The table perceived is not necessarily the table-as-perceived, because we are sure that even before it was perceived it was there. But we have already seen there is no such assurance with regard to idealities; rather *as idealities* they were not. Their idealityhood is only as revealed or distinguished.

Combine this character of idealities with their nevertheless undeniable objectivity, and the exact relation they bear to subjectivity will come to light. The idealities, though necessarily *as discovered,* claim also an independent objective status, for we do also speak of them as objectively independent. The apparent clash between this genuine objectivity and the dependence on subjectivity has to be removed. One way of

5 There will be no space in this essay for deducing the empirical or the material from the pure. In the next section we shall only offer a general outline of the subjective sphere.

removing it is to hold that if the idealities are definite idealities as only being distinguished, then as independent they cannot be such definite idealities, and as such must be indefinite, indefinite in the sense that we cannot know their 'what' so far as they are independent. Not merely their status as neither reality nor unreality, but also their contents are thus indefinite. But this is a cheap solution. Nothing can be easily dissolved into 'that' and 'what', as though these as metaphysically separate happen to be together. The 'what' of an empirical particular, once distinguished, is just the ideality which, we have seen, cannot as such be bodily present in the particular, and the mere 'what' of an ideality is evidently a false abstraction. Status and content are indissolubly one. From this point of view, the objective independence of idealities cannot but be understood as *demanding reality*, as distinguished from *being real*. The idealities, we have seen, are neither real nor unreal. But this is no status at all, being entirely privative. *Subsistence* is only an empty positive name for this privation, no more than a working symbol. So the exact status of idealities is yet a question. The only conceivable answer is that it is a *demand to reality*. This demand, though falling short of reality, is yet a positive status. This means that though the empirical particulars were started with as realities (existents), theirs is not the only reality. Idealities also demand a type of reality. That demand they can fulfil, if at all, not necessarily by descending to the level of empirical particulars, but even as remaining above these.

This demand, however, can be materialised in one way only. If idealities, as we have seen, are necessarily related to subjectivity there is no question of getting rid of this relation, which means that they by themselves can never be real, unless there were a conceivable way of our self-annihilation. Hence the only way of materialising the claim is by concentrating on subjectivity and understanding the idealities as in some way based on it, without, however, denying their genuine objectivity. Only the reality they claim is to be understood as that of subjectivity.

But is subjectivity by itself real? Does it not also, as ideality, only *demand* reality? By 'subjectivity' here is meant pure consciousness, because that alone is above the level of empirical

reals, not determinate mental states and processes. Pure consciousness, we hold, is intrinsically real for the following reason:

That is real which is felt as having existed even before it was discovered. Pure consciousness is so felt, it being impossible that it did not exist before now. I may not be always conscious of myself, but now that I am conscious of myself I am absolutely sure that I existed even before now. Historical birth and death do not stand in the way of my eternal existence. My non-existence at any time is inconceivable once I catch myself, and historical birth and death are not concerned with myself as pure consciousness, but only with myself as embodied.

Pure consciousness is thus intrinsically real, although as pure it is above empirical reals. It cannot be said that as so above it cannot but be an ideality which is neither real nor unreal. Were it so, it must have, as already seen, hung on to the distinguishing subjectivity. But pure consciousness cannot be distinguished by *another* consciousness. Pure consciousness is self-apprehended. Arguments for this self-apprehension (self-luminosity) are well known.

Above the level of objective idealities, then, there is pure subjectivity which is intrinsically real, and the reality that is *demanded* by objective idealities is in the end the intrinsic reality of subjectivity.

Idealities thus depending on subjectivity for their reality, which indeed they borrow from it, is not their so-called tertiariness. Those who hold that they are tertiary will not be content with what much we have said. They would go beyond it. They would hold that even as idealities these are as much constituted by subjectivity as they stand by themselves. This, however, is too much. They depend on subjectivity for their reality only.

Idealities necessarily *demand* reality, and it is this very demand that constitutes their *ideality*. From this point of view any ideality is a value, an *ought-to-be*. It not yet *is*, it only *demands* to be. It is unnecessary, therefore, to distinguish between ideality and value. Ought-to-be is not necessarily in the context of doing; what is in that context is ought-to-do which is not subsumed under ought-to-be. While the

reality that is claimed in ought-to-do is that of empiricals, the moral value being realised in the world of empiricals, the claimed reality in ought-to-be is above the empirical level. This second reality is ultimately that of pure subjectivity.

The distinguishment of pure subjectivity is thus at a grade higher than that at which objective idealities are distinguished. Whether there may be a grade higher still where this subjectivity, now at the relatively lower grade felt as still individual, will be distinguished as absolute is a very relevant problem for metaphysics. But there is no space in this essay for that discussion. The analysis of the absolute 'all', discussed earlier, would, if at all, lead to that highest standpoint.

Language, Logic and Fact

LOGICAL positivists and the philosophers of the School of Analysis reduce complicated propositions to some simple types and believe that the latter alone represent facts directly. This method, they claim, is justified by at least the principle of parsimony. Our task in this essay is to expose the defects of this method and follow this up by an outline of constructive metaphysics.

The first question we ask is whether the propositions embodying the views of these philosophers are themselves simple or reducible. As not immediately representing facts of sense they are not simple, and we do not see how possibly they can be reduced. As a matter of fact, the reduction has never been attempted. There are three other possible answers of which one has to be accepted. The propositions in question are either meaningless or tautologies or simple in another sense. Wittgenstein believes that they are meaningless; some other Analysts hold that they are tautologies; and according to older metaphysicians they are simple but representing facts of a different order.

Wittgenstein's answer is self-contradictory and reminds us of Bergson who having employed reason all through comes to the conclusion that the real is irrational. For Bergson there might still be a way of escape. He might hold that reason has only a provisional status and that, having provisionally proved the irrationality of the world, it tends to merge in the abyss of irrationality. But Wittgenstein cannot save himself that way. There is still some romance round the irrational. But the meaningless is worse than nothing.

The ultimate principles of Logical positivism are not also tautologies. No one feels them that way, not even the positivists themselves. The question is whether analysis is always equivalent to that which is analysed. When a complex proposition is analysed into simple ones, these together might in some way be treated as equivalent to the former. But the *analytic theory* of the positivist is not analysis of that sort. In the analysis of the former type there is replacement of a

bad language by a good one, but the analytical theory is no such replacement. (There is at most the replacement of a bad metaphysic by a good one.)

The analytical theory is a statement (or a body of statements) either about facts or about statements or about ways of stating. If about facts, it is either an immediate representation of facts, or a tautology or meaningless. We have seen it is neither meaningless nor a tautology. It follows that *so far* it is an immediate representation of facts.

The analytical theory is not also a statement about statement. If a statement is inevitably of a fact—directly or indirectly, rightly or falsely—a statement about this statement would only be a secondary statement of the same fact. But of what fact or facts might the analytical theory be a statement? If there is a statement like 'This flower is red' the statement about this statement would be like 'That this flower is red is true'. But the analytical theory is not a secondary statement that way.

May it not be—one might still ask—a tertiary statement about 'truth' itself? The idea is this :

If the secondary statement 'That this flower is red is true' is about 'This flower is red', the analytical theory is a statement about 'That this flower is red is true'. As so about the secondary statement, it deals proximately with the 'truth' itself and is only ultimately about 'This flower is red', through the intermediate stage of being about 'That this flower is red is true'.

But this interpretation is faulty. In 'That this flower is red is true' one is still occupied vitally with the fact represented by the proposition 'This flower is red', not with *truth*. When, on the other hand, one concentrates on the predicate 'truth' of the secondary proposition there is an immediately felt detachment from the particular content. The secondary proposition is but the primary itself made reflective and, therefore, in a sense tautologous. But the so-called tertiary one, unless it be the secondary one repeated in a useless manner[1] like " 'That this flower is red is true' is true",

[1] The repetition is useless in the sense that it can be multiplied *ad infinitum* without adding an iota of novelty, whether subjective or objective. The secondary statement was at least subjectively novel, but the tertiary and all later ones have not even that much of novelty.

is no tertiary statement, in the sense of being a more delayed one, about the old primary content 'This flower is red'. The concentration on *truth* is not useless that way. Not merely earlier metaphysicians, even Logical positivists and Analysts are serious with *truth*,[2] though in their own way. It would be of no avail, therefore, to contend that the analytical theory is a tertiary statement. It is not tertiary in the sense of being an extension of the secondary. If, then, a statement about *truth* is not useless, this *truth* itself would be a datum—a fact—though unlike any that the Logical positivist is prepared to admit.

The Analyst has treated universals also in the same slipshod manner. Consider the propositions—(1) This (flower), (2) This is flower, and (3) Flower is a class such that . . . . The first represents a fact directly. Whether the second is a mere repetition or not of the first depends on whether or not the predicate 'flower' means anything over and above the given particular; and so long as these two propositions (1) and (2) alone are concerned there is no decision. The predicate appears indeed to mean something additional, but as the proposition (2) is reducible to (1)—the apparent novelty being ascribable to mere linguistic manipulation—one might, on the logic of parsimony, conclude that the novelty is nothing that is *meant*. But the third proposition is not so reducible. One is here definitely speaking about a universal. The universal is so far meant as a fact. Whether it is actually a fact or not is another question with which the Logical positivist is not concerned. Fact, with him, is what is meant: he is not concerned with the ordinary problem of error. When he denies the facthood of the universal his idea is that it is never even meant. This is a sort of *a priori* condemnation of the universal, following from an analysis of language. We conclude that such *a priori* condemnation is hasty. The universal, as is evident in the third proposition above, is at least meant and is, so far, a fact.[3] So is the case with *truth* or the universal called *fact*, *reality*, *object*, *etc.*

[2] The concepts of *fact, reality, object, etc.*, are only variants or correlates of the concept of *truth*.

[3] Wisdom, Ramsey and even Russell were fully aware of this difficulty and tried in various ways to reconcile this with their atomism. We have no space here to examine their views in detail.

Once the universal flower is taken as a fact, the proposition (2) above needs a new interpretation. It may now be said that the predicate *flower* in that proposition means a universal, though not one apprehended as dissociate. The universal that is meant is meant as yet fused, in whatever way, with the particular given. The exact character of the universal and its fusion with particulars is a genuine problem with metaphysicians. It may be said that in 'This (flower)' the universal remains wholly fused with the given; in 'This is flower' it stands only half dissociated and, therefore, still in a form of fusion; and in 'The universal flower is such that . . . . . .' it is meant in its dissociation. The propositions 'S is P' and 'That S is P is true' ought similarly to be reinterpreted in the light of a proposition like 'Truth is such that . . . . . . ' In the proposition 'Truth is such that . . . . . . ' truth is meant as a distinct fact; in 'That S is P is true' it is half distinguished and yet fused with 'S is P'; and in 'S is P' it stands wholly fused and, therefore, as yet undistinguished.

The *analytical theory* as a statement about truth, fact or reality is thus meaningful, and we have seen that it means a new fact. How would the Logical positivist react to this? He might still contend, as suggested above, that it is only a statement about a *way of stating*. But if the older metaphysicians had a way of stating and the Logical positivist another, what evidence is there—we ask—that the latter is tenable and the former not? Two kinds of evidence might be offered—formal and material. The Logical positivist claims he has offered both: his way of stating is not merely more parsimonious, the simple propositions to which he reduces complicated ones directly represent facts. But the material evidence adduced is obviously dogmatic. We have just shown how there may be other types of fact, *viz.* the universal, truth, *etc.* If that is not convincing enough, there are other considerations. Does the conclusion of an *inference* mean a fact or not? And if so, how? That it means one goes without saying. The Analyst would attempt reducing this conclusion-proposition to simple ones by means of his new logic. He would say that the proposition in question is of the form 'If X and Y then Z', where X and Y are either themselves simple propositions or reducible to simple ones. But, we reply, the conclusion of an

inference is not of the form 'if—then'. At least one of the propositions in the antecedent clause is, in actual inference, a categorical proposition. The portion 'If X and Y' is, in actual inference, to be understood as 'If X, and Y', not 'If X and if Y', nor 'If X-and-Y'.

A word about Russell's *logical construction* would not be out of place here. Russell's 'knowledge about' is often a categorical statement, though indirect. He only means that such statements are to be reduced to and, therefore, demonstrated as logically constructed out of simple propositions. Are conclusion-propositions to be understood that way? Russell says that the proposition 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is in the last analysis knowledge about some particulars in the past, called Caesar, Rubicon and crossing, of which particular things in the past there was some knowledge by acquaintance. Is the conclusion-proposition to be understood this way as knowledge about a past, future or distant particular or particulars ?

Such interpretation would be faulty for many reasons. Logical construction is involved, according to Russell, as much in these cases of 'knowledge about' as in our knowledge of anything other than sense-data. Things and facts like *this flower is red* are, in his opinion, logically constructed, which means that logical construction here is not of the same sort as one involved in the knowledge of the past, future and distant. There are indeed men who regard anything that is not known by acquaintance as inferred. We have no quarrel over terminology. We only like to point out that then all inferences are not of the same type. The conclusion-proposition does not mean the facts represented by the premise-propositions, and yet it means something. It cannot be said that what is meant here is just the *following* of the conclusion-proposition (or the corresponding fact) from the premise-propositions (or the corresponding facts), nor even the former-as-following. A proposition which could mean this last would only be a secondary proposition about the conclusion-proposition. When, therefore, the conclusion of an inference means a fact it is neither known by acquaintance nor a logical construct in the accepted sense of the term.

This is true as much of inference as of any other kind of indirect knowledge, *viz.* memory and knowledge through testimony. Propositions like 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' represent facts known either by memory or by inference or through testimony. Russell's attempt to reduce it to certain simple propositions would be like arguing in a circle. For, what evidence is there that there was a person called Caesar, a river called Rubicon, *etc.*? These *were* undoubtedly known by acquaintance; but how does Russell now know that they were once so known? He either remembers this or infers this or knows it through testimony. Even if we do not deny that genuine facts are necessarily to be known by acquaintance, we refuse to admit that all of them are so known by me and now. If they are so known by others or by me at other times, we cannot hold that their factuality is certified by acquaintance. That they were once known by acquaintance is irrelevant in the present context, as much as the Berkeleyan doctrine '*esse est percipi*'. Their factuality is certified by the fact that they are now remembered, inferred or known through testimony. The basic doctrine of the Analyst that acquaintance alone is the certificate of fact thus falls through.

There is thus no material evidence for the Analyst to prove that *their* simple propositions alone should represent facts. Can they bring in any formal evidence? They claim that their principle of parsimony is one such.

Without questioning for the present the exact scope of that principle we may yet point out that if by 'simple proposition' they mean one which cannot be reduced, then even memory-propositions, conclusion-propositions, *etc.* have to be taken as simple. Reduction must be wholesale or it is no reduction at all. Partial reduction always leaves a surd unreduced, and that surd at least has to be taken as simple; and, further, as the complex proposition here is not the surd *plus* the so-called simple constituents discovered, but as rather that surd has lent a unique colour to the entire complex proposition, partial reduction is of little value, except as a not ingenuine hope that one day the surd will be reduced. In the meantime, however, we have to put up with the surd.

Not that the analytical method of reduction is still good as an *ideal*. It is not binding on us that we should always attempt this type of reduction. The reduction that the science and philosophy of all ages have accepted as an ideal method is one of subsuming diverse particulars under a general rule and diverse rules under one that is still more general, and so on. The analytic reduction, on the other hand, proceeds the other way about. It always attempts reduction to the lowest particulars.

The Analyst might reply that fact-seeking is as much an ideal as conceptual colligation and that his method of reduction is only a way of seeking facts. We rejoin, however, that there is no *way* of seeking facts. Facts are given, and though we may like to have facts there is no *method* about that, no logic of fact-seeking. We may prepare ourselves in a way for correct appraisal of facts, as in experiment. But for all that facts are facts, and they *are* exactly so far as they are not due to our seeking. There is no *a priori* necessity that a complex appearance is to be reduced to simple constituents. The necessity of such reduction is felt only when we fail to manage a complex appearance, as in error. In other cases facts cannot be shaven off by Occam's razor. The principle of parsimony has nothing to do with facts. It is applicable only to hypotheses. Where only of two *hypotheses* one is more complex than another the latter is to be chosen. The Analyst does not know the exact scope of the principle of parsimony.

We have shown that over and above sensible facts there are also facts like universals, truth, *etc.* The most important distinction between the two types of fact is that while one is sensible the other is not. The latter may be called intelligible, as distinct from sensible. The intelligible is not, however, the inferrible. Whatever is inferred is also sensible. That alone can be inferred which or the like of which was once sensed as associated with a mark sensed. The second type of facts or their like were not, on the other hand, sensed. The *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa-anumāna* of Indian logicians will be of little help here. Whatever is inferred in that way is inferred as *temporally* connected with sensed facts, as either prior or posterior to these or as the *temporally* abiding substratum of which the sensed facts in question are accidents. But the

intelligible is neither a cause nor an effect nor temporally abiding. It is not, as sometimes understood, a material cause. It is only the logical presupposition, an essence. If it is eternal it is so in the sense of being non-temporal, not 'in all times'.

The universal and truth are not inferred like the fire on a hill. We are somehow immediately aware of them. This does not mean that we perceive them through the sense. Through sense we perceive only sensible facts. If they already involve essences these also are, it is true, perceived in the same act; but they are not perceived as in themselves, as distinguished self-contained entities. In that act they are perceived as only undistinguishedly fused with sensible facts—may be through complicated relations like *saṁyuktasamavāya*, *saṁyuktamavetasasamavāya*, *etc.* In themselves they are intuited in an altogether different act.

In themselves they are intuited through the use of language. When we perceive *this* (*flower*) we *may* speak out our knowledge, but we need not; and even when it is spoken out we feel that the knowledge as such had no need of the language. But essences cannot be known except as spoken. The universal flower cannot be known as even half distinct unless through the judgment 'This is flower', and the fully distinct universal is known only through the judgment 'The universal flower is such that . . . . .' The very intuition of these essences is linguistic. Language, in these cases, is necessary not merely as a certificate for the facthood of the essence, as senses are in the case of sensible facts; it enters into their very nature. The language used may not be obvert, but it is language still. What is called *thought* is only a subtle form of speech.

That language *constitutes* essences can be proved in two successive steps: (1) thought constitutes essences, and (2) thought is subtle speech. That an essence is constituted, to whatever extent, by thought follows from the fact that *as essence* it was not perceived before, even though it *was* there. As not my creation it was assuredly there before I intuited it, and yet it was not then intuited as essence. If so, there was either a defect on my part or some intermediate obstruction or some defect in the essence itself. *Prima facie* there was no intermediate obstruction. To postulate one, like *ajñāna*, would

be unnecessary till we have tested other explanations. There was, again, no specifiable defect on my side, and to postulate one would be equally unnecessary till one other explanation is tested. It cannot be argued that the defect on my side was that at that time I had not the requisite type of intuition. For, when there is no obstructing medium, no defect on the object side and none about the organ of intuition I am bound to intuit, if only I like. It cannot also be said that I had then no *capacity* for that intuition. That would mean either that the capacity is produced for the first time through a sort of training, or that a dormant capacity is awakened through the training; but in either case there would be difficulty. The very concept of capacity precludes the possibility of its *birth*—the capacity for X is but X as dormant; and *awakenment of dormant capacity* is a phrase without meaning. A capacity is always a dormant state, there is no conceivable second dormancy of capacity—a sleeping man has no second sleep. It follows that there was no defect on my side. In the absence of obstructing medium and defect on my side, only one other alternative is left, *viz.* that there was some defect in the essence itself; and this is no unintelligible hypothesis. It means that the essence had formerly remained undistinguishedly fused with sensible facts and that now it stands distinguished. It follows that an essence as essence is but the essence-as-distinguished. To distinguish it is only another name for 'to intuit it', so that thought which intuits it has entered into its body.

True, thought does not constitute it wholly. I never feel that thought has *created* it: it demands an existence of its own. Kant understood this demand as never to be fulfilled and, therefore, a dialectical illusion. But illusion or not, there is no gainsaying the demand. The demand, also, can conceivably be realised in two alternative ways. We may try elimination of subjective thought and gain approach to the essence by practising self-surrender; or we may turn inward to discover the last being of the essence in the self itself. In either case essence and existence would be identified, and the existence so reached would be truly metaphysical; the lower existences, down to that of the sensible, would only be symbolisations of that highest existence. A third way has sometimes been suggested. It is the way of discovering a universal

self within me or actually universalising the individual me. But this third is scarcely more than an extension of the second method.

We have shown how thought constitutes essences. We have now to show that thought is implicit speech. Normally in philosophy, as in common parlance, this is taken for granted. When sometimes philosophers deny it they do it on two grounds. They find that the actual words used in language are empirically derived and not, therefore, parts of thought, thought so far being a process that only *employs* language, not itself subtle speech. The other ground they rely on is that language often oversteps thought.

Let us examine the grounds. Empirical words, borrowed from outside, may have been *employed* by thought, though even there the process of borrowing and employment is already mysterious. Whatever that may be, there are also many words—and by themselves they form a self-enclosed system—which are neither wholly borrowed nor employed. They are grammatical or logical words representing *a priori* classes of sensible facts and *a priori* syntactical relations. The actual *names* of these classes and relations are indeed empirical, in the sense of being conventions that vary from one empirical language to another. But underneath those empirical names there are pure words which coincide with pure thought, as being its very forms. These pure words, though always clad in empirical conventions, are the different *a priori* forms of semantic and syntactical aspects of language, studied in their purity in logic which is universal grammar. These words, therefore, are not employed after being borrowed from outside: they form the very life of language. As such they are as much subjective, in being forms of pure speech, as objective in being pure essences, and we have already seen how these subjective and objective characters of essences are related to each other.

Many modern philosophers and linguists deny that there is anything like universal language. But this denial is self-defeating. One who speaks out this denial, say, in English, wishes at the same time to be understood by others who do not know English, and this implies that he believes in a common language for all. This is not, again, a mere faith, never to be

actualised. As a matter of fact, he can learn other peoples' languages, and this would not have been possible except through a common language. Some primitive languages may lack some pure forms, but the very assertion of this lack points to a universal language. Some advanced languages, again, may have put in some newer forms; but this is due, as will be shortly seen, to a peculiar freedom of language. That people speaking different languages understand one another is a proof positive for the universal language.

Logic is a study of some forms of this pure language. We deliberately say '*some* forms', because it will be shown immediately that there are some other forms which logic cannot recognise. We have seen that the forms of language are as much forms of speaking as objective essences, and we have also seen that the essences are the essences of sensible facts. Logic studies those forms which as essences are in this way connected with sensible facts. Aristotle might have missed, or deliberately ignored, some of these forms, and modern logicians may have rightly included them. But they cannot say they are not studying essences *of sensible facts.* Their generalised logic is not generalised enough. There are limits within which the generalisation operates, and the limits are determined ultimately in deference to sensible facts, otherwise called 'actuality'. Language in its freedom may overstep this limit. The sentence 'S is not S', for example, is grammatically all right, though even the most generalised logic would spurn it as even formally absurd. A less shocking, but never logically interpretable, sentence is 'A is identical with itself' or 'A has its identity', the identity of a thing being never logically distinguishable from the thing and usable as its predicate. It is language as free that can go beyond even the limits of logic. Logic is still an anticipation of reality[4] —inductive logic through empirical universals and formal logic through pure essences. But language in its freedom need not so anticipate.

Language thus enters into the body of essences, and yet it need not anticipate sensible facts. We have also seen that

[4] In formal logic the anticipation is not conscious. When forms consciously anticipate sensible facts the study of these forms as so consciously anticipating would be what it called *transcendental logic.*

sensible facts themselves are not constituted by language, though as involving essences they ought to have been so regarded. This makes relevant the problem as to the metaphysical status of language. As constituting essences it is not a mere instrument as the Logical positivist would like. Yet as not constituting sensible facts it appears to have no metaphysical import. As mere instrument of philosophy and science, again, it cannot be used in any way one likes. The use, we have seen, is determined in whatever way by the anticipation of sensible facts. The function of language is thus intriguing enough. The solution that we only suggest here is (1) that though thought as subtle speech is the highest that philosophy can attain, yet as speaking consciousness it puts in a demand for mere consciousness which is behind even thought as subtle speech, (2) that this demand for mere consciousness may or may not be realised, (3) that speech or *logos*, though it is felt as speaking consciousness, puts in another demand, in another direction, for another principle in association with which mere consciousness has become speaking consciousness, and which in association with mere consciousness has become conscious speech, (4) that the demand for this other principle may or may not be realised, (5) that as pure object this other principle, if at all realisable, can be realised through the self-annihilation of consciousness, (6) that if not realisable, it is only an indefinite fringe round mere consciousness, a fringe which has to be understood in terms of mere consciousness only, understood, that is to say, as either a function of mere consciousness or just its negation, (7) that pure essences are but forms of conscious speech, and the forms of speaking consciousness are the forms of subjective thinking, (8) that none of the facts mentioned till now are sensible facts, otherwise called natural (even mental facts are natural and sensible), (9) that the forms of conscious speech and speaking consciousness are essences of sensible facts, and yet some of them may not be such essences, being due to the freedom of speech, already mentioned, and therefore serving as a warning to those who in philosophy depend too much on language, (10) that empirical universals, though citizens of the ideal world, belong equally to the natural world of sensible facts, (11) that space, time and probably also number are equally

amphibious, (12) that these amphibious entities are the points of contact between the ideal and the natural worlds, (13) that though sensibility is a criterion for naturalness, the characteristic of the natural is that it is *actual*, actuality being no category, but just the stamp of the natural, and lastly (14) that the actual is as much a self-complete world having for its organising principles the *actual* space, time, number and the empirical universals, as the ideal world of essences straight up to the *logos*; and pure consciousness that transcends even *logos* is in its turn a wholly indescribable, but quite feelable, self-complete demand.

As the actual world which is natural and sensible is self-complete, positivism is fundamentally a correct doctrine. But, historically, the positivist has blundered in two ways. (1) He has not seen that a philosophy of the ideal world is equally possible, and (2) language, for him, has usurped the function of space, time, number and empirical universals. Sense-data alone do not constitute the actual world. Discrete sense-data are made into a continuous world through space, time, number and empirical universals, and probably also through the empirical unity of self so far as the natural psychical world is concerned. The right task of the positivist ought to have been to translate all philosophy into the language of sense-data *and* these principles, not to separate language-forms from sense-data and dismiss them as no facts. The worst part of it is that he could not keep away from all language-forms. His simple facts are yet in the form of a proposition like 'This *is* flower', 'This flower *is* red', *etc.* Are not these propositions already functions of language? Even simple categorical propositions are more than barely sensible facts—the copula 'is' standing not merely for the sensible relation between the sensible facts that correspond to the subject and the predicate, but being also a descriptive tie. The *actual* relation meant by it is a relation by means of space, time, number, empirical universals, *etc.* The *kṣaṇikatvavādi* Buddhists, including the earlier Vaibhāṣikas who admitted *ākāśa*, *pratisaṅkhyānirodha* and *apratisaṅkhyānirodha*, and probably also Hume and Mill with their principle of association, were more consistent than modern positivists and Analysts.

If positivism is one-sided, equally so is the case with modern Phenomenology. Aware of the limitation of naturalism it has indeed discovered the world of essences. But like Kant in the First Critique the Phenomenologist has treated them as mere *presuppositions*, not as existent facts (though of a different order). To start with, they as not natural do not indeed appear as *actual* facts. But the essences discovered continuously put forth a *demand*, not yet a realised one, for existence; and we have seen how when the phenomenological voyage is complete we discover also ways to realising the demand.

Objective Attitude and Idealism Proper

I

THE attitude of the unsophisticated mind is predominantly objective. It equates reality with the objective world and treats the knowing subject—and therefore also the subject that feels and wills—as only a dignified member of this world. The subjects *you* and *he* are clearly objective. The one designated *I* should also be no exception, it being one of the *you's* and *he's*.

Not that there is nothing novel about the subject and its relation to the world. But that is only the halo of dignity, and commonsense is seldom serious about it. There is thus no question of idealism at the beginning.

We do not start with what is often called 'experience', as opposed to 'object'. This *experience* is either a hyphenation of subject and object or some homogeneous unity of these. Had we started with the hyphenated object there could never be a judgment like 'The table is brown'; all that we could say is 'The table-as-perceived is brown'. There is equally no start with the homogeneity. Some distinction of the subjective and the objective sides is evident from the beginning. There is no denying the subjective halo we spoke of; the very word 'experience', or any synonym of it, betrays this. That the object also is, to whatever extent, distinguished is not merely evident, this can also be inferred from the behaviour of those who have that *experience*.

We may have started in the objective attitude. But may not this attitude be wrong? Have not philosophers offered arguments for idealism? These arguments should be carefully examined.

Some prefer idealism on the ground of economy. It is better, they say, to have one class of entities, *viz.*, the subjective, than two. But, first, economy is a criterion where only rival *theories* stand against one another. But the objectivity of the world is not a theory; it is an undisputable datum, at least to one of the contending parties. Secondly, granting

the criterion of economy, why prefer subjectivity to object? Why not, again, prefer absolute or neutral entities? Thirdly, is not subjectivity itself a kind of object? Idealism, from this last point of view, would only be a special theory of realism. But there, again, the question might be asked—Why prefer the subjective object to other objects?

Idealists as a rule prefer subjectivity because to them it is more clear and more real than objects. But, first, they have never clarified the notion of clarity, and, secondly, there is no reason why objects should be less real. Some objects no doubt turn out false, but that does not touch the general reliability of objects. At the most it can be said that when a perceptual object is found false *it* has to be dismissed. Rejection, final or provisional, of *all* objects does not follow immediately.

Is there any guarantee, again, that the subjective side also can never be false? Falsity here does not mean invalidity, it means that the subjective side did not really occur, that it only appeared to occur. May there not be false subjectivity in this sense? There may be, and for the following reason:

A subjective affair, let us call it cognition, does not really occur if it does not reveal a real object. A false object is no real object. Hence the so-called cognition of that false object did not really occur. So long indeed as its falsity was not detected, the cognition was taken as having really occurred, but when the object is found unreal, we are compelled to say that it did not really occur. The non-occurrence is not unintelligible: it cannot be said that as before the object was found false the cognition was apprehended it must have occurred. For everywhere, as much with regard to subjectivity as with objects, the false which was taken as a real event till the falsity was discovered, comes now, with that discovery, to be regarded as what was only an apparent occurrent, not real. Like the false object, the false cognition also is thus only an apparent occurrent. In the objective attitude apparent occurrence is as much a form of objectivity as real occurrence. It cannot, in this attitude, mean the mere situation that *I was aware of something though that something was not real.* Initial egocentricity is as much banned here as with regard to real objects.

It cannot be objected that as the cognition of this false cognition has to be similarly treated, there would be indefinite regress. No cognition is revealed by another cognition. It is only *enjoyed*, reflectively or unreflectively. The exact nature of this enjoyment will be seen later. This enjoyment does not clash with the objectivity of that cognition. The objectivity of an object X is not the fact of its being revealed by a cognition. It only means that X is not made of the stuff of which the halo round what we called subjectivity (a type of object) is made. True, the word 'object' in common and philosophical discourse means that which is revealed by or stands in a particular relation with the cognition of it. But this is not the sense in which the word is used in this essay.

The first premise of our argument for a cognition being false, *viz.* that a cognition does not really occur if it does not reveal a real object, is not untenable. A cognition, of its own nature, asserts its object and this assertion is nothing but positing the object as real. The object may later be found false, but this is not incompatible with the first assertion which is of the very nature of cognition. Not that as not cognition it continues to be regarded as having been some non-cognitive mental affair. That would be meaningless. A subjective occurrent which refers of itself to an object—real or unreal—cannot but be cognition. Hence if it ceases to be cognition, it would cease to be a subjective affair at all.

The popular argument for idealism that as light rays take time to reach our eyes what we feel we see now may have in the meantime disappeared is of no avail. It may have disappeared, but there is no denying the fact that it *was* a real object. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities also does not lead to idealism. If valid, it only proves that primary qualities are only the structural essence of the secondary, not that the latter, relatively to the former, are subjective. Arguments from invalid perception are also abortive. As already shown, in the objective attitude apparent objectivity is as genuine as real objectivity. There is no reason immediately why the false should be subjective.

Some idealists are conscious that subjectivity, as opposed to object, is not more real. They even go further. They insist on the peculiarity of subjectivity and refuse to regard it

as a form of object. They unambiguously declare that as so understood, subjectivity is neither real nor unreal, objects alone having a monopoly over reality. Yet they propose reduction of object to it under the idea that some *ontological* economy is gained thereby. Neither-real-nor-unreal is, according to them, a simpler ontological status than reality or unreality.

But there are two points against this reduction. First, neither-reality-nor-unreality is no status at all. It is no more than privation. (To give a positive name, such as subsistence or the like, to it would not improve the position. A mere name cannot grant privation an ontological status.) To reduce reality to privation is no healthy procedure, there being no intelligible motive for this. Secondly, granting it a status, there is no reason to prefer subjectivity to *objective essences* which also, as will be seen later, are neither real nor unreal.

Some, again, believe that there is an immediate assurance of the reality of the subjective, at least in feeling and will. They are so enamoured of this immediate assurance that they would even regard the reality of objects as only borrowed from here.

But with which kind of subjectivity are these philosophers concerned? Objective subjectivity or subjectivity viewed in its peculiarity? If the former, there is no assurance, as we have seen, that it is more real than other objects, not to speak of its being the only reality. If the latter, we cannot, starting in the objective attitude, take it as real. Like the philosophers just dismissed we should say that it is neither real nor unreal—a mere transcendental presupposition.

It is said that in choice and decision we are immediately assured of the reality of subjectivity proper. The chosen thing is real, we are told, because of its feeling-*cum*-will relation to the subject, and from this it is only a step that feelings and wills alone are intrinsically real.

But objects are not real *because of* the feeling-*cum*-will relation. Certain values which objects may have may be entirely due to feelings. But the value of an object is not its reality. Such values are no more than the phenomenon that the objects already real arouse these feelings. It cannot be urged that the reality of an object is just its capacity, a character

in it, to arouse one or other of these feelings. For, then, the feelings themselves would not be real—they in their turn do not arouse feelings. Nor can it be said that if objects are real because they arouse feelings, these feelings must be intrinsically real. This would beg the question. Arousing a feeling could at all be a criterion of reality if only the feeling itself were somehow already apprehended as real. But whether it is so apprehended is just the question.

If feeling is not intrinsically real, will also could fare no better. Whatever we have said of feeling applies equally to it. There is one character, however, of will which may have misled these thinkers. Will, it is said, confers reality on what is made. It is undoubtedly a fact that I will a thing into existence. But this only means that a thing made has for one of its causes the will in question. As will is not the only cause there is no evidence so far that reality has passed from *it* to the thing. Rather, as will combines elements, already existent, into a new whole, the reality of the whole might be coming from those elements. All existent things, again, have not will as a cause; only things which are made have it. The question whether things already existent depend on Divine Will is here irrelevant.

Sometimes it is said that before a thing is willed into existence it remained a possibility, and will turned it into actuality. This may be true of *pure* will, if there is one. Whether there is such pure will or not will be seen in Sec. III. But it is too early now to apply this doctrine to empirical making by will. Even supposing that the thing to be made was an objective possibility, not an idea in the mind, what empirical will does is only to drag it down to the world which already exists, so that the possibility becomes actual by only coming into contact with that actual world. Empirical will does not confer reality on it.

Thus there is no intellectual justification of Humanism. There is a possibility, however, that this Humanism is fundamentally a challenge to all cognitive philosophy. But with that aspect of the problem we are not concerned in this essay.

II

Philosophy starts in the objective attitude. Objects alone are real, and subjectivity, in spite of some vague novelty about

it, is only a type of object so far. The task of philosophy is to offer a satisfactory account of this objective world. If idealism comes it will come in the sequel.

The methods of philosophy, like those of sciences, are (1) unreflective acceptance and (2) reflective understanding. Unreflective acceptance includes sense-intuition and associational passage—as much anticipative as retrospective—from an object actually sensed to another sensible. As such, this association—we may call it *imagination*—includes memory and all material inference. Reflection is another method which deals with the objects of unreflective acceptance in a new way. By 'reflection' we do not mean self-consciousness in the ordinary sense of the term, the awareness, *viz.* of mental states only, the awareness of the form 'I have such and such states'. We mean by it what is called *understanding* the objects of acceptance. It may be called *analysis* or *inference*, as the case may be. But there should be a proper safeguard in terminology. There is a type of analysis where the items discovered by the analysis can be spoken of as having been also accepted. (The word 'acceptance' will from now mean the method of unreflective acceptance.) This is not the analysis we have in view. Analysis as understanding reveals those items which are noticed in reflection only and cease to be noticed when we fall back into the attitude of unreflective acceptance. Such, for example, are all explanatory principles—the constitutive essences—discovered in science and philosophy. The other type of analysis is only a way of description where there is no question of knowing anything which was not known before; it is reflective in the simple sense in which all perceptual judgment is reflective—revealing nothing new, but re-stating in a new manner the knowledge already gained. Such restatement is the pre-requisite of all reflection. Reflective understanding goes beyond it.

The word 'inference' also is ambiguous. At the level of acceptance it is only associational passage, but from the point of view of reflective understanding it is the *logical* connecting of one object with another and as such discovering the *logical structure* of the things of acceptance. This is more than what is done in perceptual judgment where logical

relations are viewed as wholly parasitical to the data of acceptance and never treated as in themselves. Logical inference, on the other hand, proceeds on these relations themselves. Here the data of acceptance are rather adjectival to the relations.

Reflective understanding is roughly the method of hypothesis. In order to understand an objective situation of acceptance we first postulate the principle that would explain it and then confirm it by deduction, and if the confirmation fails, or if sometimes the principle comes to be confuted, we again postulate another principle and proceed deductively. The postulation of the principle is our *reflective analysis*, and the deduction that follows is the *reflective inference*.

But reflective understanding is only *roughly* the method of hypothesis. The postulational side of hypothesis has often been understood in a dead mechanical manner, as a mere symbol or formula. It has been said that anything, *x* or *y* or *z*, is a good hypothesis if only the situation to be understood follows deductively from it, there being nothing intrinsic in it that would determine its tenability. But no dead symbol or formula, however much it deductively leads to the given situation, can claim reality. It is no more than a word, and no mere word is real either in itself or in whatever collaboration with the given situation as real. Even the coherence of one such mechanical postulate with another will not add reality. For this another is also empty. A commonwealth of ghosts cannot pass for a man. The principles postulated by our reflective analysis, on the other hand, are *living*. They are discovered as genuine objective entities, they *flash* with a *claim to reality*. They are, in short, genuine objective *possibilities*. It is not denied that there may be erroneous flashes, much as there are errors in acceptance. But, as in the field of acceptance, when one flash is found erroneous there must be another to replace it.

Reflective analysis discovers constitutive essences. This is the business of every living hypothesis. Sometimes in hypothesis we may seek the *particular* cause of a given phenomenon. But even there what is sought is the essential cause, not a determinate individual phenomenon to be connected with the given. There we do not merely conclude that *this smoke* is caused by *this fire*, but we conclude that all smokes *qua*

smoke are caused by all fires *qua* fire. Between *all fires* and *all smokes* there is no temporal relation of priority and posteriority. It follows that the central postulation here is of an essential relation between two essences, *viz.* fire-essence and smoke-essence.

Reflective analysis thus discovers constitutive essences and their relations. When the fire-essence and the smoke-essence are under consideration the relation between them is essential causality. But other essences may have other essential relations. The essence of a thing of acceptance may be called *empirical essence.* Science is confined to empirical essences in essential relations. (We exclude mathematics the peculiar status of which need not be studied in this essay.) Philosophy goes beyond that. It concentrates on these essential relations and studies these by themselves. True, modern science also studies these relations, but it considers these as *relations* and, therefore, as parasitical to empirical essences. Philosophy proposes to study these in isolation, as autonomous entities. If science, at the first grade of reflection, discovers empirical essences in essential relations, philosophy at the next grade discovers these relations in isolation, as entities by themselves.

This would follow from a not illegitimate extension of the relation between essences and objects of acceptance. If reflective analysis discovers *constitutive* essences and if at the same time no item discovered in such analysis is also an object of acceptance, it must be said that in the world of acceptance these essences were present, not as essences, but in another form. They were here as generic images or schemata. A constitutive essence is not merely not archetypal, remaining at a distance from that of which it is the structure; even as immanent in it, it remains in the latter in another form, *i.e.*, as not distinguished in itself; it remains there as wholly parasitical, reflection alone distinguishing it as in itself. Philosophic entities were similarly found at the level of science in the form of *relations.*

Essence, we have said, is only a possibility—not yet real, but only claiming reality. This has to be explained.

Essence is not real, because nothing that is distinguishable in itself and yet real constitutes another reality can be

real. Real wood constitutes a chair, but that wood is never distinguishable in itself: it is always a wooden thing—a log or a plank—which is equally constituted of wood. Real threads, again, constitute a real cloth; but they constitute it only so far as they are *parts* of the cloth. As separated from the cloth they are no parts, they are only threads—as absolute as the cloth. A real quality, again, constitutes a real substance, but no quality is distinguishable in itself except in name. Essences, however, even as essences, constitute things of acceptance which are real. Hence they themselves cannot be real.

They are not real for the following further reason:

Nothing that cannot be taken as having been real before its discovery is truly real. Essences are not real, because once discovered, they cannot be taken as having been real before their discovery. Were they real, there is no reason why they could not be noticed before. There was no obstructing medium; to postulate one immediately would be *ad hoc*. There was also no defect on my side. It cannot be said that the defect is that I did not notice them. This would beg the question. Nor can it be said that my noticing capacity was then dormant. For, as *capacity* is already a latent phenomenon, to regard it as having been dormant would involve double latency, which is unintelligible. But if they were not real, it may be argued, how is it that I do not feel they are created for the first time by reflective understanding? We reply, they were there, but before they were discovered they were not there *as essence*. If all non-noticing is due to a defect there must have been a defect here also; but that defect was lying in the *object*—the essences were not as they ought to have been, which means that *as essences* they were not real. They were there in another form. By 'Essences are not real' we mean that they *as essences* are not real.

At the same time they cannot be called unreal also. For after all we discover *them* through reflective analysis, and they are discovered even as constitutive. They are not also felt as created for the first time by reflective analysis. Not merely not felt, were they so created they could scarcely be distinguished from dead mechanical postulates which are

no more than conceptual constructs. Nor can it be said that they are genuine and yet constructed. No object felt as genuine from a certain standpoint can, from that very standpoint, be also felt as constructed. If it is constructed, this has to be felt from a higher standpoint which we have not yet attained. A genuine object can at most be felt as yet hanging on to subjectivity, such 'hanging on' affecting in no way its genuine objectivity. Essences, thus, are so far neither real nor unreal.

This is also evident from the status of every hypothesis. Were a hypothesis real, there would have been no need of confirming it again, and were it unreal, it could never be confirmed. A point requires special notice here. May it not be said that a hypothesis is only initially taken as real, much as an object of acceptance, and that, much as there, here also, this initial reality has to be confirmed (or rejected)? We reply, we do not deny the need of this type of confirmation (or rejection). But all that it does is to remove the possibility of *falsity*. The reality we are concerned with in this essay is not opposed to falsity. Falsity is no ontological status. It is a variant as much of accepted objectivity as of the essential one. The ontological dichotomy that we are concerned with is not between reality and falsity, it is between reality, on the one hand, and neither-reality-nor-unreality (but demanding reality), on the other—between *is* and *ought to be.*

Essence, thus, is neither real nor unreal. But neither-reality-nor-unreality, taken by itself, is total privation, and as such no conceivable object of enquiry. If it is no status at all, there is no intelligible motive for studying essences. As a matter of fact, however, they are studied, and even taken as constitutive. The only way to remove the anomaly is to understand this neither-reality-nor-unreality as not altogether privation, but a positive status, *viz. demanding reality.* It is the status of every ought-to-be which not yet *is.*

It appears as privation only so far as it is contrasted with things of acceptance; and this is why we ordinarily supplement postulation by deduction, by either connecting the essence with the real things of acceptance or building a system

of essences. But the essence as distinguished in itself need have no intrinsic reference to the world of acceptance. Ontologically it is free, and so the reality it claims cannot be that of the accepted world. Had it been so, there would be no distinction between a mechanical and a living hypothesis. A mechanical hypothesis is as much *made real* by deduction as a living one.

The reality it demands cannot also be attained by any relation, such as coherence, between essences. A relation between essences is itself an essence. One may, if one likes, call it reality-essence. But as belonging to the world of essences, it cannot be actual reality. It is only a working substitute, provided the reality demanded is not attained anywhere. Its asymptotic character betrays its shadowiness. Not that at the ideal limit it will be the actual reality. This is only a pious wish, allowable only if actual reality could nowhere be found. But, as will be seen in the next section, it is found.

III

We have maintained that essences demand an actual transcendent reality which is not the reality of the world of acceptance. Where is that reality to be found?

There is one thing which, it will be seen immediately, is above the world of acceptance and yet intrinsically real. It is subjectivity. Not indeed the subjectivity which we started with as an object among objects: that had no transcendent reality, that was real like any object of acceptance. It is the subjectivity which is discovered in reflective analysis as (provisionally) an essence. So understood, it is but pure consciousness. For nothing else is common to all that is subjective in the world we started with. If there is another common feature, *viz.* reality, it is common as much to subjective as to objective things of acceptance. With that we shall be concerned later.

To show now that pure consciousness is intrinsically real. We have seen that essences dealt with in Section II are not real because, once discovered, they are not felt as having been present as essences. But pure consciousness is not discovered

that way. Once discovered, it is felt as having been assuredly present as pure consciousness, even though it was also present in another form. The objects of acceptance corresponding to pure consciousness are the mental states. As contrasted with other objects of acceptance, these are accepted as *enjoyed*. This enjoyment is not the *knowledge* of those mental states. Between this reflective knowledge and the mere 'having the mental states'—if there is any such 'mere having'—there is, even at the level of acceptance, the stage of *enjoying* these. (If there be a stage of 'mere having', that is only a matter of inference.) This enjoyment is pure-consciousness-in-another-form. Those who would not admit pure consciousness are satisfied with this another form and regard mental states themselves as self-revealing. But pure consciousness has to be admitted even at the level of acceptance. For, mental states are even at this level felt as *mine*; there is a permanent self felt as incorporating these states. Were the states the whole story of accepted subjectivity, the feeling of 'I' as the permanent incorporator could not be accounted for; and, once it is admitted, the enjoyment of the states is no other than the incorporation of these by the enjoyed self. True, at the level of acceptance the enjoyed self was only a fringe round the mental states and the body as objects. Still, as at least a fringe it was there. Reflective understanding only separates it from the associated objects and posits it in a transcendent autonomous character. The fringe was not *another form* of this autonomous pure consciousness. It was the very same consciousness, only not explicitly grasped on account of the preponderating objective attitude directed to the body and the mental states. Yet in its character as pure consciousness, *i.e.*, as other than the body and these states—as incorporating these—it was grasped. Pure consciousness, once discovered by reflective understanding, is thus felt as having been present, even as pure consciousness, before it was discovered.

The permanent self enjoyed at the level of acceptance cannot be said to be itself not consciousness but a non-conscious substance having consciousness as an accidental character, accidental in the sense that it sometimes occurs and sometimes does not. As there is no self but as enjoyed, consciousness cannot be an accidental character of it. Nor is it a

necessary *character*. The self is felt as incorporating mental states, and it is consciousness that incorporates these, on account of which these states were enjoyed. As for the self itself, its enjoyment is no other than the fact that it is self-revealing. This last will be clear from what follows.

Essences, we have seen, are not real, because once discovered, they cannot be said to have been real before that discovery. An infallible criterion of this non-reality is that in any judgment about an essence the subject is not the essence by itself, but the essence-*as-discovered*. No thing of acceptance is judged that way. We say 'The table is brown', not 'The table-*as-known* is brown'. (Not that '*the* table' means the 'table as known'. In the objective attitude there is no room for egocentricity.) The criterion that the essence, in spite of our objective attitude, is to be judged egocentrically is that were it not so judged, it must be taken as having been real before discovery, which is wrong. We are not here moving in a circle in having taken egocentricity as the criterion of non-reality and non-reality as that of egocentricity. We are putting the same thing in different languages for the sake of elucidation.

Contrast now pure consciousness with these essences. Pure consciousness as such cannot hang on to the consciousness that discovers it, because there are no two consciousnesses here. What is discovered in reflective analysis is always numerically one. This numerical oneness of pure consciousness does away with the possibility of its being discovered by another consciousness. Those who believe that consciousness is discovered by another consciousness have not transcended the attitude of unreflective acceptance. They might call the second consciousness reflective, but that only in the sense that here the first consciousness has come to be known as a character of the objective self, called 'I'. But this is not reflection in our sense, that reflection which is a method of *understanding* objects of acceptance, whether mental or non-mental.

Reflective discovery of pure consciousness, is therefore, the same thing as this consciousness itself. Hence the discovery of other essences also means that they stand directly before this very pure consciousness. It thus reveals itself and other

essences, and incorporates mental states. As we have also seen, it, though an essence in the sense that it is above the objects of acceptance, is yet real.

It is to this reality that all essences lay claim. Not to any other transcendent reality, because we have not yet come across another transcendent reality, and also because essences hang on just to this pure consciousness. One may speak indeed of *reality* as the common feature of *all* objects of acceptance—mental or non-mental; but reflective analysis finds it, if at all, in pure consciousness which is as much above the non-mental objects as above the mental. It is useless, therefore, to look beyond pure consciousness. More so, because wherever it may be it has to be discovered by reflection as pure consciousness, which means that there is no going beyond pure consciousness so far.

It may be asked—how can there be reality in the world of essences? Does not reflective understanding separate only the *what* from the *that-what* complex of acceptance, relegating the *that* side to the dark unapproachable Indefinite? Is not the so-called reality, found as an inhabitant of the world of essences, only the reality-essence, not reality proper?

This, we reply, would have been a legitimate standpoint if only pure consciousness, as above the world of acceptance and discovered by reflective understanding, were not as a matter of fact found nevertheless real. This reality of pure consciousness is not reality-essence, but genuine transcendent reality. When once this is found, the common-sense notion of the accepted *that-what* complex has to be revised. In the world of acceptance there is no *that-what* complex in the sense of a unity of two clearly defined aspects. There is only the *object* from out of which reflective understanding distinguishes the *what*; and when it is distinguished, what is left over in the world of acceptance is not a bare 'that' but the very same *object* we started with. This object, from the point of view of the distinguishment, is only retrospectively—and through an unauthorised use of the language of thought—described as *that-what*. The essence 'what' could not have, as we have seen, remained there as the 'what', thereby necessitating the 'that' as what remained over. There is no need, therefore, of relegating the 'that' to the non-rational Indefinite. Hence

also there is nothing intrinsically absurd if one of the essences happens to be real. If the 'what' could be present in the object of acceptance in another form, this may be said equally of the 'that' which is discovered in one of the essences. It is quite in keeping with what we have said so far that the reality of pure consciousness remained in the object of acceptance in another form. In pure consciousness there is genuine reality; in essences it is present in the form of a *demand* and, therefore, half distinguished; and in objects of acceptance it is present as undistinguished.

This pure consciousness as genuinely real and the only transcendent reality is still *personal* consciousness, one that is represented by 'I'. One may, if he likes, stop here. With a firm footing on this personal pure consciousness he may seek re-orientation of the entire previous philosophy from this standpoint. He may from now view essences, and, therefore, also the things of acceptance, as somehow following from this self-revealing personal consciousness. This would be *solipsistic idealism.*

But pure consciousness is alternatively over-personal also. As pure it is the limit of the gradual freedom of consciousness from its associated adjuncts, and every limiting case is as much transcendent as belonging to the series of terms of which it is the limit. When, for example, a thing is continuously divided into parts and sub-parts, the ultimate part is as much a physical as a geometrical constituent. The breadthless line is as much a physical as a geometrical constituent of a surface, and the depthless surface, similarly, of a solid. The geometrical and the ultimate physical constituents coincide. The geometrical constituent as an ideal is not a mere concept, it is an ideal *object.* It is only because it has by some been taken as a mere concept that they think of solids and surfaces as divisible *ad infinitum.* If, however, the geometrical is an object, it is the objective ideal terminus of divisibility, which means that the transcendent geometrical is also the ultimate physical constituent. The transcendent and the physical thus *coincide*: as immanent the same geometrical constituent appears in *another form* as physical. Similarly with the 'first cause' as the limiting case of cause behind cause, and similarly also with the ideal pure consciousness as that of pure behind pure.

The purest consciousness as transcendent is over-personal, and the same consciousness as the ultimate term of the series is personal. Purification here means gradual depersonalisation, the underlying idea being that every associated adjunct of consciousness makes it more and more personal, the lowest limit being grossest selfishness. Purest consciousness *as in the series* retains the last vestige of personality, one that is already on the point of dissolution. To have it is also, rather alternatively, to have the over-personal consciousness, another name of which is God. This is *religious idealism.*

There is a third alternative also. Pure consciousness—whether personal or over-personal—is, we have seen, real. This may not be understood in the way we have interpreted it. It may mean that there is a transcendent *reality*—not reality-essence—(or, it may be the reality-essence which is also the genuine reality by itself) but that it has pure consciousness for its chosen abode. It is above pure consciousness—for, we have seen that it is as much the essence of accepted mental states as of other things of acceptance—but, as never possibly to be discovered except in pure consciousness, it only problematically transcends that. It has the freedom to transcend pure consciousness, but is not conceivable as ever exercising that freedom. It is ever with pure consciousness, though in itself it is more than that. It would be dogmatic to take its freedom as actualised, and equally dogmatic to equate this reality with the over-personal consciousness. It is neither a person nor God, but only *it*-as-either-a-person-or-God. Another name for this *it* is Absolute. This is *absolute idealism.*

Religious idealism and absolute idealism are in two alternative lines branching off from the point where personal pure consciousness is arrived at, and to arrive at this personal pure consciousness is, we have seen, a necessity of understanding. There is thus no escape from idealism in the end. The forms of idealism dismissed in Section I were immature. The idealist proper is no escapist. He meets hard objects in the face and discovers in the very bosom of objects idealistic nuances.

Thought and Its Validity

I

CONSTRUCTION AND REFERENCE TO DATA

EXCEPT IN bare acquaintance of the given, my knowledge of the world always involves some construction which is my doing, no matter whether it refers to some objective structure or not. 'My doing' does not mean that I must always be conscious that I am constructing as in will. It only means that in the resulting construction there is something which as such is never found in the world, though, as just said, it may refer to some objective structure. In inference, *e.g.*, the arrangement of the data and the drawing of the conclusion by means of because-therefore is my doing in this sense, and so is the case when data are put in forms like if-then, either-or, *etc.* We do not mean that if-then, either-or, because-therefore, *etc.* are no factors of the objective world. What we mean when hypothetical and disjunctive judgments—and for the matter of that, all judgments—and inference are called construction is that even if the forms are objective their *application* to data in particular cases is my doing. This application is no fact of the actual world, data do not remain there as formed. There is no binding that the event corresponding to the conclusion of an inference cannot be known except in that inference context, nor that if we have the judgment 'If A then B' this B cannot be known except as consequent to A. It is not also tenable that data do stand connected with one another in different forms but that a particular form in which they are known as connected on a particular occasion is my selection, or that my constructional operation does no more than manifest the particular form in which they are actually connected; for neither in hypothetical and disjunctive judgments nor in inference do I feel such mere selection or aiding a manifestation. Selection is a kind of distinguishment and, therefore, presupposes that those against which a thing is selected are

already known, but the thought of A as in x-relation with B does not necessarily presuppose that we already know it in other relations with that B or other things. Further, while in no case of selecting 'A is x to B' can the selecting process be represented as x-ing A to B, this is exactly what happens in judgment and inference. As for aiding a manifestation, in all such cases the aiding process is definitely felt as outside the thing manifested, the process being mainly one of self-preparation, but in no judgment and inference do we feel like that, unless, of course, all knowledge, including non-judgmental perception, is understood that way. If perception is not merely selective or aiding the manifestation of objects there is no reason why judgment and inference should be so.

The application of forms to data is thus my doing, in the sense that in the actual world the data do not stand formed. By 'actual world' is meant that much of the world which is independent of my doing. In effect, therefore, it means the world of mere data; or of forms also, if forms are admitted as objective, but on condition that they do not stand there as having already formed the data. If forms have to remain in the actual world they stand there in a peculiar manner the exact nature of which will be determined as we proceed. It would be too early, therefore, to contend, as some have done, that corresponding to judgment and inference there are in the actual world data-as-structurally-related-to-one-another, *i.e.*, propositions of different degrees of complexity, and that 'my doing' which is felt in judgment and inference is merely psychological.

The exact relation between construction and data may be readily understood from an analogy. When a circle is constructed, either actually or in imagination, on a blackboard this construction is undeniably my doing. Yet as it is not confused with a will-construction, I somehow feel that the space of the board had already contained the circle, though quite as much as other possible figures contained there. But yet, again, that pre-existent circle could not, as pre-existent, be definite, for in that very space were all possible figures pre-existent. Two definite existents in the same space either clash or coalesce or form another definite existent or simply alternate. But none of these occurs when all possible figures

occupy the same portion of space. The pre-existent circle is indefinite, and my construction refers to this indefinite circle.

It is not true that the constructed circle only manifests (makes explicit) a latent ('latent' does not mean indefinite) pre-existent circle. For, first, this is not what we feel: we do not feel that we have manifested that circle, we rather feel we have constructed one. Secondly, while in all cases of manifesting a latent content the process involved is all for mere preparation, this is not what occurs here. And, thirdly, while the latent that is manifested was even before that manifestation quite *definite*, for once it is manifested there is the retrospective recognition that it was so definite, there is no such recognition of a definite pre-existent circle.

For the same reason also my construction of the circle is no mere selection from all possible figures. As a matter of fact, there was no definite '*the* circle' that could be selected.

So in thought-construction. My intellectual manipulation of data by means of judgment and inference forms constructs—contents which are formed-data. This is entirely my doing. Yet as cognitive, *i.e.*, as opposed to will-construction, it has to refer to some object which is independent of the construction. But even the object referred to is no definite form-data complex. It is only an indefinite complex in which forms do not stand as definite forms.

That forms are not *definite* pre-existents is further clear from the fact that as pre-existent they are not like data. Had they been so their combination with data would have, at least on some occasion, yielded a new content. But in no judgment or inference does form add an iota of content to the data it operates upon. Form is not co-ordinate with data, and the relation of a form to certain data is no other than this form itself. It is only after thought has completed a construction that form, in whatever sense, can stand as a pseudo-datum, although even then its pre-existent non-difference from data is not annulled. This means that pre-existent forms were wholly merged in data, *i.e.*, indefinite, and are somehow speakable as forms only at the level of construction. The data at the perceptual level are not atomic. Even when thought has not intervened we have the *world*, not a series of atomic data only; we have continuity and not mere discretes.

The non-judgmental perceptual level is just that of our unreflective animal life where our responses are not to the átomic data, but to a very complicated system, though the relations or forms that render the supposed atomic data into a system do not at that level stand recognized. Even retrospectively we cannot feel that the forms recognized at the reflective level were themselves pre-existent at the unreflective. Corresponding to all construction at the reflective level there are given complexes at the unreflective level. Even animals appear like *inferring* when on seeing a certain mark they expect an event. But this is no inference proper, because there is no consciousness of because-therefore, the whole process being at the level of life which is just the level of non-thought perception—the whole thing, in other words, is a datum and does not involve construction in the proper sense of the term.

The unreflective level is not one of homogeneity. Our very responses at that level belie that. Nor does it involve inferential constructions which, it is said, are so rapid that we do not feel them as constructional. There is wide difference between inference proper and what is called rapid inference. Should all association be inference there would scarcely be a distinction between such apparently diverse processes as inference proper, a word meaning a fact, a sentence meaning a complex fact and perception as presentative-representative. It cannot be said, again, that the latter three as involving thought are only judgments and, therefore, different from inference. To the Pan-associationist there is no distinction between judgment and inference also. It would be equally wrong to interpret thought-constructions in terms of unreflective complexities. For the two processes are felt as fundamentally different—one is felt as constructive and the other as non-constructive, *i.e.*, as given. It is true that in every case our latent dispositions are operative. But the modes of operation are fundamentally different. Disposition, excited mature into consciousness, but immediately with maturation, or even as a necessary condition of it, they either cling to some past datum, as in memory, or to some present datum, as in perception as presentative-representative, or are held by themselves by means of language, as in thought.

II

THOUGHT AS A VALID APPROACH TO REALITY

Thought, we have seen, is subjective construction and yet refers to an indefinite form-datum complex. This is why thought is taken as valid. The constructed form-datum complex is neither wholly identical with nor exactly copying the indefinite complex. Nor is there any one-to-one relation of correspondence, *i.e.*, structural similarity or identity between the two, for as the pre-existent form-datum complex is indefinite we cannot say that *its* structure is such and such or agrees with such and such. The structure of an indefinite is also indefinite and therefore incomparable to anything else. There is thus no determinable relation between the constructed complex and the pre-existent one. Hence the validity of thought-construction is determined only by its general reference to the indefinite pre-existent. More than this is not required for the validity of a subjective affair. This is enough even for the validity of subjective percept. When a subjective percept is felt in the subjective attitude the Realist's object which is said to correspond to it in every detail or at least in one-to-one relation does not even stand there as a definite datum. Either there is no object at all, I being wholly engrossed in the subjective attitude, or, if it be only the first step to turn round from the Realist's object to the subjective attitude, that object here is no more than the indefinite *that* withdrawn from. So that either there is no correspondence or reference to that object, or if there is any reference left it is only to an indefinite other. The subjective attitude has, in other words, constructed the subjective percept entirely of its own initiative, without any borrowing from the Realist's object, and the question of its reference to an indefinite object is intelligible only at the first step of subjectivization. There is never a question of its reference to a definite object, unless the subjective and the objective attitudes are confused.

Thought, also, in the same manner, constructs its own topic. The definite form-datum complex is its own creation, and yet it is valid as referring to an indefinite datum.

Till now we have spoken in the Idealistic strain. But things would not be very different from the Realistic point of view. Realistically, a thought-construct is but an *appearance*, to my thinking, of the data of non-thought perception. An appearance is neither wholly identical nor in one-to-one relation with the thing that appears, the thing to which it refers as being *its* appearance is, from the point of view of appearance, indefinite. So is the case with perceptual datum that is moulded by thought. As thought itself does not perceive the thing that is moulded it must be to thought indefinite. Even when perception and thought operate together the resulting knowledge, being one, is either perception only or thought only; when thought only, perception operates *within* thought, not by its side, so that its content, though very definite to the autonomous perception, stands indefinite to thought. Had the resulting knowledge been perception, the thought-content as *within* it would be equally indefinite. But as things stand, when in a single act of knowledge both thought and perception operate, the resulting knowledge is thought, not perception (unless that which is said to operate along with perception were really the *disposition* of a previous thought, now only loosely called thought). For by no amount of concentration can thought as such attain the immediacy of perception (unless it be the case that a previous thought dwindling down to disposition is first by means of concentration stabilized, and then in another later act of perception the disposition is matured and made to cling to the content of that perception).

Thought is valid because it refers to an objective indefinite form-data complex. This reference which is neither exact copying nor one-to-one relation requires further analysis. We have just seen that when thought and perception operating together yield one knowledge it is thought, though it includes, not merely as subordinate but also as sublimated in the very act of being taken up into thought, the perception. The content of perception, we agree, is the object, for relatively to thought the distinction between the content and object of perception may be ignored. Hence in taking up the perception thought takes up its object also, though as sublimated. This is thought's reference to the object which, as sublimated, is indefinite.

This will be more readily understood if we compare thought with introspection into perception. If the primary perception has the real for its content, introspection also has it, for introspection also presents that object, though in the form 'object-as-known'. This means that introspection has taken up the primary knowledge, and along with that its object also, within itself. But the object does not stand to it in the same manner as it stood before the original perception. Some indefiniteness has crept in. There are grades of indefiniteness; indefiniteness of the object of introspection is only of a lower grade.[1]

The point is this: perception, introspection, memory and thought, all alike construct their own contents. In perception the construction is effected by bodily subjectivity, but normally in the objective attitude there we fail to note it, and content is easily confused with object. (It is only in the subjective attitude that this content is felt, but then the object either ceases for me or stands as the indefinite other withdrawn from.) The content of introspection, similarly, is introspection's own, and though here the content appears different from the object, being posited in the form 'object-as-known', not as mere object, the two are yet often confused on account of the fact that introspection always operates in conjunction with the perception introspected into. Introspection into a non-perceptual knowledge is not different from that knowledge, for all non-perceptual knowledge is reflective (of whatever grade), and reflective knowledge and such introspection are identical. As for the content of memory, *viz.* image, it is manifestly different in quality from the object remembered, though here too the confusion often (but not always) takes place on account of the fact that some unreflective cases which are not memory proper often pass under that name. In thought, in the clearest manner, the content stands dissociated from the object. It openly proclaims itself as constructed. If some believe that the object also is structurally a construction we have already noticed the defects of such a view.

1 The adjective 'as known' does not loosely hang on to the object. For were it so it would not have been misunderstood, as it is by many, as the *subjective* percept.

In each case the content of a mode of knowledge is its own construction, and so arises everywhere the question of the validity of that mode, and the question is answered in all cases, except in perception, by showing that the unreflective perception and, therefore, its object also have been taken up in that mode. Only in perception there is no such taking up, as below it there is no other mode of knowledge to be taken up. So perception is self-validating. (One may argue that it is only *assumed* as valid. But this would only give rise to scepticism, which, though reasonable, may be ignored.) And as other modes have taken up that perception they also gain validity thereby.

But even this vicarious validation is impossible if these other modes have, by themselves, no property very near what is called validity. Let us see what such property there is in thought.

Thought not only constructs a form-data complex, along with every such construction it also constructs a concept of object-in-general. As we shall presently see, this concept is in no way borrowed from the perceptual object, but, yet *a priori* it somehow refers to it. It is the *a priori* anticipation of the perceptual object which, however, as now anticipated, is no longer the definite object that it had been, but only indefinitely 'any' object, merely as 'any'. ('Any object' is neither a definite object nor merely a subjective concept. It works as a bridge between the two.) Ordinarily the concept of A presupposes that A or its ingredients were already perceived. But the concept of object-in-general is a creation by thought wholly out of itself. Let us now see how.

Thought may be defined as the knowledge of objects through language. Like perception and memory, language also is a source of knowledge. Through words we know atomic objects (this is called conception) and through sentences facts which are complex (this is called judgment). And what is called inference is knowledge through a combination of sentences. Only this combination is peculiar. While in judgment every word constituting a sentence represents something which constitutes the complex fact known, every sentence constituting the combination required for inference does not present facts which constitute parts of the complex fact inferred.

None but one such sentence, *viz.* the conclusion, has any contribution to the fact known. They have their fruition in the conclusion-sentence, they exhaust themselves in the conclusion.[2] Each of these three modes of thought has a pure side. It may all be a question of empirical association as to which particular atomic object a word stands for, but the bare fact that it stands for *some* atomic object is known *a priori.* If there were no such *a priori* reference of words we could have no urge even to associate a word with an object. Words thus refer *a priori* to atomic objects-in-general, which means that thought as conception constructs of itself the pure idea of (atomic) object-in-general. Knowledge through sentence similarly has a pure side. Which word has, in the knowledge through sentence, to be combined with which word (and how) is known through empirical association. But that in every case of linguistic knowledge of a complex fact words have to be connected with each other is determined *a priori*, and the modes of such *a priori* connection have been listed in Grammar or Logic. Such relations as combining words-in-general construct the *a priori* concept of complex objects-in-general. Inference also does the same thing in its own way. It constructs a new complex concept of object-in-general, *viz.* nature.

A NOTE

We have said that thought in *a priori* manner anticipates the object of perception. It is quite probable that this anticipation is due to some native defect in thought. For in the subjective attitude in which alone thought is felt as thought there is no room for a positive reference to object. But, then, it might, in that attitude, be translated as negative, *i.e.*, a type of withdrawal from object; and validity would then be constituted by such negative reference. Pure consciousness, the ultimate of the subjective attitude, can in no way constitute such validity. Let us see why.

The false is that which has forfeited existence and yet stands or stood as a content. Everything, therefore, which holds

[2] There may be other types of combination of sentences where all the constituting sentences have contribution to the content of what is known, or there may even be combinations where all but one get exhausted in that one in some aesthetic interest ; but none of these combinations yield *inference*.

forth this distinction between content and existence either is or may be false. Pure consciousness, on the other hand, neither is nor may be false, for its falsity is a self-contradictory notion. In pure consciousness, therefore, there is no distinction between content and existence, which means that it is either existence only or content only. If content only, it is not itself valid and cannot therefore constitute the validity of anything else. And if existence only, it, though intrinsically valid and, therefore, capable of making other things valid, would validate *all* ideas equally, for it is as much immanent in false ideas as in true ones, so that the common distinction, with which we are for the present concerned, between true and false ideas remains unexplained.

III

CRITICISM OF OTHER VIEWS

Neither universality and necessity nor coherence can determine the validity of thought. The necessity of an idea means only that it is unavoidable, and its universality that we all agree about it. But both these fall short of reality. As for coherence, it only adds a certain quality to the ideas cohering, but no quality of an idea can determine its validity. The validity is determined otherwise; and coherence as associated with valid ideas may at most suggest validity.

One other function of coherence has often been confused with the determination of validity. There is a distinction between the native claim of an idea to validity (with this only we are concerned in this essay) and the confirmation of this claim in particular cases. Coherence may determine the latter, but never the former.

It might be argued that the two attitudes need not be distinct, that when a certain idea comes to be confirmed we may not feel that we have deviated from the original reality to which that idea had the native reference, so that confirmation may stand so far as identical with the native claim. But what we feel in such cases is not that the native claim has been reduced to the confirmation, but just the converse: it is the old reference that is re-enacted in the confirmation,

the latter being only re-realization of the former and the object of the former continuing, though now as indefinite. What, however, happens more often is that in confirmation we go beyond reality and error, our interest being either more or less practical or social or in the subjective attitude. In any case coherence is not the last word. Either it is reduced to reference or both are reduced to socio-practical or subjective interest.

Some hold that coherence is the very essence of reference; before confirmation it was only implicit, and confirmation only makes it explicit. But we have already seen why the category of explicit-implicit should not apply here.

So far with the theories which determine the validity of thought otherwise than by reference to perceptual object. There are, however, other theories which altogether deny the validity of thought. The extreme of these regards thought as definitely invalid. But according to the rest it is neither valid nor invalid—its function is anoetic, either purely linguistic or making a short-hand record in the interest or not of the knowledge of data, or just confirmatory which is more or less a social affair.

The fundamental principle of all these anti-intellectualists is that synthetic *a priori* knowledge is impossible—form must eternally fall outside matter. Contrariwise, the principle of all legitimate intellectualism is that thought is valid because it yields synthetic *a priori* knowledge. 'Synthetic *a priori* knowledge' means that the content of thought, though entirely thought's own, yet refers, entirely of its own initiative, to the data of perception which stand before it as indefinite. Ultimately to one who understands the whole affair in a total subjective attitude such reference may be unintelligible or even erroneous. But till that pure subjective attitude is attained the question of thought's reference to indefinite object persists, and it is this reference that determines the synthetic character of the *a priori* thought. The function of form may be all a language sport or some useful tautology or something which being neither valid nor invalid yet helps our knowledge of data. But all this is what it only *ought to be*. To us, however, who have not attained the ideal it does all this and yet also claims validity. We do not feel that hypothetical and

disjunctive judgments have nothing to do with validity, or that the process of inference has no inevitable connection with the content known in the conclusion.

Anti-intellectualists have always underrated form. Some of them have even proposed to ignore it altogether. They have built up a whole theory of inference without any reference to form. All inference, according to them, is material, passing from data to data, the idea being that data are not atomically disparate, but stand connected by themselves, though indefinitely. Some of these anti-formalists believe that syllogistic representation is wholly a post-inferential business in some practical, linguistic or confirmatory interest. Others do not care even for this.

In the same manner they might build up a material logic of concept and judgment. The representation of a single fact by a word is, according to them, a case of material inference or some process like it, and the representation of a complex fact by a sentence is made possible, first, by the memory of the linguistic representations of single facts by means of words constituting the sentence and then by the connections of these words according to the connections of the single facts concerned.

But this is an extraordinary bold attitude. We can understand why some people deny the validity of forms. But an attempt to ignore them altogether is too much. Material interpretation cannot account for a vital factor in inference proper, *viz.* the conjunction 'therefore', and till that is forthcoming it would all be confusing inference with other presentative-representative processes. They either understand inference in terms of unreflective association or interpret this latter in terms of the former, thus obliterating all distinction between the two processes. Some of them, even from this confusing standpoint, try to distinguish between the two by a mere appeal to immediate feeling as to whether we are inferring or perceiving unreflectively. But such mere appeal without any logical distinction drawn between the two processes is no sound procedure.

In fact, these material logicians have been compelled to recognize forms, though in a roundabout way. Syllogism as

post-inferential representation in some practical interest betrays this, and it is a matter of serious consideration if *tarka*, *vicāra*, inference that only confirms a prior knowledge, *parārthānumāna* and even *lakṣaṇa* and *vibhāga* and the *vikalpa* of the Yoga are not recognitions of form.

Their theory of conception and judgment is also untenable for a similar reason. They have overlooked the pure side of these two processes, *viz.* the pure reference of words to objects-in-general and the pure (syntactical) connections of words. A study of these pure sides would just be the study of forms.

IV

ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE

Till now we have understood thought as my thinking, and thought-constructions as those which I have made. But construction may alternatively be understood as logical, not merely psychological—not merely what I have made, but what is already there, I only coming to know it through thinking. Not that they are therefore co-ordinate with perceptual data. The distinction between construction and data, *viz.* that from the point of view of construction data are indefinite and by themselves in no need of construction, still stands. Only in addition to the two alternatives—data (=object) and pure subjectivity which, for the first time, is manifested in thinking—we may recognize a third alternative, *viz.* logical construction, or, pure meaning, which is no longer a stage in the withdrawal of the subject from object, but just the end of another autonomous process of ascent from the gross objects of perception.

But even in this attitude the problem of validity remains as pressing as before. Pure meanings or logical constructions, as we have them in actual life, are all associated with perceptual data, their pure status being only a demand for imagination. And so here, too, as before, they are valid only as referring to indefinite perceptual data. Here, too, it will be as wrong as before to deny synthetic apriority immediately and separate meanings from data and try to understand either in terms of the other.

The Given and Its Appearances

I

Mere reception of the given, though incommensurate with reason, is an unavoidable stage of knowledge. It has been understood in three ways:

1. As a feeling of forced passivity that immediately guarantees to us the existence of something foreign (non-reason). This is from the normal Realistic standpoint.

2. As an active process of welcome or self-surrender. This is from a quasi-religious standpoint. The existence of the foreign element is not denied. Only while in (1) it is known immediately as an autonomous being, here it is held as a postulate of our activity; in other words, as indefinitely that-which-is-welcome.

3. Idealistically, as either being swayed by or surrendering to an intrinsic irrationality in ourselves. The only difference between the (3) and the other two views is that extrinsic foreignness is here replaced by intrinsic irrationality.

In all these three forms the given, as the correlate of reception, is the non-reason. Realistically, it is a non-subjective entity, autonomous or postulated, and idealistically it is only the irrational side of our subjectivity.

This non-reason is called 'given', because it is that much of a knowledge-content which is not felt as having in any way changed on account of the knowledge attitude. Even when it is a postulate it is postulated that way, and when it is only our irrational side it is equally felt as given or unmanipulated.

II

How much of a knowledge-content is *given*? A quality (colour, taste *etc.*) is so. Received separately or not, its givenness is assured. Even if it is always found in a context, this does not mean that apart from the context, *i.e.*, in its so-called separateness, it might have been different from how it has

appeared in the context. Mere non-assurance of non-change proves nothing, and, therefore, if now a quality appears as given it has to be so taken.

So sense-qualities are given. What now about the content of *perception* where representative elements are said to be involved? All depends on how the representative elements are understood. If in perception they stand *as representations* there is no difficulty. Perception would not in that case merely reveal the given; as involving representations it would be manipulative also. As a matter of fact, however, the representative elements stand as *presentations*[1] and, therefore, the question of manipulation stands at a discount.

We do not deny that these secondary presentations are possible only because they had already been primary presentations. Our point is that the passage from the primary to the secondary presentation has to be properly understood. Any activity involved would only be unconscious, and that too in a restricted sense. Ordinarily where the unconscious puts forward a content at the conscious level it is a representation, not a presentation, and the presence there of the unconscious is actually felt in the sense that the representation is felt as a *re*-presentation, not as a presentation. We are, in other words, conscious that the content has not been entirely given, but that *we* had done something, although the *modus operandi* is not felt, so that, in effect, we feel that in some unfathomable way we had been active; and this is the only direct consciousness we can have of the unconscious. But when in perception the unconscious is said to be operative it is not felt that way. It is only inferred, and even this inferred unconscious is qualitatively different from any unconscious that may be directly felt, for its function is different—it does not re-present, it only presents. The maximum that can be said inferentially about this unconscious is that *in its presence a presentation occurs*. We do not *feel* any passage from the unconscious to the presentation. There is thus no question of manipulation or activity.

[1] For otherwise, 'perception' would be a too wide term concerning all cognitive processes (perhaps non-cognitive processes also) except sensation. Physiologists may argue that sometimes a certain felt presentation to a certain sense-organ may be physiologically impossible. But that is a question of theory. A theory should not dictate, it has to adapt itself to facts properly recorded.

The situation, then, is this: Some elements of reality are revealed to us automatically, and some other elements are revealed when unconscious dispositions are present. Only a fuller presentation of reality depends in a distant but unmanipulative way on this unconscious. In perception, therefore, there is a correct presentation of the real, and so the content is *given*. This is confirmed by the fact that below perception there is no felt level qualitatively different from it. One of the reasons why imagination and thought are said to distort the real is that below them there is the perceptual level with the contents of which those of the higher two may be compared, and it is discovered that the manipulative process in the latter two has changed the content of the former. But below perception there is no felt level with the contents of which that of perception may be compared. If there is any mere sensation-level, it is not qualitatively different from the level of perception; both are equally concerned with presentations.

Perception, thus, is a mere revelation of the given and, therefore, completely reliable. This claim to complete reliability does not clash with the possibility of illusion. What much has been shown is that perception has a natural truth-claim—whatever is perceived is taken as real—a claim which imagination and thought cannot always put forward, as these processes are felt from the beginning as, to whatever extent, free and manipulative.

Every cognitive act is either *discovering* the real or *confirming* a discovered content. The problem of error from one of these standpoints is different from what it is from the other. Imagination and thought may be erroneous from both these standpoints—(*i*) They may distort the real on account of their conscious freedom to manipulate or (*ii*) even where there is no feeling of manipulation the discovered content may yet fail of confirmation. But all errors in perception are from the point of view of confirmation only. As *discovery* perception is reliable all through, the so-called mis-discovery of a rope as a snake is either super-perceptual or only a process of confirmation supervening on correct perceptual discoveries.

III

Though sensing and perception are passive revelation of the given and, therefore, completely reliable, memory and thought are not so. That memory cannot reveal the unadulterated given can be shown in two ways: (*i*) perception can so reveal the given,[2] but image is qualitatively different from percept, and (*ii*) memory as a form of imagination is, though to a small extent, a free manipulative process.

To clarify:

Some believe that there is no image; memory, according to them, refers directly to the past percept. Some, again, hold that though there is image, it is not qualitatively different from percept. But the fact is this: Though memory may refer to a percept its immediate content is not the *datum* that was perceived, but the *datum-as-perceived-in-the-past*. With this additional qualification *as-perceived-in-the-past* the immediate content of memory differs from that of perception (which is the datum as such), almost as the content of introspection (into a perception)—the content is 'X as being perceived'—differs from that of perception where the content is mere X. This manifest inevitable relation to a past (or present) subjective context is the only reason why the content of memory (or introspection) is commonly taken as itself subjective and called image (or percept). In the case of memory this relation to subjectivity is felt in different degrees of definiteness, the lowest being a vague *sense of familiarity*.

The memory-content thus differs from a percept; and the difference is qualitative. Increase the intensity, clarity, stability, *etc.* of an image to the maximum, it still falls short of a percept; and conversely decrease these characters of a percept, it is still different from an image. This alone proves that image and percept do not differ in degree only. As for illusion, hallucination and dream, these are only *initiated* by images, there is no evidence that those images, passing through a continuous series of changes, have themselves turned into percepts.

2 The words 'given', 'datum', 'real' and 'fact' have often been used interchangeably in this essay, all meaning the *unadulterated given*. Often we have even used the word 'percept' in this sense and this is not unjustified, for, according to us, perception alone reveals such given datum.

Image as object-as-perceived-in-the-past is qualitatively different from percept. This means that *as-perceived-in-the-past* is no loose adjunct, but has actually affected the past datum and introduced a qualitative difference, although amidst such differences the datum as such has in different degrees of definiteness continued.

Memory affects the old datum. This affecting is neither an unconscious process nor conscious in the sense of being deliberate. Had it been an unconscious process we could never have felt the past perceivedness of the datum, even the lowest sense of familiarity would not have emerged; and it is also evident that we do not feel we have in memory modified the datum deliberately. Yet we feel that some modification has taken place, for in memory we not merely feel the image (datum-as-already-perceived) but also, to whatever extent, recognise in it the old datum. It is not impossible that the datum changed of itself into an image in the presence of memory, but it is easier to hold that my memory changed it; and even if the datum had of itself changed, the change is equally felt as due to my memory, like the feeling we have when on account of my attention a thing changes its look.

But though there is this modification memory, as a matter of fact, is not wholly unreliable. All depends on the amount of freedom involved or its mode of operation. In memory freedom behaves decently, it moves round an old datum and only refracts it to some extent—the datum is not lost in the refracting mist. Where, however, the refraction goes beyond all bounds, and there is deliberate misrepresentation through riotous freedom, that faith in imagination ceases. Such misrepresentation we find in constructive imagination where in the total representation we fail to recognise the core. Freedom here is at its maximum. There is freedom in all forms of imagination—memory or construction—and though it behaves decently in many cases, it is always capable of running riot. This is why imagination, even as a method of discovery, is unreliable, though, as a matter of fact, we rely on it when it is memory, because there, in spite of misrepresentation, the real core is, to whatever extent, recognised. Incomplete recognition, in memory, does not stand in the way of our belief, for though the datum as incompletely recognised is so

far indeterminate there is throughout a persisting hope that its determinate character may be gathered from a retrospection into our old perception, or, perhaps, that retrospection occurs simultaneously with the memory. Retrospection into an old perception is not remembering its datum. In memory the old datum always appears as at least to some extent indeterminate, but this is never the case with introspection or retrospection.

IV

Thought is different from both perception and imagination. It is of four kinds: (*a*) conception, (*b*) judgment, (*c*) anticipation of something explicitly on the basis of a knowledge we already possess and (*d*) inferential confirmation, *i.e.*, explicit and detailed confirmation of something in the context of a possible or actual doubt.[3] To thought as conception the immediate content is an atomic (or molecular) meaning, *i.e.*, the meaning of a word or like symbol; to thought as judgment the immediate content is a proposition; to thought as anticipation of the as yet unpresented the immediate content is 'a possible fact', and to thought as explicit confirmation the immediate content is 'the actual in the light of the possible'. Of these the atomic meanings are most fundamental as they constitute the elements of 'proposition' and are presupposed in any explicit awareness of 'possible fact' and 'actual fact in the light of the possible'. As atomic meanings are so fundamental the entire region of thought may be called 'kingdom of meaning', and the apprehension of meaning may be taken as the only common element in all forms of thought, though it must not be overlooked that the additional features in the last three forms are in no way less essential to them.

Image, we have seen, is not the given as such. More so is the case with meaning. There are people who identify meaning with the given. A word or symbol, they hold, refers immediately to a fact (=the given), and there is no third thing called 'meaning'. Even fictitious meanings are facts,

3 (*c*) and (*d*) are often designated indiscriminately by the word 'inference'. There may be other forms of thought than the above four. Doubt, *e.g.*, may be one such. But it will be enough to examine these four.

according to them. A fictitious meaning is composed of elementary meanings and their unity. That the elementary meanings are facts they take for granted; the novelty in their doctrine is that the unity also is a fact. They only hold that this unity is no fact *other than* the elements: although the elements are really unified the unity is no *additional* fact.

But, so we reply, there is no evidence that fictitiousness can be so easily reduced to the non-additionality of the unity. How is this non-additionality known? Introspection does not tell us that the fictitious unity alone is felt as non-additional. If non-additionality is felt anywhere, it can be felt as much in some fictitious as in many other complex meanings. The only difference we actually feel between a fairy and a table is that while the former is fictitious the latter is not; we feel no difference about the additionality or not of the unity.

So fictitious meanings cannot be identified with facts. Nor can even non-fictitious meanings so identified. When I hear a sentence 'Man behind!' it is true I naturally turn round to find a real man, and this may tempt one to hold that meaning is equal to fact. But if I hear the word 'fairy' I do not expect a fact fairy, though I understand the meaning of the word. This strongly suggests that if in the case of 'fairy' meaning has an autonomous status, this should also be the case with 'man'; only, in this latter case meaning has happened to coincide with fact.

If it be objected that on the same ground the possibility of illusion would do away with the identity, already established, between percept and fact, we would only reply that the two cases are fundamentally different. While in illusion the content, when the illusion is detected, disappears, there is no such disappearance in the case of fairy-meaning. Although we know that it is a fictitious meaning, it as meaning yet continues to stand—though we do not expect an actual fairy we yet continue to understand the meaning.

So the possibility of fictitious meaning can validly suggest the autonomy of meaning. The suggestion can be further strengthened. Where instead of *hearing* we *speak out* a word or a sentence we clearly feel a distinction in status between meaning and fact. We *intend* only that the spoken may

coincide with fact, but intention always allows the possibility that what is intended may not happen.

Meaning, thus, is categorically different from fact. But this is only one side of meaning. There is an equally important other side—meaning refers to fact, and the reference is so close that normally when a word or a sentence is heard we turn round from it immediately to fact and do not halt midway to greet a ghostly thing called meaning. Except where a meaning is known to be fictitious, we immediately anticipate facts, and fictitious meanings not known as fictitious are no exceptions. Even where a word is spoken, the meaning, to the speaker, is intended to be a fact.

It follows that meaning is both different from and identical with fact. It is different from fact categorically, *i.e.*, qualitatively. Yet it is also identical with fact. This identity has to be properly understood. All the properties of the fact are not manifest in the meaning. None of those properties which constitute the individuality or uniqueness of the fact—properties which are revealed in perception—stand manifest. Meaning is the representation of a fact through a generality. Whether generalities themselves are facts or not is not the question here. Our point is that even where a meaning refers to a particular fact it represents it through a generality. Not that it is therefore represented in the form of a proposition. The form of representation here is 'any X' where 'X' stands for a generality. If on hearing the word 'man' we turn round and perceive a particular man Ram, what is really apprehended *through the word 'man'* is not Ram in his unique individuality, but just Ram as *an example of man-in-general.*

Where, again, a meaning refers not to a definite particular fact, but to a generality it is not impossible that it represents the generality (universal) as a fact. But even there the formula '*any X*' is sufficient. It would be sufficient to hold that the word 'man' represents '*any man*'. Meaning may, therefore, be taken as standing for '*any* fact of a type'.

Meaning stands to fact almost in the same manner in which image stands to fact. The immediate content of memory does not exclude fact and is yet qualitatively different from it. So is the case with meaning. It also does not exclude fact and is yet qualitatively (categorially) different from it. This

qualitative difference shows that a meaning is no mere *portion* of a fact. The fact has been modified into meaning. When a fact is perceived it is presented as it is, when it is remembered it is changed into an image, and when it is apprehended through language (or like symbol) it is changed into meaning.

This modification of fact into meaning is neither an unconscious process nor deliberate. Nor is it a purely objective change of the fact. Such change occurs only in the context of our apprehension through language; hence, as in the case of attention, the contribution of the subjective process cannot be denied. And yet the contribution is not deliberate, unless in the case of deliberately contructed fictitious meanings. Nor is the contribution an unconscious process, for then the qualitative alteration of the fact into meaning could not be accounted for.

This conscious (though not deliberate) modification shows the presence of freedom in our apprehension through language. This freedom in the case of ordinary meanings behaves decently. It centres round a fact and creates a film through which that fact is refracted in a particular way, and yet in the resulting representation the fact-core stands, to whatever extent, recognised. This is why such meanings are taken as valid. Even fictitious meanings come under this category so long as their fictitious character is not detected. It is only when a fictitious meaning is deliberately constructed that the freedom is manifest riotously. It can even run to the extreme stage of positing impossible meanings like 'circular square'.

A meaning may be simple or complex. The red-meaning is simple, but the flower-meaning is complex. The meaning 'red flower' is more complex. The flower (we are here concerned with a given red flower, corresponding to which the meaning should properly be 'this red flower') is already red, yet the meaning 'this flower', though in a sense it already comprehends the meaning 'red', refers only to the flower as flower, not to the flower as red. The meaning 'red flower', on the other hand, refers to the flower as red.

But the complexity in the *proposition* 'This flower is red' differs *qualitatively*. Here new factors are introduced, the

given is modified into a new relational complex, and these relations are none of them given. The 'is' in 'This flower is red' does not stand for any factual relation between the flower and the red. It is the relation of predication, and its freedom from facts is manifest beyond doubt in other predicational relations like 'if-then' or 'either-or', *etc.* In spite, however, of these predicational relations introduced there is yet, as in memory or conception, a trust in our judgment attitude, so that the freedom, manifest or not, is yet centring round some 'given'. In different stages of judgment, however, the given progressively recedes. In the judgment 'The flower is red' it is most manifest. This progressive recession of the given, and yet the maintenance of trust in judgment attitude all through, is a peculiar problem for logic. It is not our concern here.

Judgment, like conception or memory, ought to be unreliable because of the freedom involved. But like the latter two it is also in most cases actually relied on, because it reveals, however manipulatively, a given core. After all, a *given* red flower is somehow revealed through the judgment 'This flower is red', and in higher and higher forms of judgment this given core recedes more and more. Proposition is a modification of some given fact by the freedom involved in our judging attitude, and through that modification the given fact somehow manifests itself, though to an extent indeterminately. Or, it might be said that simultaneously with perceptive judgment occurs perception also as revealing the given (that is why we trust perceptive judgment), and simultaneously with other higher forms of judgment occur memory and retrospection, each in its turn revealing the given in the appropriate way.

In thought as *the anticipation of the as yet unpresented* this freedom is very manifest. Corresponding to the passage from the premise to the conclusion, corresponding, in other words, to the 'therefore', there is no passage in the world of facts. The whole passage looks like a way of subjective manipulation. Not indeed subjective in the sense of *arbitrary*. There is undoubtedly a necessity felt in the passage, much as in propositional forms like 'if-then' and 'either-or'. But it would be equally wrong to take these as factual (*i.e.*, unadul-

teratedly given) therefore. The 'therefore', much as the propositional form, is the manifest form of freedom involved in all anticipation through language. This freedom modifies the actual fact into a possibility, though at the centre of this possibility there still stands the actual half-recognised.

Inferential confirmation is a peculiar attitude. That to which it refers may be a brute fact, a meaning, a proposition or a fact as explicitly anticipated. The only novelty in this attitude is that such a referendum—either the actual that is given or its modification in some manner—is again viewed in the light of the possible. The possible, as just shown, is a modification of the actual and, therefore, both actual and non-actual ; only non-actuality imposed by our freedom stands as a fringe round the actual. But in confirmation this non-actuality stands as a most manifest context; and that which is directly (as the unadulterated given) or indirectly (as a modification of the given in some subjective context) actual is in confirmation viewed in the light of this manifest context of possibility. In other words, in confirmation the actual and the possible are equally manifest. The confirmed is of the form 'A as actual (directly or indirectly) is also possible'. It is doubtful if any *chemical* combination here takes place, except when the details of confirmation are ignored and the whole thing is put in a general modal form like 'A *must be*'.

The Nature of Reflection in Metaphysics

I

WHEN WE say we have *reflective* knowledge of an object what we mean is that this object, though already known, has now revealed characters which it had not revealed before, and we are sure at the same time that these characters, though unrevealed till now, had all along been there. The only proof that these characters had been there all along is that I do not feel that my reflection creates these for the first time; and one cannot say that though I have not created these they themselves come to exist for the first time just when I reflect. If the only conceivable change in the world that has taken place is that I have come to reflect and if the emergence of the new characters is not to be connected with it, there remains nothing to account for this emergence. These characters must have been there all along.

Yet it is a fact that they were not revealed till I reflected. And here is the crux. Why is it that these characters, though present, could not be known ? One answer, useless though, (as will be presently evident) but readily suggested, is "Because I did not reflect." But what is this 'I did not reflect' if it is not just another name of the fact that these characters, not known till now, have just come to be known, of course with the *proviso* (*i*) that as I know these for the first time I know also that they were present all along and (*ii*) that the general context to which they belong—the substance of which they are characters, or a system of other characters with which they are associated, or just their general situation—was already known ? 'Because I did not reflect' is thus as idle a reply as saying "Because I did not know" to one who asks me, "Why was a thing not revealed to you ?". The problem is serious and it is doubtful if it has ever received the serious consideration it deserves.

To the question "Why were the characters not revealed till I reflected though they were present all along ?" there are

other answers too, almost equally light-hearted. One might say, "Because I did not pay attention", "Because I had not the requisite training", "Because there was something wrong with me," *etc.* But these are all *ad hoc* hypotheses, neither clearly conceived nor manipulable any further. Nobody, for example, knows for certain what attention is, and though psychologists have spoken a lot about it they have never told us how much of attention is needed for certain characters to be detected. We may go on paying attention to a picture in order to detect a certain thing suggested to be in it and yet fail to detect it, and it may well happen—why, nobody knows—that suddenly that suggested content flashes before our eye. To one, again, who holds that some training is necessary to detect these characters we may point out that this training is precisely the training in *reflection*, which means we have not solved the problem. And no less light-hearted is the off-hand answer that there must have been something wrong with me. For, nobody except an Advaita thinker knows what precisely this subjective defect could be. And when the Advaita thinker has carefully inferred *ajñāna* with all its paraphernalia he is not particularly concerned with *reflective* knowledge. His concept of *ajñāna* accounts for knowledge in general—to be precise, to explain why we come to know a thing which was not known before. The problem of reflection, we have seen, is more complicated. It is the problem that though the object or the general context to which the character hitherto unknown but present all along belonged was known these characters themselves have somehow remained unknown till now, though we were sure all along that they had been there. The Advaita thinkers were concerned with knowledge in general, not particularly with reflective knowledge as distinguished from the unreflective.

There is still another reply, equally abortive, which we may dispose of before we proceed further. We may be told that the reason why before reflection certain characters did not reveal themselves is that a particular *attitude* to a given situation was absent. We reflect, we may be told, when not being satisfied with a given situation as such we treat it as a problem, looking at it from the viewpoints of different ideas suggested, so that in course of such intellectual manipulation

of the given situation it comes to place before us certain characters unsuspected before or, at least, undetected till then; and from this, we may be told, it follows that the only reason why these characters could not be known till then is that we had not treated the given situation as a problem.

This, we admit, is a correct account as far as it goes. Our only complaint is that it has not advanced enough. When, for example, I perceive a table it has certainly been necessary that I have had turned my head towards it and had certain other physiological movements, subtle and gross, and it may be equally true that in the absence of these conditions I could not have perceived it. But would any epistemologist in search of a theory of knowledge look for these conditions? Many, if not all of these movements, are just general conditions for all types of attention, not specially relevant to perception. Just similar, we claim, would be the treatment of a given situation as a problem. The peculiar attitude of treating the given situation as a problem is undoubtedly a necessary condition for *all types* of reflective knowledge, mediate or immediate, not particularly for the type of reflection we are concerned with here, *viz.*, reflective *perception*. It would not, therefore, be wholly correct to say that the reason why I did not perceive certain characters before reflection (the characters which I could only perceive when I reflected) is that I did not treat the given situation as a problem. Something else is necessary to account for this non-perception.

II

If anything, say X, exists and if yet I am not aware of it, this may be due to any one of the following reasons:

(*a*) There is some defect in me the knower,
(*b*) There may be something in the objective situation that stands in the way of my knowledge of X,
(*c*) There is some defect in the very object X.

To explain.

(*a*) When X that exists is perceivable and yet I do not perceive it, this, as many have claimed, is due either to my not

having attended to it or to a lack of training to dig it out, so to say, or plainly due to some defect in my sensibility; and where the object is not perceivable but can be inferred I may yet fail to know it inferentially because I have not correctly employed all that leads to this inference.

(*b*) Sometimes, again, I may not perceive an otherwise perceivable object, because of an intervening distance or because of something that shields it from our view. I may similarly fail to know an object inferentially simply because some external agency has prevented me from inferring it.

(*c*) Often, again, I may fail to perceive an object because it is too subtle for perception, the subtlety in question being due either to its being undistinguishedly fused with other objects, as water in a cupful of milk or, as in the case of atoms, to the simple fact that it is imperceptible. This is exactly what we mean by 'defect in the object itself'.

An important feature of this third type of non-knowledge requires special notice here. It is that this non-knowledge is always non-*perception*, never a failure to infer. There is no case where an object, though existent, can fail of being inferred because it is subtle, or, for that matter, because there is some defect in the object. People have indeed spoken of God as uninferrible. But, whatever may be the motive behind, *prima facie* the thesis is unintelligible. If we cannot infer an object it goes without saying that we cannot perceive it too, so that as neither perceivable (intuitable) nor inferrible it cannot be deemed an existent thing at all. It follows that in every case we fail to know an object because of some defect that resides in the object, the non-knowledge in question is but *non-perception*, 'perception' meaning any kind of direct awareness—sensuous or non-sensuous—another name of which is *intuition*.

Now, therefore, if in the case of a puzzling picture I fail to discover a bird-form which, we are told, stands half drawn there (being drawn as a gap in the foliage), and if this non-discovery is due neither to any defect in me, as we have already seen, nor, obviously, to any intervening obstruction in the objective world—for, despite our best attempt we cannot find any—it follows *per reductio ad absurdum* that this non-perception is due only to the fact that there is something

wrong with that bird-form itself: it must have remained there *undistinguishedly fused* with the foliage, much as water gets fused with milk, with only this difference that while in the case of the water-milk the water as such could not be detected till one had physically separated it from the milk, in the case of the bird-form it is only *reflection* that could distinguish it. In unreflective perception the bird-form had stood undistinguishedly fused in the foliage and now stands distinguished in reflection.

We are using the word 'fused' very deliberately, distinguishing it from what is ordinarily called *confused.* Confusion is only an epistemic situation, and what we intend by 'fusion' is a conceivable objective situation that would *exactly* correspond to subjective confusion. Normally in cases of confusion the items that I confuse with one another are objectively quite distinct: it is I alone who stand responsible for all that is unclear. By 'fusion', however, we mean a situation where even objectively the items stand mixed up with one another undistinguishedly. That the bird-form in the picture stands fused with the foliage, not confused, is clear, as we have seen, from the fact that I was in no way responsible for the non-perception, nor was there any intervening obstruction. The water mixed with milk is another illustration, and so is the case with hydrogen and oxygen mixed up into water. We may add another illustration, *viz.*, the real expanse and colour of a thin sheet of india-rubber remaining concealed as that sheet is compressed into a lump. What through these illustrations we are insisting on is a sort of objective implicitness. The objective implicitness that we find in these cases is, we admit, not always of the same kind. The differences in the cases of the water-milk complex and the bird-form in the picture we have already pointed out. Later on we may have occasions to point to other kinds of objective implicitness.

One point we like to dispose of here before we pass on to the next section. It is the argument, sometimes offered, that when the so-called implicit is said to pass over to the stage of explicitness, or *vice versa,* the so-called implicit—or the so-called explicit, as the case may be—has really ceased to exist, yielding place to the so-called explicit, or implicit as the case may be. When, for example, hydrogen and

oxygen combine chemically to yield water we are told that the old hydrogen and oxygen have ceased to exist and we have only a particular drop of water, and when, again, that drop is decomposed it, in its turn, we are similarly told, has ceased to exist yielding place to another hydrogen gas and another oxygen gas brought there to existence for the first time. The idea is that these two new gases have nothing to do with the older two gases which ceased to exist long ago yielding place to the drop of water which has now been decomposed.

This view, contrary to all that is common-sense, is only a desperate attempt to bypass the difficulties that we find genuinely involved in the notion of objective implicitness. We never say that objective implicitness is a clear enough notion and easily manipulable. Indeed, the central task of the present essay is just to clarify it. What we insist on here is that on the ground of this apparent unintelligibility we should not avoid the concept. If in some cases implicitness could not be traced to mere subjective defect or accounted for as due to intervening obstructions, we should not on that ground throw it overboard and declare the implicit dead. True, if we cannot in any way tackle the concept we have to follow the Vaiśeṣikas. But what if we first permit the concept, as otherwise we have to go violently against all common-sense, and then proceed to clarify it!

As fusion is thus different from confusion we would in the same manner understand *distinctness* as the exact objective counterpart of subjective *distinguishing*. Another name of objective distinctness is *autonomy* or *self-containedness*.

Metaphysics is said to have for its subject-matter pure ontic entities like space, time, self, God, Reality as a whole, *etc*. Whether as rational beings in this twentieth century we should at all recognise such ontic entities is, of course, a serious question. But before one turns to that one has first to understand what much the metaphysicians themselves have actually claimed.

The first thing they claim is : (*a*) that we, human beings, start our life with an initial faith in such pure entities, 'initial' meaning either that the faith in question is innate

or that it is the starting acceptance of what the elders we respect have admitted.

(*b*) Their second claim is that through intellectual analysis and reasoning or, alternatively, through reflection disciplined in other ways, we can realise the exact nature of these entities in their inter-relation, this realisation maturing in the end into a type of intuition that reveals them in their distinctness, *i.e.*, as freed from the state of fusion they appeared in at the unreflective stage of our knowledge. This intuition as the ultimate end of all analysis and reasoning, and of all reflection esoterically disciplined, may be called reflective intuition or, if one likes, intuitive reflection.

(*c*) The third point they insist on is that in case we have reached these entities, not through intellectual analysis and reasoning, but through the other method stated above, *viz.*, reflection disciplined through some esoteric exercises, we as rational beings have to employ, if only at the next stage, the intellectual method of analysis and reasoning in order at least that others may be convinced, if not positively led to intuit these entities for themselves.

Obviously, for the metaphysician himself the most important of the three claims is the second one. For him, in other words, the central method of discovery is reflective intuition that detects these entities in their autonomy and inter-relation, freed from the fusion they appeared in at the unreflective level. This method is largely similar to the type of reflection (discussed earlier) that detects the bird-form in the picture, though we must note at the same time a fundamental distinction between the two, *viz.* that while in the case of the bird-form it could be detected in its distinctness, though perchance, even at the unreflective stage, there is no such possibility with regard to metaphysical entities. Space, time, self, God, *etc.*, are never experienced in their autonomy at the unreflective stage: at that stage they are experienced as fused—as either relations or functions or adjectives, not as autonomous substantives. The metaphysical entity—often called 'essence' or 'ideality'—is that which, never being apprehended in its exact pure form at the unreflective stage, is apprehended precisely in that form in reflection.

Obviously, the prior non-apprehension was not due to any subjective defect or any specifiable intervening obstruction in the objective world. Nobody, for example, can point to any defect in me that could be responsible for my not having apprehended pure substantive space or time. That I did not reflect or attend or that I was under the spell of *ajñāna* or even that I did not take the given situation as a problem—none of these, as we have already seen, accounts for my failure to discover substantive space and time, and nobody can point to any conceivable obstruction that could intervene. The non-apprehension was, therefore, due to objective fusion, and hence of the nature of *non-perception*, which means that when later I succeeded in discovering pure substantive space or time, the discovery was in a form of intuition. Initial faith in these pure entities and all intellectual analysis and reasoning that I could employ were, as we saw earlier, either accessories or required for communication with others. The exact function of analysis and reasoning we shall examine later.

III

Before we proceed further, we feel we ought to consolidate our position at this stage by meeting all possible objections to our concept of reflective intuition.

The concepts of fusion and distinctness, or, for that matter, objective implicitness and objective explicitness, are often so unpalatable that in spite of all we have said people might revolt and insist on tracing non-apprehension at the unreflective stage to some subjective defect. They would argue that a defect in the object itself is unthinkable. We have claimed that the defect in question is objective fusion : we have said that at the unreflective level the object stood fused and that in reflection it stands distinct in its autonomy. But we may be asked—Is the movement from fusion to autonomy itself objective ? This, according to them, would be fantastic, at least a gratuitously complicated account. It would be a much better account, they would argue, if it could

be said that the entity in question was there in its distinct autonomy even when we did not reflect and that if at that stage we had not perceived it that way, this was because of something that was wrong with me.

Our first reaction to this argument is that such subjective defect is often an *ad hoc* hypothesis. This we have explained before. We add that even in case a subjective defect could be validly inferred we should prefer phenomenological analysis of experience as providing us with a direct picture like the one we have already given. Such phenomenological account is at least a good alternative to mechanical inference.

True, even as phenomenologists we have to face the difficult question whether the movement from fusion to distinct autonomy is itself objective. But we like to answer straight that it is so. Let us see why.

We admit one can legitimately question whether the movement from fusion to distinctness is objective or, for that matter, whether even the so-called fusion state is so. But one thing is certain, *viz.*, that the distinctness of the object revealed in reflection is, beyond all doubt, objective, it is clearly apprehended that way; and our contention is that if only we analyse this objective distinctness a little more closely we shall see in what way fusion too could be objective and how there could be objective development from fusion to distinctness.

The distinctness of the object revealed in reflection is evidently objective. But there is yet another side of the story, equally evident and no less important. It is that this distinctness is yet relative to the subjective act of distinguishing, that is, reflection, and this is at least strongly suggested by two facts :

(1) We did not perceive the object in its distinctness so long as we had not distinguished it and (2) immediately as we distinguish it in reflection it stands revealed as distinct. This shows how a perfectly objective feature like distinctness—perfectly objective, because it is clearly felt that way—may yet depend on a subjective act like distinguishing, there being no incompatibility of the two.

A study of the exact nature of this dependence will throw a flood of light on the nature of the said passage from fusion to distinctness.

Distinctness of an object to depend on my subjective act of distinguishing does not mean that it is *produced* by that act, as though the act in question was a form of will that could produce change in the external world. Could distinctness be produced that way this would presuppose that there was a bare object X to which this distinctness had not originally belonged but to which it accrued later ; and this is absurd. For, is this bare X different from X-as-undistinguished, different, in other words, from X-as-fused, or is it not so different ? If different, one would be compelled to hold that even the fusedness of that X was *produced* by unreflective awareness. But this is unintelligible—fusedness of X just means that of this X we had no awareness at all, though we might have been aware all the time of the general context to which this X belonged. The hypothesis, often put forward by eminent thinkers, that even at the unreflective level we were somehow aware of the object X, though it was not then distinct, the hypothesis, *viz.*, that at that stage it was known as unknown or that the object X, somehow known, was yet covered from our view by some mysterious *ajñāna* involved in unreflective awareness, is unnecessarily more complicated than the phenomenologically evident fact that at the unreflective stage this X was not known at all. True, we had insisted earlier that though we had not known it at the unreflective stage it yet was present all through. But this we could say only retrospectively, *i.e.*, from the point of view of the later reflection which assured me that in that reflection the object X was not created for the first time. To account for this *retrospective* assurance of the existence of X it is not necessary to postulate states like 'known as unknown', 'covered by *ajñāna*', *etc.*

We have just seen what consequences we are led to if we hold that the so-called bare object X is different from X-as-undistinguished (fused). Consequences would, however, be worse if to avoid the difficulty we should deny the difference outright. In reflection, we have seen, X stands distinguished. But if this X, *i.e.*, the bare X, is not different from X-as-undis-

tinguished it would amount to saying that in reflection X-as-undistinguished stands (yet) as distinguished, which is a blatant self-contradiction. If, then, the so-called bare X can be said to be neither different nor non-different from X-as-undistinguished three possible conclusions can follow. They are:

(*i*) There is no bare X at all,
(*ii*) There is no stage called X-as-undistinguished,
(*iii*) Bare X is admissible, though as indescribable.

Of these three possible conclusions the second may be dismissed immediately, for, at the unreflective stage X does remain undistinguished. The third too may be disallowed on the ground that beside X-as-undistinguished we need not postulate a bare X. Were there a bare X other than X-as-undistinguished there could be no escape from the conclusion that it is indescribable—or an indefinite something, if one may so like. But this bare X is an unnecessary postulate. Hence the only conclusion left is that there is no bare X. It would be useless to argue, as some have done, that bare X is that which has the potentiality of developing, in whatever context, into X-as-distinct, for, as so understood it is nothing but what we have been calling X-as-undistinguished, *i.e.*, X-as-fused.

If, now, there is no bare X, it follows that neither unreflective awareness produces fusedness in it nor, what is our main concern here, reflection produces distinctness in it. Reflection could produce that distinctness if only it could in the same act produce that X itself. But as in reflection we never feel that we have created X for the first time, it follows that the distinctness of X is not *produced* by reflection. If, therefore, as already said, it yet depends on reflection which is the subjective act of distinguishing, this is dependence of quite another sort.

There is nothing mysterious with this type of dependence. It is nothing more strange than relative features like rightness or leftness of things, or comparative features like largerness, smallerness, *etc.*, that depend on, without being created by, the subjective act of comparison. If of two things one is to the right of the other which, therefore, is to its left, or

if one is larger than the other, which latter, therefore, is smaller, this rightness and leftness or the largerness and smallerness are perfectly objective features, though decidedly relative to subjective comparison. Obviously, they are not produced by this act of comparison, for we never feel that way. Nor can we say that they are just as much revealed in comparison as a table is revealed in perception. For, while we never feel that the table is dependent on my perception, we do feel like saying that the largerness and smallerness depend on comparison. As depending on the subjective act of comparison and yet as not produced by it, they are just relative to it, though perfectly objective at the same time. Another example of such dependence we find in the illusory snake that stands corrected. It is definitely felt as objective (though not real), and yet as not unqualifiedly *the snake*, but as only a-snake-to-me, it is, of its own constitution, relative to me the percipient.

The difficulty we were faced with at the beginning of this section, *viz.*, whether the passage from fusion to distinctness is itself objective, may now be disposed of. If what is intended be that there is a bare X which passes from the fused state to distinctness the problem itself is abortive, for there is no bare X that could pass from one state to another. If, on the other hand, it be intended that the fused X comes to appear as X that is distinct, we claim that the passage is perfectly objective though dependent as much on the subjective act of distinguishing reflection, quite as much as comparative features like largerness and smallerness are, or, if one likes, much as the rope comes to appear as the false snake.

One serious objection against our analysis of the concepts of fusion and distinctness we have disposed of. We now turn to two other objections, equally serious. One of them is as follows :

If in every case of *objective distinctness*—which is such a difficult concept and not acceptable to many—one finds also a subjective act of distinguishing, should we not, so we may be told, very justifiably be content with the latter alone, discarding the former as unnecessary, to say the least ? If in course of explaining reflection we have insisted on objective distinctness, but when faced with difficulties turned to the

subjective act of distinguishing round which this objective distinctness is, as we have held, perforce to move, is it any good admitting this objective distinctness over and above the subjective act, particularly when reflection could be adequately explained as merely this act of distinguishing ?

We would reply as follows :

Our normal attitude to life is objective. Normally we are interested in objects, discovering characteristics of different objective situations. It is only late in life that we turn to the subjective, and even then what force our interest that way are more often than not certain peculiar features in the world of objects. We are scarcely aware of the niceties of subjective states and acts except through the corresponding peculiarities in objective situations. Had we begun with the inward attitude God only knows what we could discover. History of philosophy is replete with muddles and confusions that introverts and immature idealists have bequeathed to us. We do not deny that there are good idealists and inspired introverts. But they too, at least most of them, had to wade through objective life ; and if a few could have direct access to the subjective, this is certainly not for us to emulate. To start with the objective attitude, to think in terms of object, is at least less confusing than idealistic effusions and is, therefore, initially a more reliable method of procedure.

We do not for a moment deny that there are conscious states and acts. We only insist that these states and acts being mostly object-oriented we should at least begin with understanding these as diaphanous, distinguished from and related to one another through the peculiarities evident in the respective objects they are oriented to.

This is why in our analysis of reflection we have tried to avoid the traditional and psycho-physiological accounts as scrupulously as possible and have relied instead on objective features that are evident, though for that reason we have not denied subjective states and acts altogether.

Two objections against our account of reflection we have disposed of. There is a third objection, apparently innocent, but not less serious than what we have grappled with so far, and we now turn to it. It is that the object which now stands distinct in reflection is a new object altogether, not the one

that we experienced at the unreflective stage, there being no evidence that way. More precisely the point of the objection would be as follows :

The object X that now in reflection stands distinct is either different from the distinctness it has or not. If not different, it, obviously, could not be present at the unreflective level, for, at that level the object, *ex hypothesi*, was X-as-not-distinct. How could X-as-distinct be identical with X-as-not distinct? If, again, X be different from that distinctness, if, in other words, there could be a bare X, then its presence at both the reflective and unreflective stages would not matter much. The important point that reflection is said to testify to, though retrospectively, is that the *distinct X*, not merely the bare X, was present at the unreflective stage. But, as just shown, the distinct X could not have been present at the unreflective level, as that would have meant that the distinct X *as distinct* remained, at least for some time, indistinct. This is the objection.

We reply, we have in a way already dismissed it. In reply to the first objection to our account of reflection we have shown that it is the indistinct X itself which has become distinct X, and we have shown how this is intelligible. What is commonly called 'bare X' is nothing but X-as-indistinct. We now add that of the two X's, *viz.*, X-as-distinct and X-as-indistinct, the former alone is X *proper*. We hold this view on a simple ground—it is that the form in which reflection reveals a thing is always its proper nature. 'Proper' here does not mean *true*, so that the form in which a thing appeared at the unreflective level may not be illusory *ex hypothesi*. The dimension proper-improper cuts across the dimension real-false and is not identical with it. The distinct and the indistinct may both be real and both false as the case may be. We are not here concerned with the reality or falsity of an appearance.

To the charge that distinct X could not have been indistinct at the unreflective level even for a short while we would reply that, properly understood, this involves no self-contradiction. X-as-indistinct could be equal to indistinct-X-as-distinct if only X-as-indistinct were equal to X + indistinctness. But that is not the case. What we call indistinct X

at the unreflective level is really a not further analysable homogeneous whole, spoken of as X-as-indistinct only retrospectively from the point of view of reflection which has for the first time revealed that X as X, *i.e.*, as distinct. The indistinct, as such intrinsically unamenable to representation by language, has *perforce* to be described in terms of the distinct which is revealed in reflection.

That the indistinct X is a not further analysable homogeneous whole is evident not merely when we find it for the first time at the unreflective level but equally so when once having discovered X in its distinctness at the level of reflection we drop back to the unreflective level. Though enriched with all the details we have discovered in reflection, we, if we have dropped back, find the same homogeneous whole once again, the details remembered only hovering round it ineffectually. None of the things we had discovered in reflection are found fitting in with the object, once we have dropped back to the unreflective level. This is so not merely when there is relapse through some defect on our part but equally so in a deliberate turn-back.[1]

The object of our unreflective awareness is thus always a homogeneous whole. What reflection distinguishes out in that homogeneous whole when we reflectively intuit it is the *distinct* X, X proper, *i.e.*, X in itself. The relation between this X proper (the distinct X) and the homogeneous staff (the indistinct X) is largely like that between the form of a table and the table as first perceived unreflectively. We deliberately say, "between the form of a table and *the table*", not between the form and a formless matter; for, phenomenologically, we never find in any given complex a form and a formless matter. We never intuit a formless matter; indeed we cannot even imagine what it could be like. The table that we start with in unreflective life is one homogeneous whole, and later in reflection we discover a form in it; and if even after this discovery we yet speak of *the table* it is again the same homogeneous whole, though, it may be,

[1] The reflection that we are analysing here *vis a vis* the prior unreflective stage is one that discovers *metaphysical* entities like pure space, time, self, etc. Earlier we have called it *metaphysical reflection.* What we are speaking about metaphysical reflection here is not always true about other types of reflection.

along with the once-distinguished form loosely hanging on to that entire homogeneous staff. The matter which is said to remain over as the form is taken out is always an indefinite abstraction, neither intuitable nor conceivable otherwise, except, in deference to the mechanical rule of algebraic summation, as just *what could remain over*, nothing better than the simplest and, therefore, the contentless equation $a—b = a—b$, the trivial proposition, in other words, that when b is taken away from a total situation a what would remain over is $a—b$. Absolutely nothing else is known about this $a—b$, nothing is known as to whether it is c or d or e , *etc.* The table is the fused state of the table-form, not that form *plus* a matter. The table-form is what is reflectively distinguished in the table, though the table is not the form *plus* something else, it is nothing but the fused state of the form. Similarly with the distinct X and the object of unreflective awareness ; the distinct X is only what reflection discovers out in the object of unreflective experience, which object is only a fused state of that X, X as such being nothing but X as distinct. Indistinct X is not X *plus* indistinctness ; nor can one say that distinct X is X *plus* distinctness. There is no intuitable or otherwise conceivable bare X.

The analysis that we have offered so far is one of metaphysical reflection. It is the analysis, in other words, of that type of reflection which distinguishes pure entities like space, time, self, *etc.* It need not be valid for other types of reflection where, for example, when we have turned back to the unreflective stage the distinct X might continue to occupy the whole field of vision. If after a rapid glance at a heap of objects I reflectively distinguish a particular thing out of that heap, I may, even when I have returned to unreflective experience, continue to perceive that particular thing. A little more complicated, though basically of the same nature, is the reflective awareness of the hitherto unattended tic-tic sound of a clock just after it has ceased—I feel as though I had been hearing that sound all along. Metaphysical reflection is sharply different from all such cases. As already noted, its very characteristic is that it distinguishes entities which in their distinct nature cannot be perceived at the unreflective level, either originally or when we have come back

to it, or which can at most loosely hover round it without adjustment.

We may now dispose of a fourth objection to our account of metaphysical reflection. We have said that the distinct X, though objective, is intrinsically relative to subjective distinguishing. One may ask, however, if this is not precisely the reason why it could not have been present at the unreflective level. The illusory snake, for example, though appearing objective, is yet intrinsically relative to some one's perception, and may not one say, on just this ground, that the snake could not have been present before it was perceived as a snake?

We reply, we deny the prior existence of the snake not because it is relative to a percipient, nor because there is anything intriguing in this relativity, but because it comes to be sublated, or, if one so likes, because it does not fit in with other things of the universe; in plain language, because it is, for whatever reason, definitely declared to be false. The distinct X, on the other hand, is never felt as *false*. Indeed, while the denial of the *prior* existence of the snake amounts in effect to the denial of its all-time existence—past, present and future, with regard to the distinct X one may at most question its *prior* existence. Even then, the denial of the prior existence of the distinct X is only a theoretical possibility: nobody ever seriously denies even this prior existence of the distinct X.

IV

We have now to meet the most serious objection that could be raised against all that has been said so far about metaphysical reflection. This objection has, as a matter of fact, been raised again and again by powerful thinkers. It is that metaphysical reflection is altogether a myth; there can be no such reflection at all, none which could distinguish in a sort of intuition the so-called pure entities often called essences, idealities, noumena, *etc.* This objection has taken two forms. Some hold that metaphysical entities cannot be intuited but only inferred, and some go further and hold that there is no such entity at all.

Let us first dispose of the first form of objection, *viz.*, that metaphysical entities can only be inferred, not intuited. We may note in passing a milder form of this objection. It is that even if some intuition of these entities is possible the nature of this intuition is not amenable to any epistemological analysis—it just somehow happens and that ends the matter. All that we should be concerned with in philosophy is the *inference* of these entities.

To this first objection and its sub-form our reply is as follows: Assuming that there are metaphysical entities, why should one deny the possibility of a sort of reflection that could intuitively discover these entities in themselves and also in their inter-relations? If other types of reflection—one may call them empirical reflection—be allowed, what particular point is there that we should disallow the metaphysical one? Is it because the anti-metaphysics thinkers do not possess this particular faculty or because one ought not to speak at all of these entities? That one does not possess the faculty is no proof that there is none such. There are people who cannot appreciate classical music, but that does not prove that such appreciation is an impossibility. Like æsthetic appreciation, metaphysical reflection may require a sort of prior training. Blind men cannot deny the fact of seeing, nor should they throw the onus of proving this fact on those who say they can see.

One cannot also hold that metaphysical entities cannot be *spoken of*. Metaphysicians have, as a matter of fact, spoken of them, and their number is legion. For thousands of years philosophers have said so many things about pure entities like space, time, self, God, *etc.*

The only possible point, then, against metaphysical reflection is either that these entities are known in some other way, not through metaphysical reflection as a form of intuition, or that they cannot be known at all. Those who deny metaphysical reflection on the former ground hold that metaphysical entities can only be *inferred*, not intuited. Those, on the other hand, who hold the other view, *viz.*, that the so-called metaphysical entities are *non est*, are driving at a basic change in outlook. These latter are the real full-fledged anti-metaphysics revolutionaries.

But there is much to say against both these views. As against the first, we ask—How can one infer a thing which cannot be intuited? Normally, if *a* is inferred from *b*, this is possible if we had previously intuited *a* and *b* together. If we had never intuited *a* we could not have intuited it along with *b* and are, therefore, unable now to infer it from that *b*. Even in cases where this togetherness of *a* and *b* has itself been arrived at through a previous inference, or in case it is just taken on the authority of another person, the intuitability of *a* is not precluded, for *a* must have been perceived even as a precondition of that earlier inference; and where the togetherness is taken on trust from another person it only means that I believe that in my behalf he had intuited *a*.

It is possible, we admit, that often *a* is inferred when not it precisely, but only its like, had been intuited before. 'Its like' does not mean the trite that as the same identical event cannot be repeated what we intuited before was always a *like*. By 'its like' we mean here to refer to cases where we explain a given situation by postulating a hypothesis *in the light of* one postulated earlier, though not as unintuitable, in a similar situation. This is what we always do when we infer supersensuous entities like atoms, electrons, *etc*.

It may be noted, however, that what we infer in such cases is never so unlike the entities intuited before as to be wholly unintuitable. Proportionately to the peculiarity of the situation under investigation the intuitability of what is inferred is only modified to a degree, the power of our sensibility being stretched, in imagination, to the degree required—it may be, to the maximum degree. There is never a need of denying sensibility altogether. If, for example, through such a process of inference we establish that there are certain things in the moon we never intend that these things are unperceivable; the most that we can mean is that normally with the present-day amenities we cannot come to the moon to see for ourselves the things that are inferred to be there. The imperceptibility of atoms and electrons is only a grade further removed—we only believe that with the power of sensibility that we happen to possess we cannot perceive them. And, just as we can *imagine* that we are present on the moon face to face with the things inferred there, we can equally *in imagina-*

tion stretch the power of our sensibility to an extent enabling us (in imagination, again) to perceive atoms and electrons. Metaphysical reflection that intuits pure entities may, in this context, be understood as the farthest possible stretch of sensibility. What is inferred is thus never altogether unintuitable, and the so-called non-sensuous intuition is only the optimum extension of sensuous perception. In different grades of the so-called non-sensuous intuition we only progressively get rid, in imagination, of course, of the normal limitations of our sensibility. All intuitions—sensuous and non-sensuous—are fundamentally of the same nature, the sensuous being only laden with physical and physiological limitations and different forms of the non-sensuous being only progressively free from these.

We may have some idea of this even when we analyse the common process of explanation-through-hypothesis. When, for example, a scientist, faced with a difficult situation, seriously attempts an explanation, what normally happens is that a certain hypothesis suddenly *flashes before his mind's eye* and he next tries to substantiate it through relevant considerations. If the hypothesis can be substantiated, well and good, but if it fails another hypothesis *flashes* again, and so on. What now is this flash? Is it not a sort of intuition? It is not necessary that every intuition should be correct; even incorrect intuition is after all intuition just as any erroneous perception is still perception. This flash, again, may not be of the nature of metaphysical intuition immediately, but it is intuition all the same. As intuition, again, it is not perception in any ordinary sense of the term. Though it has for its object something that is empirical it is undoubtedly supersensuous to a degree. This type of intuition, sometimes called *pratibhā*, is intermediate between sensuous perception and metaphysical intuition.

We do not intend that there may not be a class of hypotheses which do not or need not flash at all. Such hypotheses are quite possible, but they are more or less of the nature of formulae and technical principles postulated to knit together diverse facts into neat systems. Explanation of or understanding a situation, when we proceed by postulating such principles, is nothing more than neat description,

and, of course, of the neatness of the description there are various criteria. The distinguishing feature of this type of hypotheses is that none of them claim to be facts: They are only formulae for neat description, *i.e.*, sheer *methods* of organisation. As such they cannot, obviously, be objects of knowledge, they are only postulates in the strictest sense of the term. It is only in a loose sense that we often say they are known through inference ; in the strict sense they are not *known*, and *a fortiriori* not inferred, though the process of arriving at them looks very much like inference.

We have already seen how some people have held that metaphysical entities are not intuited but only inferred (through the process known as hypothesisation) and we have refuted their views by saying that nothing can be so inferred which is not intuitable. To obviate this charge some may now hold that these entities are neither intuited nor inferred (as existent), but only *postulated* in the strictest sense of the term. They may, in other words, hold that these entities do not exist though we may very well speak of them and even use them for systematising our knowledge of the universe. These entities are, in short, essences that do not exist.

Should one choose to hold this view, we confess we have nothing to say against him except that hypotheses, even those regarding metaphysical entities, do often flash, they are not always cold mechanical formulae or just techniques of usage, linguistic or otherwise. There is nothing, we admit, against treating, if one so likes, *all* hypotheses as just techniques of usage ; but there is certainly no binding that way. The reason why these philosophers are so vehemently against *living hypotheses* is not that they never have hypotheses flashing before their minds' eye; it is only that they genuinely believe that they have no so-called metaphysical intuition, and, fearing that once living hypotheses are granted in other fields there would be no justification for *a priori* condemnation of hypotheses regarding metaphysical entities, they prefer to treat all hypotheses, without any distinction of caste and creed, as dead mechanical postulates. Extremes are always more respectable than compromises. The philosophers whom we are considering here are, therefore, more respectable

than their feebler associates in the field of Logical empiricism, more respectable, we mean, than those who treat *some* hypotheses as about existents because they are empirically verifiable and reject metaphysical ones as not so. These feebler of the Logical empiricists forget that if by far the largest number of hypotheses they allow as verifiable are verifiable as only *indirectly* referring to sense-experience, there is no reason why even metaphysical hypotheses should not have such indirect reference, though the reference in their cases may be more indirect than in other cases. But have these Logical empiricists ever told us how much of indirect reference is permissible and why a reference which happens to be a little more indirect should be discredited?

The extreme of the Logical empiricists are largely consistent and their attitude is genuine. They have also done a useful service in not having allowed metaphysical intuition in a slipshod manner, and their contribution in the field of Logic and Semantics is decidedly immense. In a way, again, they have given us a very respectable philosophy meant for those who either do not possess metaphysical intuition or have no faith in it. Our only point against them is that in spite of all this they have not made out a decisive case against metaphysical entities. We do admit that if in spite of all our pleadings for metaphysical reflection some people do not, very honestly, find any such, for them the only reasonable course would be to vote whole-heartedly for the extreme form of Logical empiricism. But there is nothing in this philosophy to prevent metaphysicians from proceeding with their own type of reflection.

One may ask here the oft-repeated question—Supposing I have that intuition, of what good would it be to me if I cannot put it *logically* before others? We reply, the old-day metaphysicians did present their intuitions in logical forms of argument and analysis, and, except for a few anti-intellectualists, they never shrank from this. For convincing others they employed logic from the beginning to the end. Apart from what actually the metaphysicians did, there is at least nothing to prevent one from employing logic, even though he has intuited metaphysical entities.

V

Metaphysicians have used logic in two different ways:

(1) In the interest of listeners they have argued from empirical matters to their metaphysical entities.

(2) For themselves, they make continuous effort to intuit metaphysical entities in the exact relations in which they stand to one another, so that once these are intuited in proper inter-relation they would be assured of their journey's end. These relations that bind the metaphysical entities into a system or organise them, as the case may be, in a hierarchy are precisely the principles of pure Logic.

Let us explain the two uses of logic by the metaphysician.

(1) The metaphysician, otherwise satisfied with his intuitions, is yet interested in convincing his listeners, and it is only in this latter interest that he argues from empirical matters to his metaphysical entities; and it may often happen that due to some lack of conviction somewhere he himself plays the part of a listener. The sole purpose of such argument—to put it, in another language, the ultimate objective in trying to convince the listener—is that once the listener is convinced, through arguments, of the existence of a metaphysical entity he would, of his very rational nature, seek to discover it for himself through intuition—a demand on him which he can only ignore at the cost of his rational constitution. For, if following the metaphysician's arguments he has, in a way, himself inferred the metaphysical entity, he is bound, as we have already seen, to take it as *intuitable*—because nothing can be inferred which is not intuitable, and if, as is obvious, it is not to be sensuously intuited his very rational constitution would demand that he should actively see how otherwise it can be intuited.

The effort has to be made, though we cannot at the same time hold out a promise that it will be successful. It may well happen that despite all honest efforts the listener fails to intuit metaphysical entities. There is nothing indeed to worry about if he fails to intuit only some of these entities but succeeds in other cases; for then our only advice to him would be 'Try and try again'. But in case he fails to intuit any of these entities—which is not at all an impossibility, for

there are people who, in spite of their best attempts, cannot be artists—in case he thus fails utterly, we cannot impose metaphysics on him. Under these circumstances he will have three other alternatives left open to him. He may choose to be an extreme intellectualist, relying solely on inference and analysis and going so far as to doubt perception even till its content comes to be confirmed by some inference—explicit or implicit. Or, despairing of solid gain that way, he may turn violently against this intellect too and choose to live in the fool's paradise of romantic sentimentalism. Or, thirdly, he may choose to be a Logical empiricist.

The choice of these alternatives, we have just seen, springs from the failure to intuit metaphysical entities. It must be noted, however, that this failure is only an accident, there being no *a priori* necessity that one must fail. Success too, we admit, is equally an accident. The point we insist on is that if some people have succeeded and if metaphysical entities can at all be inferred and are, therefore, at least intuitable, one should try one's best to intuit these. The whole question thus boils down to the simple point whether the inferences that metaphysicians have actually offered are valid. One of our main charges against the Logical empiricists is that they have nowhere examined these inferences. They have simply ignored these. Arbitrarily believing that metaphysical entities cannot be intuited they have obstinately adhered to their thesis, equally arbitrary, that all intuition is sensuous and the real is nothing but what is sensuously intuitable. They have never even tried to intuit these, they have started with the arbitrary assumption that these cannot be intuited. If only they had examined the inferences that were offered by metaphysicians regarding these entities, the whole picture might have been altered.

One might argue that Logical empiricists do not even believe that one can infer metaphysical entities. The question of intuiting these could arise if at all they could be inferred. But Logical Empiricists would deny even this possibility of inference.

But why after all—we ask—should they deny this possibility of inference? Is it because according to them these entities are sensuously unintuitable? But, first, why should

sensuous intuitability be taken as the criterion of reality? Could it not be enough if these were just intuitable, sensuously or not? And, further, would it not be putting the cart before the horse to say that metaphysical entities cannot be inferred *because they are unintuitable?* As a matter of fact, metaphysicians have inferred these entities, which inevitably establishes that they at least claim to be intuitable. To start with the idea that they are unintuitable and to conclude from this that they cannot, therefore, be inferred, would be moving just the wrong way about. *A priori* we cannot deny the inferribility of anything, and if any thing is inferrible there is at least a demand for intuiting it. Logical empiricists would have done better if they had examined the arguments the older metaphysicians had offered and refuted them one by one, instead of condemning them all together at one stroke. Kant too has condemned the inferribility of metaphysical entities, and though he appears to examine some of the traditional inferences in all details, the main reason for his condemnation is that these entities cannot be sensuously intuited. He and the Logical empiricists sail in the same boat. Logical empiricists have tried still other ways of escape. They have held that the equation of reality with what is sensuously intuitable is valid on any one or all of the following three grounds:

(*a*) Unsophisticated common sense understands reality invariably that way.

(*b*) The sensuously intuited can be pointed to others who can, therefore, perceive it for themselves, while that which is said to be non-sensuously intuited is always elusive, if not to one who so intuits, to those at least who are addressed.

(*c*) Definition of reality as what is sensuously intuitable is at least one by means of which we can give a consistent account of the universe acceptable to all and which, therefore, is at least a prescriptive definition, a sound postulate, in contrast with the idea that it may also be non-sensuously intuited, which latter can at most give us discrete noumenal entities, never a system of these and which labours under

another defect, *viz.* that the empirical world has been ignored by these intuitionists.

None of these three grounds, however, are tenable to the end. Regarding the first we may point out that unsophisticated people understand by 'reality' not merely what is sensuously intuited but equally what is intuited otherwise and, besides, many other things also. If there is anything common to all that unsophisticated people mean try 'reality', it is just what is independent of our knowledge of it, and it matters little to common sense whether it is apprehended sensuously or non-sensuously, whether it is intuited or inferred, etc. Common sense is either no exclusive indicator of truth or one has to keep it confined to a system of primitive beliefs that has not on some valid ground or other been rejected. One cannot eat it and have it too.

Regarding the second consideration above that has led the Logical empiricist to prefer sense-intuition, we like to offer two simple comments. If what he intends is that only the sensible objects can be pointed to, this is obviously wrong, for the objects intuited otherwise are also pointed to by those who intuit them. If, on the other hand, what is intended is that the pointed object must be such as can be followed by the listener, our reply is, first, that sometimes listeners cannot follow even sensuously intuitable objects, when for example, the perception of these requires some training, as is abundantly evident in laboratories, and, secondly, we argue that if adequate training is granted, even non-sensuous entities can be followed. This is why metaphysicians have offered suggestive analogies, and irrefutable inferences and have often prescribed esoteric exercises as a part of the training in question. It is no good shutting our eyes to these procedures, seeing that even in our empirical life we resort to many of these procedures to get the listeners on our side, and these devices do often succeed in making the listeners perceive the objects we point to them.

As for the third ground mentioned above, viz. that with the definition of reality as the sensuously intuitable, and with this definition alone, we can offer a systematic account of the universe, and that, therefore, this should be the best

definition acceptable, we observe that the different metaphysics which the old-day philosophers have offered have also been systematic accounts of the universe, no mere loose catalogues of discrete noumenal entities. If those metaphysicians have intuited noumenal entities they have intuited them in their interrelations, as either in a system or in a hierarchy, and they have presented their metaphysics accordingly. The logical way in which they have presented their intuited entities is just a shadow of these noumenal relations —a projection of those relations on matters of our empirical life. We do not claim that non-sensuous intuition is unerring because non-sensuous, we do not claim that the different systems of metaphysics given to us by different metaphysicians are all faultless. But sense-perception also errs and different systems of science are not all correct. Metaphysicians, therefore, are not particularly to blame. It will not do to say, as Logical empiricists have done, that whereas in the case of science an agreement can be arrived at by referring directly or indirectly to public facts of sense-experience there is no such possibility with regard to metaphysics. For metaphysicians also seek to settle their disputes by referring directly or indirectly to facts of sense-experience, and this is exactly what they have done by inferring noumenal entities from empirical data, or, in some cases, by offering more or more suggestive analogies, so long as the listeners do not succeed in intuiting noumenal entities for themselves. It will not do again to argue that metaphysical accounts of the universe do not contain anything about our everyday empirical world, for, first, in many metaphysical systems the world with many of its empirical details has been considered, and, secondly, has not science also been largely indifferent to noumenal entities? The fact is that both science and metaphysics are concerned with the structure of the universe, not necessarily with its empirical details, and if science has studied a relatively empirical structure, metaphysics proposes to arrive at a deeper structure primarily through non-sensuous intuition but proximately, and for listeners, through arguments and analysis and, therefore, referring so far to a large extent to empirical details. And, lastly if to many Logical Empiricists the structure of the

universe is only a system of postulates, may not metaphysics also be allowed as another system of postulates of a different kind? And who will determine which system is better if the metaphysical one is not sympathetically understood?

If some of those who have failed to intuit metaphysical entities have swung over to Logical Empiricism, others, we have noted, have turned into extreme intellectualists and still others into sentimental romantics. As for the romantics, we have nothing to say for or against them. They move in a field so alien to ours that we do not know what to say regarding them. Against the extreme intellectualists, however, we have just two points to urge. One of them is that there is no scope for inference at all unless we start with the relatively unquestioned belief in what is intuited, sensuously or otherwise, normally sensuously intuited. It is because the sensuously intuited data are accepted as real that we can take the inferred object also as real; and when inference is said to correct a perception what actually happens is either that a sensuously intuitable defect is discovered in a given situation or that a coherent system of intuitable data is just preferred to an isolated datum or to another system which is less coherent, coherence in the latter case not constituting the reality of that which coheres but only determining its reality for us. A thing is not real because it coheres, rather it coheres because it is real. Neither coherence nor intuitability constitutes its reality, and coherence, like inference, presupposes that what coheres is intuitable.

Modern Psychology and Hindu Thought

I

It is only when a science is sufficiently advanced that it turns back upon its *concepts* and analyses them. Decidedly, modern psychology is not so advanced, it has yet to explore many facts, postulate newer hypotheses and build theories. As yet in a formative stage, it has little time, and lesser interest, to probe its fundamental concepts.

Classical Indian psychology, on the other hand, is mainly confined to such probing. It examines the nature and function of consciousness in general, asks whether there is a soul over and above mental states, how exactly the soul, if there is any, stands to different mental states, whether there is anything called "unconsciousness" and, if there is any, how it influences the conscious life, what are the general types of knowledge, feeling and will and how in general they originate, *etc.*, *etc.* Such questions are asked in a general speculative interest and answered quite as much as other *philosophical* questions, *i.e.*, not in the way on account of which modern psychology is called *scientific*. In short, there is no subtle experimentation, no close sifting of facts, no systematic statistical study, no pragmatic testing—therapeutic or otherwise, *etc.* Not that classical Indians were unaware of all these scientific requirements. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita psychologies we sometimes come across cleverest sifting of facts, and often there are references to esoteric experimentation, as in Yoga ; but this is not the general rule.

This clarifies another aspect of Indian psychology. It is that, though philosophical, Indian psychology is no philosophy of the *science* of psychology, no philosophy, in other words, which presupposes a corresponding science the fundamental concepts of which it takes upon itself to probe, the like of which we find, for example, in the modern philosophy of physical sciences. Indian psychology is philosophy from the beginning to the end. Naturally, it is open to correction at

many places, particularly where there are *a priori* excesses, by modern psychology which is thoroughly empirical.

This is a very natural weakness of Indian psychology, as indeed of any study in ancient India. Yet there is much to speak in its favour. Unlike a philosophy of science which can in no way correct the findings or theories of the corresponding science but can only place them in a clear perspective, a philosophy which is original in the sense of not having developed out of a science can so correct. If a verdict of such pure philosophy clashes with that of a science each party ought to be on its guard. The modern attitude of too easily condemning pure philosophy is not justified. A scientific verdict is undoubtedly based on facts and cautious at every step. But the fact that one is cautious and faithful to facts is not enough. For, philosophy also proceeds on the basis of some *facts* and *argues out* its case. Unless, therefore, one actually demonstrates errors in a contrary philosophic verdict one has not properly made out his case in the science of psychology. It is in this sense that philosophy *can* correct science.

The second merit of classical Indian psychology is that it is extremely thorough and systematic in its analysis of fundamental psychological concepts. It may not be scientific in the modern sense of the term, but its thoroughness and systematic character is a bulwark against easy attacks.

The third merit is that it often, though mostly in an unsystematic manner, refers to psychological data many of which would startle a modern psychologist. We find such data mostly in the Yoga system of philosophy and often in Advaita Vedānta. The analysis of dream, dreamless sleep, trance, *etc.*, are examples to the point. We do not mean that the old Indian psychologists were always correct in their observation. The least that we claim is that modern psychology would do well to ponder over these.

II

Indian psychology, thus, is not merely worth reading, there is every reason to believe that it may throw unsuspected light

on modern psychological problems and suggest corrections and improvements.

The method of the old Indian psychology was certainly introspection from the beginning to the end, aided, as every perception ought to be, by inference wherever necessary. But this introspection was not always what we in modern times take it to be. There was in Indian philosophy a thorough and systematic study of the nature and content of introspection. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which is the least mystical of all the Indian systems holds that introspection has for its content the fact "I know x" where x is the object of the knowledge which is now being introspected into, so that every introspection is the knowledge of three things at one and the same time, *viz.* of a self, a knowledge and the object of this knowledge. It is not the awareness of a mere unreflective knowledge, it reveals two more things, *viz.* the self and the object of that unreflective knowledge. This last-mentioned object may be revealed in introspection in two ways. It may be revealed as only secondarily attached to the knowledge that is revealed, where this *knowledge* is the central theme and the object just adjectivally tagged on to it. But it may also stand as itself the central theme, when the content of introspection would be of the form "x as known by me".

Modern psychologists either admit introspection in the first sense only or deny introspection altogether. But scarcely has any of them paid sufficient attention to the second form of introspection mentioned above. Those of them who want to lay more emphasis on the object x have generally turned toward objectivism of some form, knownness as subordinately tagged on to x being too easily interpreted as either a form of being physiologically responded to or just a postulational constructed subjectivity having no claim to reality. Not that there is no reason for such objectivism. Knownness is an objective property in contrast with *knowledge* which is somehow understood as subjective, and naturally these psychologists feel tempted to interpret it in a qualitatively different manner. But this is not necessary. For, first, the very concept "subjectivity" is shrouded in mystery, and, secondly, one must note that even knowledge, as according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, may itself be an *object* to introspection. Whether that introspec-

tion, itself a knowledge (though of another knowledge), is not in its turn an object to another introspection, is a different point with which we need not be concerned now. It is enough here that if even knowledge, as distinct from knownness, can be objective, one need not mystify, though often in the name of clarification, this knownness. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would hold that behaviorism and the other form of objectivism just referred to are both of them unnecessary.

What I am aware of in introspection is either *I know x* or *x is known by me*. In the first case the knowledge that is known is known as related to x, and in the second case the object x is known as related to knowledge. Indian psychologists, particularly of the neo-Nyāya school, have studied these relations in meticulous detail, and in this study they have relied chiefly on introspection. They have recorded the diverse ways in which a factual *complex* appears to the subject perceiving it. In this doctrine of *viṣayatā* developed by the thinkers of the neo-Nyāya school we find a complete account of judgment—perceptual and non-perceptual—that would equally interest a modern psychologist and a logician.

The other pole in introspection is the self. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believes that the self is revealed in every introspection, for when a knowledge is revealed it is revealed as belonging to me. Everybody says "I know", and this *I* is felt inevitably as self-identical behind all such knowledges (and feelings and wills), which means that the *I* is revealed as a permanent locus of these mental states. This is the general Hindu view ; none of them would, like the Buddhists and modern Western psychologists, understand it as adjectivally distributed among the mental states. This self is a substance not merely behind knowledge, it is revealed as equally behind feelings and wills, for we all have a mental perception of the form "I am happy", "I am willing", *etc.* Indian psychologists would, practically all of them, differ here with modern psychologists in two more basic points. (1) They would, all of them, reduce the propositions "I feel", "I will" and "I know" to "There happens a feeling, there happens a will, there happens a knowledge in *I* the self" and, with but the solitary exception of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, would never take feeling, willing and knowing as *acts* of any kind. It is only the Mīmāṁsakas mentioned

who considered knowledge as an act, and they too had to struggle hard to prove it. (2) The second point of difference between the old Indian and modern psychologists is that feeling and will, as distinguished from knowledge, are not taken as by themselves conscious. All the three are undoubtedly *mental* phenomena, but not all are conscious. The word "mental" means that these all are special characters of the self; or, as we shall see later, they all belong to *antaḥkaraṅa* which, however, is other than the self.

According to the first view, knowledge alone is conscious in the sense that though all the three are internal phenomena knowledge alone is that which reveals other things, "consciousness" meaning that which being internal so reveals things. According to the second view, as we shall see later, consciousness is that which is *subjective proper*, *i.e.*, never an object, from which it follows that even the mental event called "knowledge" is not intrinsically conscious, but that there is a principle still further behind, and that principle alone is consciousness. But as even that principle also *reveals* the mental states it too is called "knowledge". Thus always in Indian philosophy knowledge, understood in an appropriate sense, is literally equated with consciousness. This is a point absolutely novel of Indian psychology and should be thoroughly investigated not merely because it is novel but because it has far-reaching implications for psychology. This is explained as follows :

First, if feelings and wills are not conscious they do not reveal other things and have, therefore, no objects, the so-called object of a feeling or will being nothing but the object of the *cognition* that produces that feeling or will.

Secondly, introspection as knowledge of a knowledge must be qualitatively different from the knowledge that is known. For, if both were consciousness and if there were nothing against one consciousness being revealed by another consciousness, this introspection could again be introspected into. But this is absurd. Not merely would this lead to the difficulty that the second introspection could equally be revealed by a third, and so on *ad infinitum* ; as a matter, of fact, the very first introspection is self-revealing. It follows, as we have already noted, that there are two kinds of knowledge,

one self-revealing and the other not. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position on this point is not always clear, but other Indian psychologists have, most of them, admitted this. Add to this the problem whether this self-revealing introspection occurs *after* the primary knowledge or simultaneously with it and we are face to face with a fundamental difference between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta. With the former the primary knowledge may go without being intuitively grasped, with the latter it cannot. In the latter case, therefore, we have to admit a type of knowledge, called "*sākṣin*", which reveals the primary knowledge (as also a feeling and a will). The question would now arise whether corresponding to each mental state that occurs in my mind there is a distinct *sākṣin* or whether one and the same *sākṣin* perceives all these mental states in me. Advaita favours the second alternative on the ground that the knower *sākṣin* is self-evidently felt as one and single. Indeed, if there were no unitary knower recollection and allied phenomena could not be accounted for.

To Advaita, then, this *sākṣin* knower is the self. This is a notion of self fundamentally different from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika notion. To Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the self is not conscious in the sense that consciousness is its own nature. Consciousness as knowledge is, according to it, an accidental happening in it. To Advaita, on the other hand, consciousness is the very nature of the self. Indeed, it equates, the self absolutely with consciousness. Other systems of Hindu philosophy have sided with one or the other of these two schools, and some have attempted synthesis. Sāṅkhya and Yoga, for example, are with Advaita in this respect ; the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas are with Nyāya in that the self, according to them, is a nonconscious locus (substance) in which knowledge or consciousness happens ; the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas believe that the self is in part conscious and in part non-conscious ; and Rāmānuja holds that both the self and knowledge are conscious. The analysis of self-consciousness that these Hindu psychologists have offered will appear to a modern thinker a grand psychological study.

III

Consequent upon this concept of self-revealing *sākṣin* there has grown in Advaita and Yoga a stupendous transcendental psychology which may be called a type of depth-psychology, not, of course, in the modern sense of the term. The self as pure consciousness has been distinguished from mental states like knowledge, feeling and will. These latter have been called *vṛttis*, and as every change presupposes a permanent substance that has undergone that change the Indian psychologists under consideration have recognised a substance, other than the self, of which the *vrttis* are changes. This substance is sometimes called *antaḥkaraṇa*, sometimes *citta* and sometimes *manas*. We may use the English word "mind" to represent it. The self and the mind are two different substances. The idea is that while the self is self-revealing, the mind is revealed by the *sākṣin* self. In other words, while the self is truly subjective in the sense that it is always the knower, never the known, the mind is an object because it is revealed as an other by the self. Mental states as changes of the mind are thus objects, not truly subjective. Needless to say, this is the view of Advaita and Sāṅkhya-Yoga. The Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṁsakas, as we have already pointed out, hold a different view. While according to Advaita and Sāṅkhya-Yoga the self in self-consciousness is conscious of the mind which is other than the self, these Mīmāṁsakas hold that the knower self knows *itself* as an object, so that in so far as it *knows* it is truly subjective, *i.e.*, consciousness, but that in so far as it *is known* it is an object, *i.e.* *jaḍa*.

In developing this depth-psychology Advaita and Sāṅkhya-Yoga have gone still farther. They hold that the self as consciousness can even stand by itself, *i.e.* apart from the mental states. There is, in other words, autonomous pure consciousness capable of standing all alone. This follows, according to them, not only from the fact that in self-consciousness the *sākṣin* demands such pure status, though as yet it is revealing a *vṛtti* ; the Advaita psychologists have, through a thorough analysis of dreamless sleep, shown that such pure consciousness actually exists. If dreamless sleep be a fact, the Advaita analysis is startlingly novel. Incidentally, though

rarely in thorough detail, they have analysed dream and argued that in dream the self gets dissociated from the actual world centring round the physical body and perceives the maturations of unconscious traces stored up in the mind. (There are other theories of dream also.) It is a pity that the laws of such maturation were never discussed in philosophical treatises. This was with them a close secret. But they unambiguously asserted that there are such laws and have even claimed that one can through the practice of *yoga* penetrate to the very laws according to which even unconscious traces of our past life (*pūrvajanma*) mature into the actual experiences of this life. On this they based their science of astrology the worth of which needs thorough examination in this century.

Once consciousness is thus separated from mental states it follows that the apparent conscious character of these latter is due either to a confusion between or to a fusion of the autonomous consciousness on the one side and the mental states on the other.

These philosophers were firmly convinced that the chief aim of our life is to realise this pure consciousness because this is freedom *par excellence*. This, they held, could be achieved through the culture of an attitude deeper than introspecting into mental states. The culture in question consists in being progressively aware of introspection itself in an intensive dimension, and the progress in this line is attended by more and more dissociation from the world of objects, including the mind. The dissociation need not always be withdrawal. Philosophers outside the Advaita fold hold that it has equally a positive outward attitude to objects, but an attitude which is free. In plain language, it is a high order of reflective attitude unbound by empirical bias and pre-possessions. Such free looking toward things of the world reveals, we are told, a whole host of deeper truths in a progressive systematic manner, some parallel of which we find in the transcendental psychologies of Kant, Hegel and other transcendentalists in the West. Though ordinarily a close secret, this transcendental psychology has been systematically developed in Pātañjala Yoga and half systematically in many Śaiva and Śākta texts. Later in the texts of Haṭayoga we find a similar

study of sensation and body-feeling, though, it appears, with excesses at places.

IV

So far with transcendental psychology. As for normal empirical psychology, we find a complete study of all relevant details in the different systems of Indian philosophy. We give below a short account with emphasis on novel points.

Psychology of Sensation and Perception: Sensation is direct awareness corresponding to sense-data. These sense-data are not merely colours, tastes, smells, touch-qualities and sounds, they also include substances, universals, *etc.*, and, according to some, negation in addition. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that sensation is no introspectable stage, but just a presupposition to be inferred from the complexity of the content of perceptual judgment or, better, of judgmental perception, which is introspectable at the lowest. Other Indian psychologists, on the other hand, hold that it is an actually introspectable stage, and some hold, like the Hegelians, that though it is an introspectable stage the datum here is only a homogeneous experience out of which distinct items, relations and the resulting complex later develop.

Hindu psychologists all believe that where a substance has colour and moderate size it is taken in by the senses if it is in contact with the eyes. In the case of auditary and other sensations the corresponding substances are sensed if only they are simultaneously in contact with the eyes also. Hence air as a substance is not sensed though we sense its touch-quality.

Hindu psychologists do not admit kinaesthetic sensation of *weight*. The weight of a thing is, according to them, only inferred, not sensed. But other kinds of kinaesthetic sensation are in a way allowed. Motion (*karma*), for example, is sensed as inherent in a substance. Some of the *karmendriyas* correspond to, though certainly they are not identical with, motor nerves. (The Hindu classification of *karmendriyas* would be an interesting subject for modern research.) If motor sensibility is allowed in modern psychology, the old Indian thinkers may be taken as having admitted this also

in their doctrine of *karmendriya*. As for organic sensation, this too is included in that doctrine. Some of these thinkers have even allowed coanaesthesis as general undefined tactual sensation. Interesting details of these sensations have also been worked out in different systems, particularly in Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya.

As for the mechanism involved in sensing, we often find subtle details discussed. The general theory of the origination of visual sensation is, however, exactly the opposite of any that is modern. It is that the *indriya* concerned, *i.e.*, the subtle power operating in the physiological eye, in the form of subtle light, goes out and touches the object. This may be naive from the modern point of view : the empirical evidences adduced by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may not stand modern scientific scrutiny. But a hypothesis of this kind explains many of the puzzles involved in visual sensation ; and be it noted that most of the Indian thinkers admitted that light is fast-moving. As regards other sensations, however, there is no question of this going out, though in the Advaita system we find another general theory, *viz.* that *antaḥkaraṇa* comes out through the end-organs and gets shaped according to the shape of the object. "Shape" is here a most generalised concept.

The view that the substance (and equally the whole over and above parts) is *sensed* dispenses with the necessity of the modern doctrine that perception, as distinct from sensation, is presentative-representative. (Indian psychologists would in this respect side with the Gestalt psychologists.) That, however, it involves simultaneous differentiation and integration is admitted in their doctrine of *savikalpa pratyakṣa*. This *savikalpa pratyakṣa* is the perception of a closely integrated complex where not merely different qualities are integrated with one another, but qualities are integrated with substance, one substance with another, a particular with a corresponding universal, and so on. If the forms of this integration are called "thought forms", we should say that these forms are, in perception, fused with the sensed contents, so much so that one should call the resulting complex "judgmental perception" rather than "perceptual judgment". In thought proper these forms stand relatively free. It should be noted in this

connection that according to most of the Hindu thinkers these forms of integration are as much factual objective relations as subjective forms.

The phenomena called "complication" or "fusion" and "synasthesia" are admitted by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in its doctrine of *jñānalakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa*, though philosophers of other schools have stoutly denied this.

As for perception of space and time, there are different opinions among Indian psychologists ; but few of them have proceeded on solid introspective grounds. Here they have relied more on inference. What they have worked out in this connection is more philosophy than psychology. Probably Yoga is the solitary exception.

Psychology of Memory and Thought : Memory is a favourite subject to Indian psychologists. As already noted, they explain retention by unconscious traces. They have not indeed studied the acquisitive phase of memory. But about traces they have always to say something interesting, though mostly in a speculative interest ; and Yoga has even spoken of deliberate manipulation and control of such traces in *asamprajñāta samādhi*. Details, however, are lacking, and often the whole approach is esoteric. With regard to *revival*, however, we find systematic study in connection with the consideration of *illusion*. Particularly in Vivaraṇa and Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha we find this systematic study.

The psychology of *thought* is extremely well developed in Indian philosophy. There is seldom any Sanskrit synonym of "thought". This is because Indians never recognised any attitude that is common to *meaning* (of words and sentences), *perceptual judgment* (better, judgmental perception) and *inference* (and allied processes). These, according to them, are all distinct processes, not modes of a common process called "thought", and as regards the *subject's reference to objects*, a process which often in modern psychology goes by the name "thought", Indians would all refuse to recognise it as at all a psychical phenomenon. It, according to them, is nothing but knowledge, and knowledge is understood as only a mental event that reveals an object. Reference, assertion and the like are acts *in name only*. They are only *grammatical* verbs representing no real acts. Even Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas who

take knowing as really an act never take it as an act of meaning or referring to an object. Hence the modern concept of intellectual manipulation of problems, or even of inference as an intellectual *act*, is equally banned. Indians would on this point side with the Structural psychologists.

The details they have worked out of the thought forms they have recognised are extraordinarily thorough. All the systems are equally interested in these. The entire theory of knowledge that they have developed would considerably improve and correct the modern psychology of thought.

Psychology of Feeling and Emotion : There is some analysis of pleasure, pain and bewilderment in all systems of Indian philosophy ; and in Sāṅkhya, and particularly in Yoga, in their doctrines of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, the analysis is a little more thorough and interesting. Some philosophers have added another feeling called *upekṣā* (conscious indifference) ; but many of them have also uncritically called it cognitive (*upekṣābuddhi*). *Rāga* (attraction) and *dveṣa* (repulsion) for an object would go under *emotion*.

Rarely, however, have these philosophers ditinguished different types of pleasure and pain, *viz*., somatic resonance or hedonic tone, pleasure and pain as full-fledged psychic states, higher forms of pleasure, *etc*., *etc*. The only distinction they have drawn is between bodily and mental pleasure (and pain), and that also from the point of view of their cause ; and the Vedāntins have distinguished between these, on the one hand, and absolute bliss, on the other, which bliss they either fully or partly equate with the pure self.

As for emotions and their relation to body, on the one hand, and pleasure-pain, idea and conation, on the other, this has been studied as thoroughly as possible in some Vaiṣṇava systems, particularly of Bengal, and in the texts on aesthetics. The analysis and classification worked out there is an achievement of Indian psychology.

Psychology of Conation : Wish and will are analysed in most of the systems, though, except in Mīmāṁsā, we do not find all necessary details. Mīmāṁsā, however, offers a thorough analysis of these, at places more thorough than any in modern psychology. It has examined in all details the nature of these psychoses and the relations they bear to the subject, his ideas,

traces and emotions and also to the objects willed and the object used as means.

As for automatic actions, many of them are explained in their doctrine of *karmendriya* and *prāṇa.* The systematic study of these is found in treatises on Medicine, and, to some extent, in other systems including the Śaiva. Some of the automatic activities—those which a modern psychologist would call "instinctive", "racial" or "hereditary"—are all explained by their theory of *karma* and *janmāntara* ; the traces of the previous life mature into the biological activities of this life. This theory does not deserve immediate dismissal. The modern concept of instinct is certainly not less mysterious than this theory ; and though heredity and racial traces have to an extent been covered by modern science there is undoubtedly much left over to conjecture. Para-psychological phenomena, again, lend some support to this old Indian theory. Further, if abnormal activities are largely and vitally determined by complexes, and if this can be extended to many an activity of even the normal person, *prima facie* there is no reason why it may not be extended still further to accommodate biological activities, and in that case the complexes concerned have got to be pushed back for their origin to the previous life. This is Hormic psychology on a grand scale, though to be thoroughly re-examined in this twentieth century. Analysis of habitual actions rarely interested the old-day Indians. Some analysis we find in Yoga.

The problem of freedom of will was seldom discussed in Indian philosophy. Their analysis of will was generally in the line of the modern-day Structural psychologists. Yet, obviously, freedom could not be denied. For, were all acts absolutely determined by previous conditions and attending circumstances, and in the long run by traces of the past life, there could be no question of *mukti* (final liberation). Hence free will must have been accommodated somewhere. This we find in their doctrine of *vairāgya* (detachment). Ordinary wills are all initiated by attachment in the form of *rāga* or *dveṣa.* Activities springing from detachment, according to Indian thinkers, leave no *saṁskāra* behind, so that if we go on practising such acts, in course of time when all the *saṁskāras* that are maturing in this life are exhausted, we shall have no

further *saṁskāra* accumulating in this life to mature again. This is *mukti.* Some, however, hold that such detached activity first leads to philosophic intuition which, in turn, yields *mukti.* Some, again, hold that the so-called detached activity is really no activity at all, but a type of *cognition.* Free will, thus, is an intriguing topic for Indian philosophy.

Self and Others

GOOD LIFE is always, to whatever extent, spiritual. The spiritual is that which involves an attitude of freedom, a possibility—of which we are conscious—of our standing aside the natural order, not blindly submitting to it. This freedom may be cognitive, emotional or moral. Questioning or certifying natural events is an example of cognitive freedom ; self-effacement in conscious love points to free emotions ; and moral prescriptions, unlike other commandments, are meant to be carried out freely, it being frankly acknowledged from the beginning that the agent to carry them out has the freedom to act otherwise.

In Nature there is no questioning or certification. Nature proceeds in its fixed course, unconcerned whether one challenges it or issues a certificate. Challenge and certification are in another order which is over-natural. Self-effacement in conscious surrender is equally no natural phenomenon, all effacement in Nature being only forced. Nor is self-effacement an act of moral freedom. An agent carrying out prescriptions rather asserts himself, though, it may be, in a form of sacrifice ; he feels that the good he does to others is his own doing. Moral freedom also is nothing natural—Nature would never allow that an act be otherwise than as causally determined. If Nature is at all to accommodate a sort of freedom it is only indeterminacy as a surd, no conscious freedom to undo a natural order.

The over-natural freedom in moral life is also evident from the fact that the well-being meant for the moral agent is no natural phenomenon. Moral prescriptions, if carried out, may lead to earthly adjustment, but equally they may not, and whatever earthly adjustment is intended is possible through the development of the agent's freedom. There is no faultless adjustment unless effected this way. Empirical adjustments create ever-new problems for further adjustment : there is always a lack of good felt pointedly. The well-being meant in morality is always total, though it may have degrees of perfection.

Could there be good life if I were the only person in the world ? The question is relevant to each of the three types of good life—cognitive, emotional and moral. But as in common parlance the third alone is considered good life we begin with this third. The second and the first will come in incidentally or in the sequel.

The good for moral life is what one ought to do, and what I feel I ought to do (under certain circumstances) entails that others also ought to do it (under the same circumstances). *Ought* is an objective demand ; but unless it be an *ought-to-be*, it is nothing independent of one's doing.[1] There may be an independent *ought-to-be*—a theoretical value—which we seek to approach. But *ought-to-do* which is only a prescription, though ideal, cannot have Platonic being. It is what I have to make real and, therefore, no reality before it is brought to being. Yet, however, it is not felt as un-objective ; it is felt as having a demand on us. This objectivity of *ought-to-do* can be explained in three possible ways each of which presupposes another self, directly or indirectly.

The objectivity may be taken as lying in a sort of consensus —I feel I ought to do X because I feel that others also feel this demand. Those others, again, feel that way because every one of them feels that everyone else (including myself) feels it. There is no circle here. What is intended is that my feeling the demand is at the same time everybody's feeling. One may, if one likes, call it universal feeling, but the universal here is primarily distributive.

The universal may also, if one likes, be understood non-distributively as an over-personal self. But even then, as not the individual self willing the *ought*, it is another. The individual may in some sense be identical with this another. But there is some difference somewhere, and that is enough. The self taking the command feels that it is coming from another.

The third way of explaining the objectivity of *ought-to-do* is naively to take it as coming from some external authority. This authority cannot be impersonal, it cannot be a colourless repository of independent values; for moral values, we have seen, do not exist before they are worked out. The repository in question is either God or some elder or an organism like society, state, *etc.* A prescription is an order

just in so far as it is ordered, and none but a person, individual or collective, can order. The question of another self necessarily comes in.

Are there only two selves involved in the moral context and not many more? In the second and the third explanations above, the source of *ought-to-do* is a person, an agent that orders. In contrast with him, and standing before him, I feel that, though a possible executor, I am actually a recipient only, a person who is addressed—in plain language, an objective self. At this stage I am not indeed a mere item of Nature; in the moral context I always have a problematic—and at this stage problematic only—dimension of freedom. This is exactly the characteristic of *you*. *You* as addressed is an objective self, not actually the *I* that addresses, and yet a possible *I* in that I believe that you feel yourself an *I*. *You*, so far, is one who calls himself 'I' but whom the addresser does not call 'I'. Moral order is addressed to me as such an objective *I*. Once this is recognised, the possibility of many selves in the plural comes in inevitably. The objective *I* is one among many, much as any objective thing is. "I" in this sense is a common noun, not basically a personal pronoun. When I address a person, that particular person is not the only *you*: to me other persons may equally stand as *you*—they are all potential *yous*. I have the freedom to address them also in turn, and often, again, I address several persons simultaneously as 'you' in the plural. So other *yous* are at least possible. Not merely that; they follow necessarily from the concept of *you* that is addressed. *You* does not cease to be when the address ceases, nor is it nothing before it is addressed. *You* continued and will continue as *he*, the word 'he' being a name for possible *you*. If moral order is meant for me as *you*, it is equally meant for every *he*.

There is yet another reason why the 'objective I', *i.e.* 'you', should be a common noun. *You* is not merely one addressed as a foreigner bossing over or being bossed over by me. It may also be one surrendered to in love where to that *you* I am a secondary *you* non-resisting. To you as a boss also I surrender and so stand as a secondary *you*, but in that case I resist and so retain my subjectivity. But in loving submission there is no resistance. It is in such submission

that the secondary *you* involves the possibility of many other *yous*. Love in submission—what may be called feminine love—is never jealous, it implies a community of lovers who equally submit to a lord. Jealousy is begotten of masculine love which wants to posssess the beloved: as so tending to possess, it cannot tolerate competition. Yet even this intolerance is an indirect pointer to other persons—possible competitors—who are to be debarred.

'You' and 'he' as common nouns in a way imply an infinity of possible *yous* and *hes*. Difficulty arises with regard to the unobjective *I*, the *I* that is not submissive or ordered. The unobjective *I* is one that loves in a masculine way, or orders or freely works out an order. It is the unique subjective *I* which, as the very concept indicates, has no parallel. There is no *I* but this one, and though *you* and *he* may call themselves 'I' this is no truly subjective *I*. *You* also is unique, but since it changes into *he* this uniqueness cannot be a permanent feature. *I*, on the other hand, never loses its uniqueness, unless it has deliberately walked over to a *you* in loving submission. Even the remembered *I* is not discontinuous with the *I* that remembers. Are other selves involved in the notion of *subjective I*?

We reply 'Yes'. How otherwise could there be the concept of *we?* *We* is relevant not merely in the context of loving submission, it is relevant in the context of free execution also. The sentence 'Let us jointly do this' is neither meaningless nor false. There may not be an intelligible statement like 'Let *us* love her', but a statement like 'Let us fix her up in some office' is intelligible.

Even the sentence 'Let us love her' is not entirely unintelligible. It implies that there are other subjective *I*-s putting forward their claims, but that I am resisting them. This attitude of resistance tends indeed to dissolve *we*, but presupposes a prior *we* to dissolve. It follows that where there is no such resistance there is an active *we*, a real commonwealth of participators. There is no case of 'I acting'. It is either 'we acting' or 'I alone acting', and aloneness implies active exclusion of other persons who form *a priori* a commonwealth of *I*-s, viz. *we*.

It is indeed impossible to exclude other persons so long as I stand embodied. The self to start with is not a pure *I*

transcending the body. It is a self-with-body. But if so, even this is not the whole story of the actual *I*. If the self at this stage incorporates the body it, for the same reason, incorporates many other things. The body is incorporated because it is so closely allied to the self that often I call it *myself*. But the body alone is not so close. My emotions, choices and cognitions, my character and, above all, my heritage are equally close. Not that I cannot get away from my heritage or change my character, nor that particular mental states are always to cling to me. But do not boils on the body rise and disappear? Can I not, again, change my body and even commit suicide? The self to start with is a homogeneous complex of self, body, mind, character and heritage. The only criterion for distinguishing the self, understood in this sense, from the not-self is whether something is so closely allied to me that I can legitimately call it *myself*. Once, however, heritage is taken as incorporated the question of other selves comes in. For heritage includes my relation to a community of persons. Other persons are inevitable correlates of the initial self.

Moral life, we have seen, is spiritual. But this spirit in man is nothing transcendent as yet. Moral man is yet the total man, the homogeneous self-body-mind-heritage complex. Freedom, the spiritual in man, is felt indeed at this stage, but not felt as transcendent. Moral orders are yet in definite empirical contexts, and neither the orderer nor the executor views the well-being apart from such contexts. Not that transcendent freedom is denied, but it is not also explicitly in view. The idea is that freedom at this stage is meant or felt as only a vague problematic dimension of the natural man. The natural man is still the dominant context, though there is a vague hint at a possible freedom, a possible spirit.

So long as the consciousness of *ought-to-do* has not dawned upon the natural man there is no hint even of the spirit. At the moral level there is such hint, though the man is still dominantly natural. The self is still immersed in the multitude of things, though it folds itself as it were and understands one flap in a possible different dimension. In both the stages other selves are admitted. That the natural man is constitutionally gregarious is an accepted doctrine today, and

we have seen how the consciousness of *ought-to-do* implies other selves as necessary correlates.

Other persons are *you* and *he*-s, as distinct from *I*. A careful scrutiny of the three types of self will help clarification of the notion of good life *vis a vis* other selves.

I, at the stage we are considering, am at least embodied. But in the consciousness of *I* there is a consciousness of transcendence. Somehow or other *I* claims to transcend the body, though the transcendence is yet problematic. This is evidenced by the fact that bodily changes do not affect 'I'-consciousness. In spite of serious changes in the body there is the same 'I'-consciousness persisting, except, of course, in abnormal cases of dual personality. The transcendence demanded by *you*, on the other hand, is never so radical. If for a second time you come to me with your body appreciably changed I cannot recognise you. Not that you are nothing but a particular body: I do not address that body. I am addressing a self, and so far you claim to transcend that body. But the body is also indispensable to you the self.

The continuity of the past you with the present one is not merely known but constituted by the body in question. If that body could be ignored you would be only one of *us*. *You* as addressed is a foreigner. Address implies alienation, though in actual speaking to you there is something more than address, *viz*. friendly communication. Speaking to you is really inviting you to be a member of our commonwealth. 'Inviting' implies that you are yet an alien, but as I am inviting you to be *one of us* this implies that I understand you as potentially my friend, as potentially a member of our commonwealth. Antagonism and affinity alternate in the concept of *you*, the body being responsible for the antagonism and the transcendent self for the affinity.

So far with *I* and *you*. As for *he*, this is one with whom I still have personal relation, though in the form of memory or anticipation. The personal relation here is at the lowest ebb, but never dried up. With other members of my commonwealth I have the most cordial personal relations ; with you and your commonwealth the relation is still living, but not cordial enough, except so far as you are taken as a potential member of *our* commonwealth. With *he*, on the other hand,

the relation, though yet personal, is more distant. For *he* is alienated not merely from *I*, but also from *you*. If your alienation from me is constituted by your body, his alienation from me through alienation from you is constituted by body squared. In speaking to you I am conscious of your self which, though partly constituted by your body, also transcends it ; and this alone makes the speaking relevant. But I never speak to a *he*. I spoke indeed to him as a past *you* and shall speak when he will be a *you*, but I never speak—in the present tense—with him. As, now, the present he is already a *possible you* and as my speaking to the present *he* is also only *possible*, in the form of past or future speaking, it follows that *he* that is spoken to is only a possibility of possibility. It follows also that there is only a possibility of possibility of his self transcending his body. Your and my selves are at least possibly transcendent, but his self as incapable of being spoken to has not even this transcendence. *He*, therefore, is wholly constituted by his body. His self and body coalesce.

But he can neither be denied to be a self. He is not like chairs and tables. Unlike these, he, I believe, calls himself 'I'. Yet this *I* is not what I feel livingly. It is somehow a symbolisation of *I* proper. What, then, we mean by coalescence of his self and body is that he-self is *never more than* a dimension involved in a body. I-self, though a similar dimension, is yet believed as realisable ; and there is at least an attempt to realise you-self. You-self in its purity cannot indeed be realised except in loving submission, because that *you* is only one-I-address, this hyphenation to me standing in the way of the independent assertion of you. Yet there is an attempt to realise it through friendly communication. But in the case of he-self there is no attempt even. If *you* is a possible *I*, *he* is a possible *you*. If *he* were only a possible *I* there would be no distinction between *you* and *he*.

The immediate awareness of *you*, and *a fortiriori* of *I*, should not be lightly dismissed. *You* is only as spoken to, and *I* the free speaking (or acting). Such *I* or *you* is not to be sought in the world of natural objects or as coordinate with them. Freedom is no natural phenomenon ; it stands aside the natural order and is to be realised either in withdrawal from it or through re-orienting the world of natural objects

or through free denial of the freedom attained. A naturalist tends to understand self as either a dead object or at most as a *he* or *you*, believing that *he* or *you* is a natural phenomenon. But a dead object is no self, and *you* as self is one-to-whom-I-speak and *he* is only a possible *you*, so that unless one is definite about the knowledge of *I* no light is thrown on the knowledge of self in general. It as freedom is never apprehended in terms of nature. It is neither a state nor a function, nor even an objective presupposition, of the body. That would not merely be missing the freedom or the transcendence felt, there would be another difficulty. The body in question is already *my* body, so that for a naturalist there is mystery even at the starting point. The very datum to start with is already *my*, *your* or *his* body. Nor can it be held that freedom with all its peculiarity is *inferred* from the characteristics of the body. For even the overnatural that is inferred is ultimately taken as natural, though peculiar. Even the maximum of naturalistic manipulation with items of nature will fall infinitely short of the over-natural. The inferential account can at most be a distant picture of the over-natural. But whereas in all inferential account it is believed that, given favourable natural situation, the inferred can be directly realised in a naturalistic way, there is *ex hypothesi* no such possibility with regard to the over-natural.

I is realised in an over-natural attitude and in contra-distinction with *you* and everything that is natural. The natural cannot be realised over-naturally, much as the reverse, and except in loving submission all attempt to realise *you* fails. In explicit contrast with these the *I* as knower, masculine lover, orderer or executor stands realised. Loving submission too is not possible unless one has first realised freedom in this manner, for only after it has been realised can there be free denial of it. The way in which over-natural freedom is realised through such contradistinction may be called *subjective attitude.* It must be noted that even in this attitude there are stages to pass through. The freedom realised at a stage may at a higher stage be found to have yet been due to subtle natural determinants unnoticed at that previous stage.

The freedom that is realised is thus primarily *I*, and *you* as possible freedom can never be realised except in a specific self-negating attitude of *I* the freedom. *I*-freedom thus tends to abound in self-sufficiency. Could such self-sufficient life be called good? It would be so called if only the self-sufficiency approximated to could be realised. As a matter of fact, at every stage of realisation, however remote, there is an unavoidable reference to *you*, an objective *I*[1], complete self-sufficiency being only a limiting case entertained in faith only as an Idea. It will be presently seen that there is also no contradiction in I-self objectifying itself.

The same *I* which is freedom—knower, orderer or executor—appears also as *you* in the form of known *I* or beloved or ordered. In love, for example, which begins with the sense of freedom (unless it be merely natural) and then freely denies that freedom, the free subject is turned into a *you*, not merely in identifying itself with the *you* that is loved but also in presenting itself as a *you* to be taken up by that loved *you*. This is literally a process of metamorphosis—*I* completely changes into *you* by denying its I-hood. As in this process there is denial of I-hood there is no question of contradiction. It cannot be said that free denial of freedom is itself a contradiction. The second freedom is at a higher stage of realisation, realised *de novo* in the form of *you*. Even in masculine love where the beloved is taken as under my loving care the attitude is never wholly masculine. I, taking care of the beloved, have a subtle expectation of being responded to and so far turn myself into a *you* to the *you* beloved. Here too there is no contradiction. Taking care and expectation of response—my I-hood and you-hood—only alternate.

In moral life too there are both subjective and objective *I*-s, and yet no contradiction. Moral life is the life of free will, and freedom of will is realised in creation of objects. There is no will that does not cause a change in nature. Only, in *free* will that change is *created*. Natural will is an item of Nature. (One may even refuse to call it will.) Yet it differs

[1] The objective *I* is a *you*, but all *yous* are not objectified *I*. Other *yous* are not also *possible* objectification of *I*. Those *yous* are believed as independent, though that independence cannot be realised.

from every other natural item in that it must cause some change—produce some effect. With regard to other things in Nature the law of causality is that every event must have a cause, not that every event must have an effect. Will, however, is a natural thing that not only has a cause but must also have an effect. In *free* will there is only the absence of causedness, for freedom, we have seen, is over-natural. As will, however, it must produce an effect. Effectuation by something which is not itself an effect is precisely what is meant by 'creation.' Freedom of will consists not in the capability of refusing to produce a change, it consists in not itself being determined in or before producing that change. When, in contrast, a natural cause leads to an effect, it being itself an item in the inexorable causal order is bound to lead to that effect.[2]

Free will as free is uncaused, but as will it must produce some change in nature. As will it has to be realised as producing Nature ; only, this production is creation. The first change that it creates and through which it realises itself is a change in my mental nature. We may say that it creates mental nature anew, the already existing stuff being used as a means only. In other words, it creates the objective self, a *you*, and realises itself in the form of the created *you*. Through that *you* it creates body and through that the rest of Nature. There is no contradiction here, because free will does not realise itself in its subjectivity.

It is only in cognitive life that the metamorphosis of free cognition into the known *I*—an object, a *you*—presents a serious problem. Cognition as free refuses to be determined by Nature. As doubting it challenges Nature, and when it issues a certificate Nature is made to dance to its tune. Doubt is the reflective awareness of the absence of certification ; hence certification is the primary cognitive freedom. Certification is a way of answering the question 'Why is something that I know to be taken as real ? ', and the answer is ultimately

[2] Another peculiarity of free will, following from its over-naturality, is that it uses accessories freely. It has the freedom to accept or not to accept them, and if it is to produce a change, as it must, it may freely choose other accessories. In Nature there is no plurality of causes, admission of such plurality or indeterminism being either intellectual failure or a subtle turn-back from the naturalistic attitude. Plurality of causes, however, is the very law to free will.

'Because I know it'. One type of knowledge, say inference, may be preferred to another, but the ultimate certificate is *my knowing the object.* Inferentially one might show that the ultimate certificate is that the object has produced the knowledge. But this fact of production as a natural process has after all to be known. This production can at all be a certificate only as I know it. In certification there is always a *because-therefore* which is an intelligible category so far only as it is an expression of my knowing. In Nature there is no neutral *because-therefore.* Certification in the form of 'I know' is parallel to identification of a person. The credentials of a person are accepted when someone whose credentials are self-evident identifies him. The reason for accepting the person is the identifier himself who as self-identifying cannot be a sheer item of Nature. Were he a mere item of Nature his credentials would also have been demanded. The identifier, and, therefore, the identification itself, is over-natural. Knowledge too as certifying is similarly over-natural subjectivity, neither caused by Nature nor requiring a certificate from it. Immediately, therefore, as the question of certification is raised I am aware of a subjectivity which being in no way determined by Nature has no need also of looking over to that Nature. This subjectivity tends to be realised in itself, in its pure I-hood. How possibly can it have a swing-back, a transformation into *you* the transcendence of which over Nature can never be realised? ' We reply as follows :

The realisation of cognitive freedom has two aspects. It is the realisation of *I* (a) as having nothing to do with *you* and (b) as in itself. In the first aspect there is no complete negation of *you*, what is negated being only its demanded autonomy. The ghostly *you* continues. It continues as a plaything to compensate for my feeling of loneliness. No play, however, is random ; only, the rules of play here are not compelling as to others. The rules too have lost their independence. They are permitted, but in complete freedom. The objective *I* which to some trascendentalists was an enigma is thus found to be not incorrelatable with the *I* that is pure. The objective *I* is a *shadow* of the pure *I.* It follows that there is no contradiction here too. A real and a shadow do not form two things to make room for contradiction.

Unlike illusion, hallucination and dream-content, a shadow cannot be (as a matter of fact, has never been) taken as false, in the sense of what is rejected, though it is not taken as real either. Shadows are somehow permitted as innocent adjuncts. They never claim to usurp the rights of the reals of which they are shadows. They are never aggressive, they peacefully co-exist with reals.

There is no contradiction even if in the second aspect of realisation, mentioned above, *I* is taken as transformed into a *you*. At the optimum realisation *I* does not indeed feel lonely to require a shadowy playmate. Yet there is an intelligible possibility of *you*. If at the previous stage there was a shadowy replica of all the normal I-you relations it must be admitted that at that stage the pure *I* was also an object—a *you*—to that *you*, though in the over-all context of play. The *I* at the next higher stage of realisation must, therefore, be one who at the pevious stage perceived the purest self, already attained, as still an object. As this perception too is all play there is no contradiction. The highest *I* as transcending even the purest subject, is beyond all subject-object distinction. It is an Absolute which freely plays with both the purest subject and what was objective *I* to that subject. As, however, the purest subject was a *you* to only that *you* which was its own shadowy objectification, the Absolute must be taken as having some special affinity with the purest subject, the possibility of its play with *you* arising only as it was incarnate in the purest subject.

Thus even in transcendent life where freedom is realised to whatever extent there is reference to *you*, whether that transcendent life be emotional, moral or cognitive ; and the reference in none of the cases is a contradiction. Optimum cognitive realisation where *I* is realised in self-sufficiency without even the remotest reference to *you* is only an Idea. Actual good life, therefore, whether half natural yet or in the transcendent attitude of realisation, is always in reference to *you* ; and as *you* is basically a common noun there is always reference to an infinite number of selves. In moral life these other selves are my creations, more or less perfect, the stuff on which these creations are imposed being used as only means and instruments. In emotional life they are just there,

not created, and the lovers either go over to them or possess them. In that form of cognitive life which is *good* the knower, abounding in self-sufficiency, just plays with shadowy persons, though not unmethodically. The method, however, is itself shadowy, which means that though all good is done to them and they are all loved there is no attachment to them, not even the minimum attachment that is required for serious moral life.

The Concept of Self in Buddhism

I

NYAYA-VAISESIKA, apart, the minimum that is connoted by the word "self" is that it is a *subject*, and the minimum that is connoted by the word "subject" is that it is something to which objects—non-mental or mental—are revealed: it is that which looks at things called *object*. The definition of subject in terms of feeling and will would only be secondary. Whether this subject may, in its turn, be an object, either to itself or to another self, is a question that may be kept open at this stage. The minimum that we insist on is that it is more than object—in common language, it is the knower in contrast with which objects are merely known.

If Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has not agreed to this, it is because in that system the word "self" never means the knower in the usual sense of the term, but only a locus—which is an object among objects—where mental states are said just to occur.

It may, then, be accepted that the self is a subject. What, now, is the relation of this self to mental states, particularly to the states that are called *cognition*? Are these states also subjective or are they never more than *objects* to the self? There are all varieties of answer to this question in Indian philosophy. We select here only one of them and defend it just in order that it, coupled with the view that the self is subjective, may form the background against which we may in later sections develop the different Buddhist views of self.

The particular view of mental states that we take up here belongs to Advaita, Sāṅkhya-Yoga and a few other allied schools. It is that all mental states, cognition included, are mere objects, never subjective. If they appear different from other objects, called physical, this is because they are phosphorescent of a kind which physical objects are not; and if on account of the luminosity of light and the ordinary phosphorescence of certain materials they are not regarded

as subjective, there is no reason why the peculiar phosphorescence of mental states should be treated otherwise. The idea is that mental states, in spite of their phosphorescence, are yet known as *objects* by the self and never occupy the position of knowers or selves. They may be felt immediately as they occur,[1] it may also be granted that nothing that is non-mental is felt that way. But this does not prove that they are subjective. This primitive feel of mental states is entirely at the unreflective level where the subject self has not yet learnt to *look at* these states as in introspection and cannot, therefore, at this stage, understand its own relation to them. What happens at this stage can only be inferred from the stage of reflection where the self stands aloof and looks at the states from the outside, so to say. The only retrospective account of the unreflective stage, from the point of view of reflection, would be that the self, as always capable of dissociating itself and, therefore, metaphysically a separate entity, was somehow, at this stage, fused with mental states. Were these states themselves subjective there could be no intelligible account of reflection. At the unreflective stage, therefore, as in reflection, mental states are objects only, not subjective.

If Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Prābhākaras have pleaded for exception for *cognitive* mental states, that is for another reason. To Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika there is no unreflective mental state in the sense that such a state could be apprehended without there being introspection (reflection), and the Prābhākaras hold that unreflective cognition, as distinct from other mental states, is already half reflective, the only distinction between it and reflective cognition being that in the latter the sense of *I* as the knower is explicit while at the unreflective stage it remained implicit. But these two views of cognition appear unusually desperate. Mental states are as a matter of fact felt even though there is no introspection, and the distinction between implicit and explicit is always a too easy solution.

We grant, then, that mental states are never more than objects and that, as distinguished from them, the self is, to speak the least, *also* subjective.

[1]Unless they are unconscious states of which we are not speaking here.

II

It is mainly in contrast with these two Hindu points that one may best understand the Buddhist views of self. All Buddhists, irrespective of whatever school they belong to, have repudiated both the points.

Like the Hindus the Buddhists have offered different theories of self. But all agree that a self as dissociate from mental states is never *definitely assertible.* Some may have gone further and held that there is no such self at all, some that even as not so dissociate it cannot be definitely asserted and some, again, that as dissociate it cannot be even definitely denied. But all agree that as dissociate it cannot be definitely asserted.

The Buddhists have demonstrated this either through psychological analysis or through logical arguments. The logical arguments they have offered are well known and need not be re-stated. We are concerned in these sections with their psychological demonstration.

Why should the Hindus speak at all of a dissociate self? Is it because mental states are objects and the self views them from apart? But, first, the Buddhists refuse to recognise mental states as objects; and, secondly, they insist that even from a distance the self has always to view some mental state—there is no occasion, and we cannot imagine one, where there is a self and yet no mental state to look at. From the first it follows that the self the Hindus speak of is a gratuitous concept, and the second proves that even if there be a self over and above mental states its distance from these can never be eliminated and is, therefore, no evidence for its self-containedness. This distance they will explain otherwise than by postulating a dissociate self.

The Buddhists, particularly the Yogācāras, hold that mental states are subjective. Against the Hindu view delineated above they would hold that this subjectivity is constituted precisely by the peculiar luminosity of these states. They are subjective precisely because they are felt immediately as they occur. This luminosity cannot be a type of objective phosphorescence. It is so very different from ordinary types of phosphorescence that we cannot class it with them. To

the objection that all this is only at the unreflective stage of feeling which has to be retrospectively interpreted in terms of reflection where the subjective self finds these as objects and objects only—to this objection they would reply by interpreting reflection in a new manner altogether.

According to the Hindu view in question reflection is the fact that a self which is subjective views mental states as objects. But is the *viewing* itself intelligible on this view? Is it subjective or only an object? As belonging in whatever capacity to the self it cannot be an object; yet, for these Hindus, cognition is an object, and is not this *viewing* a form of cognition? One cannot say that the viewing in question is the very nature of the self, not cognition as a mental state to be viewed. For, then, there would be another difficulty. Is it a never-ceasing affair or does it occur only when there is a mental state to be viewed? If the latter, it cannot be the very nature of the self which, according to those who admit such self, is eternal. Nor can it be an eternal affair as it does not differ *in nature* from cognition as a *mental state*. If it reveals mental states, cognition also reveals things outside the mind. Is not the relation between cognition as a mental state and an object outside the same as that between the self's viewing and the mental state viewed? No difference in nature should be postulated merely on the ground that the objects related to are different or that while one of them resides in the self the other does not. This is why in Advaita both are called *jñāna* (cognition). But if so, why call them different affairs? Is it because one is in the context of reflection and the other is in connection with the primitive feel of a mental state? But, then—to come back to our old question—what exactly is the distinction between reflection and unreflective feeling? The Advaitin holds that at the stage of unreflective feeling the self somehow stands fused with mental states and cannot, therefore, be aware of its intrinsic separateness evident in reflection. The Buddhists, however, would offer a new account altogether which is much simpler. They would say that in reflection a cognition as a mental state comes to be related to another mental state (which may well be a cognition) in a way different from how at the unreflective stage a cognition stands related to it.

All cognitions are mental states and all of them are subjective, and the difference between the unreflective stage and reflection is to be explained by the different ways in which a mental state stands related to a cognition. At the unreflective stage a cognition stands undistinguishedly fused with a mental state, and in reflection a cognition stands in a different relation to a mental state.

III

According to the Buddhists, then, mental states are themselves subjective. From this it is only an easy passage to a more far-reaching conclusion, *viz.* that there is no need any longer of a self as the Hindus claim. The self as a subject would have been a necessary postulate if mental states were mere objects. But once they are taken as themselves subjective it is no use postulating another subject.

So far with the self as subject which the Buddhists would never admit. The self, however, is popularly understood as also a unitary core-point round which personality develops. How would the Buddhists react to this notion of self?

They have nothing against this popular notion. They would only demand a clearer idea of what this core-point could actually be. Is it something other than mental states, in the sense that it can hold its own even in the absence of these states? Or is it an other in a less rigorous sense? They hold that it cannot be an other in the sense of being self-contained. Dispositions (*saṁskāras*) apart, with which we are not for the present concerned, we never come across—they hold—a self standing all alone with no mental state to give it company. They would even wonder how at all there could be the idea of a lonely self. The question of absolute loneliness could arise only if there were gradual lessening of accompaniments. But in the actual state of affairs there are never more than a few mental states at a time, and every time they are so few in number that nobody ever thinks of reducing that number. Many Hindus even hold that there is never more than one mental state at a time.

Even in swoon or dreamless sleep there is no self as subject standing all alone in the midst of nothing. Whatever core-

point there is at these stages is either no subject and, therefore, no self in the usual sense of the term, or not alone.

It is not a subject, because at these stages it is not conscious of itself. There cannot be a subject which is not conscious of itself either through primitive feel or reflectively. By definition, we have seen, the subject is that which looks at . . . , and looking-at would be a misnomer if the subject to do this work were not conscious of itself.

It would be equally senseless to argue, as the Advaitins have done, that though we do not actually at this stage find the self as conscious we may yet infer this from what we feel when we wake up. Only an unconscious state could be inferred retrospectively. To say that there was some consciousness though it was not felt would be a blatant absurdity. The subjective, we have seen, is by nature phosphorescent.

Further, even in swoon or dreamless sleep all mental states are not absent. There may not be a patent mental state at such stages. But traces or dispositions are continuing. *Saṁskāra skandhas* are also mental states, though not patent or phosphorescent, and at no stage of our mental life are *saṁskāras* wholly absent. These *saṁskāras* may be *kṣaṇika* (momentary), but that matters little. One *kṣaṇika saṁskāra* lapsing, the vacuum is immediately filled by another similar *saṁskāra*, and there is no knowing as to how long a series of particular *saṁskāras* will continue. One has no right, therefore, to postulate its cessation.

But how, then, could there be *nirvāṇa* ? The reply depends on what exactly the Buddhists mean by that term ? With them it does not mean factual cessation the Hindus speak of. To the Buddhists of all denominations, except the Mādhyamikas, it means just the awareness that there is nothing more than the series of mental states,[2] and the Mādhyamikas add that we cannot assert the series even. What has kept us in darkness is precisely the Hindu notion that there is a permanent self over and above mental states.

But how at all to explain personality if there are only series of mental states (*saṁskāras* included) ? The Buddhists also have not denied personality, they have recognised it in their doctrine of rebirth and the Law of Karma.

2 We are not concerned here with non-mental *dharmas*.

It appears that the Sāmmitiyas and Vātsiputriyas were most worried over this problem, and we are told that unlike other Buddhists they admitted the self. But was it the self which the Hindus have pleaded for? We venture to suggest that the self these Buddhists speak of is no *definite assertible*, nothing that is self-contained. It is *indefinite* in the sense that though, on the one hand, it is not self-contained, it, on the other hand, cannot be denied. It cannot be denied because otherwise the fact of personality and the notions of *Karma* and rebirth would go unaccounted for. That it cannot also be a definite assertible, *i.e.*, self-contained, may be shown through an analysis of the relation between a series and the items of which it is a series.

A series of items is nothing *over and above* the items, and yet it is not absolutely identical with them. The relation in question is like that between a *relation* and the terms it relates, assuming that the relation that relates is not an acknowledged separate item or items like the series of events that relate two men as teacher and pupil. When a relation is not of this type it is impossible to postulate another relation between the relation and the terms, which means that in a sense it is not different from the terms. Yet, on the other hand, we never take it as absolutely identical with them, nor as nothing but mere words as in cases like 'and', 'together with', 'different from', *etc.* The only reasonable solution would be to hold that the relation, though different from the terms, *gets exhausted* in them, "exhaustion" meaning that though the relation is different the difference does not amount to its actual or possible separateness. There are various kinds of difference. Sometimes the different is a clear self-contained entity, sometimes, again, it is never found actually separate (self-contained) but we believe that though factually it always goes with another it is yet capable of being separate. But the relation we are speaking of is, as different, never even possibly separate. In other words, it has no self-identity, though it is not for that reason identical with that from which it is different. Relation is, in this sense, *indefinite*, nothing self-contained, though undeniable at the same time.

What is true of relation is true equally of a series that is different from the items of which it is a series. The series is

in this sense indefinite. The self is nothing but a series of mental states. Hence it too is indefinite. By "self" the Sāmmitiyas and Vātsiputriyas may have meant nothing more than this indefinite self, a self which, though undeniable, is neither actually nor possibly a self-contained entity. Personality can as much centre round such indefinite self as round a self that is definite.

IV

No Buddhist, to whatever school he belongs, can possibly admit the self as a *definite assertible.* That would go straight against the Buddhist fundamentals. We have seen how we should interpret the "self" of the Sāmmitiyas and Vātsiputriyas. The self which the Yogācāras admit under the name *ālaya-vijñāna* is not also fundamentally different. It too is indefinite.

Ālaya-vijñāna is subjectivity par excellence which the Yogācāras *seek* to dissociate through different stages of mental life. But is it necessary for them to finalise this process of dissociation in the sense that at a certain stage they will have the pure subject all by itself—the pure heart that does not remain as the heart *of something?* To the end it may well remain the ultimate informing principle, but one that after all informs mental affairs at different levels. Could it ever be found all by itself it must have been recognised as an enduring substance, which no conscientious Buddhist can allow. Nor is *ālaya-vijñāna*, at whatever stage, momentary. Mental states are momentary, but not so their informing principle. As thus uncharacterisable either way it cannot be a substance or a state. It is no other than an *act*, the act of consciousness, which is never factually a separate entity, though undeniably as an informing principle it is different from the mental states it informs. A parallel doctrine of non-substantive act-self we find in Kant. He too could not deny the act-self—in his language, the act of transcendental apperception—and insisted that there is no possible assertion of it as an enduring substance.

No act is assertible either as over and above or as absolutely the same as the events it informs. The relation between

the act-self and mental states is largely similar to that between a series and the items of which it is a series. Largely similar, not wholly similar. For there is a difference which ought not to be overlooked. A series is neither actually nor even possibly dissociate from its terms, it has no self-identity whatsoever ; but the difference of the act-self from mental states points after all to a *possible* dissociation which may not, as a matter of fact, materialise. "Dissociable but not actually dissociate" is a novel concept. It indicates either a perpetual task of dissociation, a never-ending effort, or just a quiet self-conscious feeling of the pulsation of life without any effort for factual distinguishment. In either case the situation is romantically indefinite. If the Yogācāras have not meant the former they must have meant the latter. In plain language, *ālaya-vijñāna* is nothing transcendent, it is only an immanent ultimate. Unique personality may well centre round such indefinite self.

V

The Buddhist view of self, discussed so far, can be put in a nutshell as follows:

(*i*) No definite self can be asserted.
(*ii*) The indefinite self cannot be denied.

These are two basic propositions acceptable to all classes of Buddhists. It is only in their further elaboration that we find the Mādhyamikas parting company.

While for others the proposition (*i*) is readily reducible to "The definite self is denied" and the proposition (*ii*) to "The indefinite self is asserted", the Mādhyamikas would never allow such reduction. For them, non-assertion of X is not analytically the same as its denial, and non-denial of Y the same as its assertion. With others these have happened to be identical only as a matter of historical fact. Otherwise, for logic there is always a third attitude, *viz.* absolute non-committal.

When, for example, one feels intellectually convinced that all answers offered to a question are correct it is possible that he commits himself to none of them, and when all the answers are shown to be equally wrong non-committal is

indispensable. When all the answers are correct it is still possible to prefer one to others on some non-rational ground, but not so when all are equally wrong. The Mādhyamikas are for this second attitude of absolute non-committal which, for them, is the panacea for all the ills of life and precisely to promote which they have harnessed all their dialectical skill.

In our daily practical life we do indeed move between assertion and denial as the only two alternatives and disparage non-commital as sheer lack of decision. But the absolute non-committal of the Mādhyamikas is no mere privation. It is positively based on reason, every conceivable view being exposed as fallacious. One who is convinced that every view is wrong is no longer at the level of daily practical life, though he is not for that reason unpractical altogether. He does not indeed aim at this or that, but he is supremely cautious—and in a sense this is practicality at its highest—that he is not misled by dogmatic commitments that cause suffering. The attitude is practical par excellence as it removes suffering and engenders active sympathy for sufferers.

The Mādhyamika non-committal is not wholly negative either. Though technically called *śunyatā* it is really the supreme knowledge (*prajñā*) that every commitment is wrong, with its inevitable feeling and will co-efficients which are equally positive. The seer stands in the midst of everything and reacts to everything though he is committed to none.

Applying this supreme attitude to what is called 'self' the Mādhyamikas come to the following conclusion, remaining all the time conscious that this conclusion too is really no commitment, for it is not one among many possible conclusions *meant*, but just what is *shown* or *expressed*, as the modern Analysts would say.

Granted that no definite self can be asserted, from this it does not follow that it can be denied. So far it is neither assertible nor deniable. But this lack of assertion or denial should not for that reason be taken as itself a commitment. Those who propose to take it that way would be equally wrong. This does not, again, mean that the definite self *is* none of these, for this too would be a commitment. The only way out is to commit nothing, this committing

nothing being equally no commitment but just non-committal.

So the Mādhyamikas would neither assert nor deny the self by way of commitment. If there is no empirical evidence for its existence, neither is there any for its non-existence.

One might ask whether, if in spite of all our best search we do not find the self, this would not be a sufficient evidence for its denial. The Mādhyamikas would reply—It would have been so if we had assertion and denial as the only two alternatives. Once, however, we rise above both and prefer non-committal the whole picture is altered.

Thus the definite self which the Hindus speak of is, for the Mādhyamikas, neither assertible nor deniable in this peculiar sense of non-committal, and similarly with regard to the indefinite self. The Mādhyamikas will have nothing against the thesis "The indefinite self cannot be denied", but from this they will not draw the conclusion that therefore it is asserted. Further, to assert an indefinite would be a contradiction in terms. Whatever is asserted as existent is *ipso facto* a definite entity, a thing which is at least possibly self-contained. Normally when an indefinite is asserted as existent it is so asserted only as involved in some definites which have intrinsic existence, so that the existence which is predicated of it is only borrowed or transferred from those definites. This means that the indefinites by themselves cannot be asserted. They can be asserted only as exhausted in definites, which means that they are only presuppositions of definites which are existents and, therefore, not themselves existent. Nor are they, as we have just seen non-existent for that reason.

The attitude of Mādhyamikas is to a large extent similar to that of Kant in his "Critique of Pure Reason" or of Husserl in his "Ideas". Strange though it may sound, it may even be understood from the point of view of the modern Analysts. Kant has repeatedly said in his first Critique that the self as subject is neither assertible as existent nor deniable, it being only a transcendental presupposition of the empirical mental life. Husserl too, in his "Ideas", has taken the (pure) subjective at different levels as only phenomenological presuppositions, not existent (natural) facts. In the language of modern Analysis also we may say that the self is only a

postulate necessary for describing the mental life, nothing meant as real.

Agreeing so far with these philosophers, the Mādhyamikas differ, however, with them in other respects. While with Kant theoretical non-committal is only a preparation for a true Existentialist assurance of the self in pure moral life, with the Mādhyamikas it is cognitive attitude par excellence, the *prajñā* and the moral life, the calm compassion that expresses itself into synthetic moral life, is only *parallel to*—one might say, only another side of—this supreme cognition. The difference with Husserl lies in another direction. Even as unasserted (and non-denied) Husserl tried to *catch* the pure subjective acts at different levels and represent them in a complete chart, a venture which the Mādhyamikas would never approve. In general attitude the Yogācāras might to an extent be compared with Husserl in this respect, but not so the Mādhyamikas. As against the modern Analysts, the Mādhyamikas would point out that the subjective is no mere postulate, neither a mere dead cold requirement nor a mere linguistic convention. With them it is a living process, though neither assertible as existent nor deniable—either way an untenable but a living hypothesis all the same.

From the general Mādhyamika position it follows also that neither definiteness nor indefiniteness is a constitutive character of the self. From the beginning to the end it is epistemic, only a way of commitment to the self. Other Buddhists—the Sāmmitiyas, Vātsipuriyas and Yogācāras—did not talk of the definite and the indefinite self that way. With them definiteness or indefiniteness was understood as a constitutive character of the self.

Formal and Actual Freedom

The problem "Formal *vs.* Actual Freedom" is usually understood as the question whether certain definitions of freedom, started with as postulates, can hold to the last in actual situations, whether, in other words, these definitions are not *merely ideal*, never completely workable in given actual situations, and whether, therefore, a freedom that is workable —actual freedom—is not different from freedom that is ideal.

The usual problem "Formal *vs.* Actual Freedom" is thus based on the assumption that ideal freedom, otherwise called formal freedom, is a mere postulate. In the present paper we have challenged this assumption : we have claimed that formal freedom is a living over-natural process. Naturally, therefore, we have looked to the main problem from a different point of view and, more interested in the point of view itself than in many of the empirical details, we have had to be satisfied with a general analysis only.

Freedom is the fact that man sometimes stands aside nature and resists all pressure—physical, biological, psychic, social, *etc.* Free man, just so far as he is free, is thus outside Nature, "Nature" meaning the field where every event is completely determined by, *i.e.*, predictable, in principle, from other events that either precede it or happen after it determining it teleologically. If man is thus, as a matter of fact, sometimes outside Nature, it means that he has a capacity to remain so, for it is not by accident that he has slipped from Nature ; through sustained effort he can acquire a more or less permanent attitude of so standing aside, and whenever he stands aside he feels, rightly or wrongly, that he is more in himself.

Freedom is thus over-natural. But this does not mean that it is antagonistic or even indifferent to all that is Nature. We are speaking here of freedom of *will*, and will, we shall show later in detail, is nothing if it does not manipulate things of Nature. Over-natural freedom must, therefore, be represented in Nature also. At the level of Nature it is represented

by what is called *decision* which, though an empirical event, is abrupt somewhere. Decision, be it noted, only represents freedom, it is not freedom itself. Its abruptness, another name of which is freedom, is only its adjective.

Every decision is abrupt, *i.e.*, free, at some point. No complete account can be given as to why I decide for this particular act, and not that, at this particular time and place. Given all relevant conditions for an act, one may cooly decide for another. Complete empiricistic determination is at best a postulate, a mere prescription that there be nothing over-natural, and its success depends on how far an abrupt decision is amenable to such treatment. The treatment fails in many cases, and where it appears to succeed there is always a smuggling somewhere of something which is not un-ambiguously an item of Nature—a personality, an ought or value. Personality is a nucleus that grows, a centre round which character is formed, and it is doubtful if that nucleus is an item of Nature. It is even more doubtful if value or the ought is an item of Nature. The ought, another name of which is the desirable, is never merely that which is or can be desired under definable natural conditions : these conditions have themselves to be desirable. For the same reason it is not, also, what is desired rationally or consistently. 'Rational' or 'consistent' is no synonym of 'desirable'.

Personality or the ought does not also *determine* a decision in the way a natural phenomenon determines another. There is no personality or ought *first* and *then* the determination by it of our decision. Creative personality and operative moral values are relevant only in the context of decisions for particular acts, and so the word 'determination' has here a different connotation altogether. A pre-existent ought or personality has nothing in it to compel a particular decision for a particular act ; one would always be at liberty to flout it. The very fact that it is not flouted speaks against its pre-existence. In will personality is always creative, and the ought always functional.

There is thus no empiricistic account of freedom. Freedom is an over-natural urge. The question now is whether this freedom is *formal* or *actual.*

The actual is that which exists, contrasted with which the formal should be that which does not exist. But as the formal is not zero we have to say that it is a *content* that does not exist. But even this does not make the meaning precise. A false content does not exist, but nobody calls it formal on that account. So we have to say that the formal is that which is not prevented altogether from existing, we have to say that somehow it both exists and does not exist—exists in one way and does not exist in another. More precisely we can say that by itself it does not exist but that it exists in association with some existent fact or facts. The formal, in other words, is that which, though always in some existent fact, is, as the form of that fact, somehow original, not wholly reducible to that existent; and as the existent, for us, is primarily an event in Nature, the formal, as not reducible to it, is, therefore, over-natural. It is, again, the same over-natural form which, in another way, is said to exist, *viz.* when it is viewed as *also in some existent fact.* As not existing *it is merely formal*, and as *also existing* it is to be called *actual.* Henceforward by 'formal' we shall mean what is merely formal.

Briefly, the relation between the formal and the actual is this:

The actual is that which we start with, and the formal is later distinguished in it. As distinguished in the actual, the formal has to be understood as what was already in the actual, though, till distinguishment, as undistinguished. Once the formal is distinguished it is understood in two ways—as in itself, *i.e*, as now distinguished, and as undistinguished from the actual and, therefore, as itself actual. In plain language, the formal is an over-natural presupposition of the actual.

But if by itself the formal does not exist, why insist—one might ask—that it is over-natural, as though as not existent it has yet some original status ? Why not de-ontologise it altogether and treat is as a mere postulate ? The charge, we reply, can be met in two ways. First, even as a postulate the formal has to be called over-natural : the formal is postulated, even by modern empiricists, as a principle beyond Nature, not co-ordinate with natural events. The only difference is that while they treat it as a cold dead postulate—a

mere formula, so to say—for organising existent facts, we hold—and that is our second point—that all presuppositions are not of this type. Many of the presuppositions may be dead formulae, but not those which generate rules that are normally taken as permanent. Space, for example, is one such presupposition that generates geometrical rules, and freedom or spirit another generating basic moral rules.

Modern empiricists who insist on the postulate-character of presuppositions insist also that there is no rule which can be called permanent. They insist that every rule is a conceptual construct just necessary for certain situations and so liable to alteration as situations change. But this is not true of all rules. There are rules—those of Eucleadian Geometry, for example—which persist in claiming permanence. This claim has to be faced, it should not be lightly dismissed as an age-long prejudice born of our confinement to a three-dimensional space. The multi-dimensional structure which modern scientists speak of is only a dead, though successful, postulate, but the three-dimensional space with the Eucleadian rules is insistent. With this as the presupposition, and not with the multi-dimensional structure, we lead our life, and if there is any metaphysical interest other than life everything that is metaphysical is believed as existent, though at a higher level; but *ex hypothesi* the multi-dimensional structure is not to be taken as existent. No postulate is ever to be taken as an existent fact.

Freedom too is no dead postulate because, as we have said, it is the source of some basic moral rules that are abiding. That there are abiding moral rules is evident also from the fact that we often compare different empirical norms, even axiologically, with one another. Unless we had believed in an abiding norm or norms there could be no such axiological comparison. These abiding norms may not be specifiable. Perhaps as merely functional they cannot be specified, and most probably as the guiding principles of actual will which operates in and through Nature they remain ever-fused with empirical social norms. But, decidedly, we cannot deny that there are abiding norms.

Over-natural freedom is a living presupposition of decisions and, through decisions, of our acts. By itself it is

formal, but considered as a *presupposition of acts* it is actual freedom. It is always in the context of acts, always present in these as the operative principle, but, undeniably, it is also an original urge, not wholly reducible to acts. It is what we can neither deny nor yet assert as existent. We know nothing of it except that it is the source of basic moral rules, though we feel its presence whenever we act reflectively. By itself, therefore, it is of little importance to us.

An ethics or ontology that idolises this formal freedom and neglects our concrete acts is no more than a speculative luxury, unless, of course, one understands by its originality some demanded superior type of existence approachable in some religious or over-religious attitude. We are not concerned with this latter alternative. We only insist that it is not the freedom that we meet with in our daily lfe. The freedom which is our everyday concern is freedom of *will.* Free will, as will, must be dealing with existent facts of the world, only its dealings are not compelled by forces of Nature. Free action is the manipulation of things of the world without any pressure from Nature. As such actions are *first* events issuing forth from original (but non-existent) freedom (of course, on the occasion of some natural events misconceived as the causes of these actions), and as this original freedom is the source of some permanent rules, the actions have to abide by these rules. Moral actions are cases of actual freedom that presupposes an original formal freedom which does not, however, exist.

In will, formal freedom always looks outside, and as seizing upon things of the world and manipulating them it is actual freedom. Will never turns inward. If there is any freedom claiming self-completeness and attainable through withdrawal, it is not freedom of will, and not also attainable through will.

But cannot a man will to *be* good, and is this not a will in the inward direction ? We reply, one cannot *be* good except by consciously *doing* good. Doing-good is more primary, and as this is effected being-good happens automatically. Over and above doing good there is no second will to be good. Doing-good and being-good are two inseparable aspects of one and the same moral situation, doing-good being

only more primary. A moral situation is this: there is a functional original freedom which of its own nature manipulates things of the world according to rules that issue from itself. Doing-good is the manipulation side of this situation, and being-good is on the side of original freedom, and we have seen that original freedom is only a presupposition of free *acts*, tending always to realise itself as those acts. It follows that if being-good is a state of *realisation*, it must be of the form 'doing good.' There is no self-contained inward realisation called 'being-good'.

There are people who hold that every increase in being-good is either itself a greater realisation within or a clearer manifestation of some ideal perfect freedom. But this is impossible. If being-good is relevant only as doing-good every increase in the former is to be measured by a corresponding increase in the latter. There is no limit, however, to the increase of doing-good. It follows that equally there is no limit to the increase of being-good. For will, therefore—as much in the aspect of being-good as in that of doing-good—there is no ideal perfect freedom.

The so-called ideal freedom is understood, by those who admit it, as either realisable through the rising stages of being-good or as already real and getting more and more manifest in those stages. The denial of this ideal freedom means, in effect, that formal freedom (of will) should not be idolised as self-contained and existent.[1] Freedom which is relevant to will is always operational, it always comes out and has its play on things of Nature.

Actual freedom as the free manipulation of existent facts is thus inevitably in the context of Nature. As freedom, it resists indeed all natural pressure, but, paradoxically enough, as manipulating Nature it has to abide by the obduracy of natural facts and laws of Nature. This, however, is no anomaly. The acceptance, here, of Nature is not forced, but free, and—what is more important—the acceptance belongs to the very constitution of *actual freedom*.

1 Presupposed by actual will there is no over-natural freedom which could be self-contained and yet non-existent. Formal freedom is neither existent nor self-contained.

To explain both the points. Free will accepts Nature as only a means for something about which we are free. As such the acceptance has itself to be called free. If X is a means to Y we accept X not in the interest of X, but only as it conduces to Y. In other words, only that much of X is accepted which is of minimum necessity. Freedom would have been jeopardised if the whole of X were to be accepted. Here, on the other hand, there is conscious selection, and where there is selection there is freedom. One might ask here if, in will, even this selective acceptance of Nature were not against freedom. We reply—and this is our second point—these who could ask this question have no clear idea of actual freedom. Doing good—good will—as actual freedom works *ex hypothesi* under this limitation. It is precisely as under this limitation that good will is actual freedom. Formal freedom may not have this limitation, but we have seen its fate. This limitation constitutes the very actuality of freedom. There is no *a priori* clash between will-freedom and this limitation. Were there a possibility of such clash actual will that operates in and through Nature could not be felt as free. What is incompatible with such limitation is a freedom that is no freedom of *will*. In cases other than of will, pure freedom, if there is any, is a maturer stage to be reached through an effort of withdrawal from Nature. But, in will, free manipulation of Nature is maturer than formal freedom. The spiritual task in will is precisely to manipulate Nature more and more according to basic moral rules, not to run after the functional formal freedom. As, therefore, in will the very manipulation of Nature is the actual realisation of freedom, the limitation we are speaking of is not merely no defect but positively an enrichment of freedom.

Some believe that through will-not-to-will (*vairāgya*) we can, even in willing, realise the formal freedom as in itself. But it is doubtful if the so-called will-not-to-will is a form of will at all. It may well be a peculiar attitude to abjure will altogether and turn to knowledge or love. Or, it may just be a preparation for knowledge or love, or this knowledge or love itself in an attitudinal form.

Nature that limits freedom is not merely physical, it covers also the obdurate facts and laws in the biological,

psychic and social fields. This last field of Nature offers an interesting limitation to freedom. Social facts and laws are infinitely more unstable than the physical, biological and psychic, and yet they limit freedom as necessarily as the latter. No man is born in a vacuum, everyone begins life with a social heritage and environment, and his freedom has initially to accept and operate in and through these. Limitation being a necessary constituent of actual freedom, and social heritage and environment being one of the determinants of this limitation, there is no getting rid of it from the beginning. This does not, however, mean that one has to remain as committed to a particular social set-up as to physical, biological and psychic limitations. The latter are more or less permanent limitations, but particular social structures do, as a matter of fact, change frequently and do not, therefore, permanently limit our actual freedom. Moreover, and that is the more important point, it is this very unstable character of particular social structures that precisely finds room for actual freedom. If social structures were as inflexible as physical, biological and psychic Nature there could be no scope at all for actual freedom. Actual freedom, operating primarily according to moral rules that emanate from formal freedom and secondarily according to natural laws and amidst natural events, reorganises Nature and builds newer situations. Human creations which, though as accomplished, are parts of Nature are not due entirely to Nature, and when these creations are moral they are precisely for social change. These social changes are often indeed secondary situations grafted on an existing over-all social structure, just as is the case with physical changes my will effects; but often again they are more fundamental, infecting the over-all set-up itself. Such fundamental changes are possible only because every particular social system is, of its own nature, at least pliable, if not entirely a human creation. Social structures constitute limitation to actual freedom so far only as we have to start with them. We start with them as though with an inherited bank balance.

Approaches to Spiritual Life

I

THERE ARE three approaches to spiritual life—cognitive, emotional and moral. The first two alone are held in highest esteem in our country. The third—the moral approach—is generally looked upon as ancillary or, at the most, an unavoidable adjunct to spiritual progress—ancillary, because no immoral man can be religious, and an adjunct because if one at even the pinnacle of spiritual development chooses to act immorally it is likely that he would have a fall. Some even think it fit to abandon the life of will altogether at a certain stage of spiritual progress.

As to how the cognitive and the emotional approaches stand related to each other, whether both are equally relevant or one is less in importance than the other, whether, again, if both are equally important they are n need of combination or any one is sufficient, or whether at the highest level they, or even all the three approaches, coincide—these are intricate problems of philosophy which are not for us to discuss here. Our task is only to analyse the three pathways, particularly the first two, and discover the distinctive feature of each and, incidentally, to select from among them that one which is most appropriate in modern times.

II

One important point we should note at the very beginning. It is that all the three approaches involve some kind of faith. Faith is not antagonistic to knowledge, as it is commonly taken to be, nor is it a monopoly of the emotional approach. The knowledge that we are speaking of is not one at the level of nature where we take in whatever forces itself upon our senses or comes in through memory operating on sense-data (as in inference). It is not the awareness of something which *is* in the world, whether here in front of me or distant in

space and time. Had we, in knowledge we are speaking of, been so assured of the existence of the thing aimed at, there was no necessity of further following it up, as is inevitably the case with all spiritual pursuit. Nor is this knowledge in need of experimental sifting of facts for a hidden truth to be stripped of entanglements and brought to the focus of consciousness. In all such experiments, before the truth is so delivered it was all a matter of conjecture: we had no absolute assurance of its existence. Of spiritual truths, on the other hand, we have absolute assurance from the very beginning. Yet, as already noted, we are faced with a further task of knowing it. The first assurance, we shall see immediately, is a form of *cognitive faith*.

There is such cognitive faith, followed up by further knowledge, in all cases of testimony. When we accept something from a *reliable* authority we accept it in full confidence—this is almost a truism, the phrase 'reliable authority' just meaning that what the speaker in question says is to be accepted as true. Yet, for whatever reason, we feel that it is knowledge at second hand and feel, therefore, that we have to verify it again for ourselves. The first acceptance was evidently a piece of faith, though cognitive, and the verification that follows translates that cognitive faith into actual knowledge. When, for example, a teacher of medicine tells his student that such an such drug cures such and such diseases, the latter accepts this truth in all confidence but is yet driven, unless he is intellectually lazy, to have it verified for himself. This is not like the verification of a hypothesis. A hypothesis, before it is verified, is not an assurance. But what the student of medicine is verifying is already what he is assured of. The verification in question is, therefore, of a peculiar character. It is a demand, cognitive all through, to be more intensively at home with the truth.

All spiritual *tattvas* have this double cognitive appeal. My *guru*, my tradition or my *śāstras* assure me from the beginning that these *tattvas* are perfectly real. Yet there is in me an uncanny sense of distance, a feeling that something still stands between the truth and myself, that I have taken it so far on *faith* alone, though it is no less certain than any of which I have absolute assurance. Necessarily, I feel an urge

to get over the distance, to have the truth now for myself. I feel it incumbent that I should turn the cognitive *faith* into full-fledged cognition.

Western thinkers, Greeks and medieval philosophers excluded, have only substituted *a priori* awareness for this cognitive faith ; they have not debarred the latter altogether. What to us Indians is an assurance coming from the *guru*, tradition or *śāstras* is precisely that which these Westerners call apriority. It is all a difference between Indian humility and Western self-assertion. Consequent upon this, there is in modern West a failure to pursue the aprioritics further by way of trying to *realise* them as cognitive actualities. They are content with discovering the *system* of aprioritics and suggest at most a possible relation of that system with our daily world, confessing all the while that none of these are by themselves real as yet, but only presuppositions, or, like the modern Americans, understand the whole situation from the point of view of *will*, insisting that the only way to realise them is to embody them, through our human effort in the matrix of daily life, in the form of moral activity or creative art. Without ruling out these possibilities, however, we claim that there is at least an alternative contemplative attitude, which is cognition through and through, wherewith we may come more and more in contact with these truths, though quite in another direction. Any way, even these protagonists of aprioritics recognise a sort of cognitive faith over and above full-fledged cognition.

Even in ordinary cases of knowledge, say, when I perceive a wall, there is such cognitive faith involved. It goes without saying that everything I know or speak of is, so far, in the context of that knowledge. That the thing concerned stands by itself, apart from that knowledge, is only an article of cognitive faith. It is only because this faith cannot be further pursued—for that would mean the absurd position that I will have to leap beyond my shadow—that this faith passes for final cognition. Faith, thus, is involved even at the lowest stage.

That *emotions* involve faith of a type is evident even at the lowest naturalistic level. If I love a man I naturally take him as good and react accordingly, though I may at cooler momen

know that he is a scoundrel. Before I loved I *knew* that he was a scoundrel, and equally so when I am cooled; and midway, therefore, between the two stages I must be knowing him as a scoundrel, for no knowledge of the character of a person can be merely momentary. This *knowledge* running concurrently with an opposed emotion is an intriguing phenomenon and undoubtedly of absorbing interest for psychology. But the central question remains unanswered—how, contrary to the *knowledge* that he is a scoundrel, could I in love take him as a good man? We contend that this is a matter of *faith*, and its distinctive character is that it never cares for what we *know* of the man. Even when I love a man who is really good and hate one who is really bad, what happens is only that my love adds a new goodness and hate a new badness. Neither love nor hate is determined by the intrinsic goodness or badness of the man. They are, in the long run, determined by unpredictable circumstances; the cause is to be traced to some disposition in my mind, and nobody knows for certain how a disposition works.

It is no fault of the emotive faith that the qualities I find in the man I love are cognitively false. These qualities are not to be cognitively viewed at all. There is no need of cognitive substantiation, and it matters little if knowledge repudiates them, for one can persist all his life in the emotional attitude. Cognition has only a distant bearing on emotion. Substantiating cognition can at most prevent the emotion from deterioration, and one that repudiates may only shake its foundation, and even this could happen if only the emotion is spasmodic, not sufficiently rooted. One who is strong in heart may find that emotions have a logic of their own that knits his activities into a consistent life-system. Even for the weak who are hammered by knowledge, all that this knowledge does is to maintain him in a particular emotion or push him to another, never to wean him away from emotion altogether. Weaning is possible only where a man of *cognitive* bent has, in a moment's weakness, slipped as a stranger into an emotion, seeking comfort there. Except in this last case, cognition is either ignored or absorbed in the over-all emotional life which moves round its own faith and with a logic which is specifically its own.

That moral life also moves round a faith and has a logic of its own goes without saying. There is always an ideal ever to be worked up to in the face of complications that meet us on the way, and this ideal is neither nothing nor a real like one that is *known*. Not nothing, because it has been moving us from the very beginning, and not yet (cognitively) real because it is not yet accomplished. It is not even a *future* reality, because the cognitive future is either just what *will happen* or what is not yet, not what, inevitably with some present status, can be moving us. It is not, again, a mere psychological idea, for we inevitably assert it as objective; nor a pinned down persuation, because there is no remotest light-heartedness about it. It is not also a Platonic subsistent for contemplation, for its only meaning lies in being worked out by man, and no one wants to have it by itself but only after concretely embodying it into new situations and institutions. Moral progress consists only in such embodiment, it is never toward the naked ideal by itself. The ideal, no doubt, is progressively realised, but 'realisation' here means *made real through human agency.* The ideal is thus an object of non-cognitive faith. That this faith is not also emotive is evident from the fact that there is never a possibility of this ideal being repudiated, except arbitrarily, by cognition.

III

Equally in cognitive and moral faith the ideal or, better, the ideality aimed at is an *ought*. In moral approach it is an *ought-to-do*, in cognitive an *ought-to-be*. The *ought-to-do* is what moves us from the very beginning and has to be made real. The *ought-to-be* is that about the existence of which we are absolutely assured from the beginning but which inevitably demands a further cognitive process of contemplation (preceded, it is obvious, by some moral, and probably also by some emotional exercise for the purification of the mind) wherewith to come in closer and closer contact with that ideality. Emotional faith, on the other hand, is different from both these. No *ought*, no kind of distance, is felt. From the beginning the desired object in its totality is felt to be in closest contact. Spiritual progress in this field is possible only in a

new *intensive* dimension. It does not consist in bridging over a gulf, but only in living it with all the heart, our heart dancing to every minutest string that constitutes the object of the emotion, and every such string is a character that is relevant only to the emotion in question and absolutely unamenable to cognition or will.

In the emotional attitude there is no *distance* between myself and the object of my emotion. This has to be properly understood. In a way there certainly is a distance. A man whom I *respect* is more distant than one I *love*, and in either case there certainly is a distance between him and myself, and in a way too I feel this distance: I feel that he is not I and I not he. But it is a fact that simultaneously with that distance felt there is equally a felt demand that the distance is to be conquered (to whatever extent), and in every emotion I feel some conquest achieved. If there is some conquest from the very beginning, this means that in emotion there is from the beginning an actual identity-bond between myself and the person to whom the emotion is directed. The demand for a further conquest of the distance is, therefore, only in an internal dimension ; and how far the conquest would proceed depends on the nature of the identity we have started with. In a way, the limit is grasped at the very start—we have in emotion started with a unity which, therefore, is already achieved. There is only an internal distance to cover.

This unity varies according as the internal distance is greater or smaller. The distance is of varying length in different emotions. There is maximum distance when the emotion is aversive, as, for example, in anger, hate, *etc*. Short of this, the maximum distance in attractional emotions we find in our respectful awe for a ruler or a dispenser of justice. The distance shortens considerably when the object of emotion is my father or some august senior in my family. It is much shorter when the object is my mother, and shortest in conjugal love. In between these there are many grades: we have only picked up some representative cases. In all the cases, however, the distance, whatever be its measure, is only internal, the respective limit to the attainable unity in each case being felt as fore-ordained from the beginning. This justifies the various types of emotional approach to God in different religions.

In Islam and Judaism the emotional distance between man and God is greatest: God there is approached as the Great Ruler and Justice, and the distance is so serious that seldom, in these two religions, is man allowed direct access to God. There is a prophet intervening, held in confidence by God and demanding confidence of man. The distance is shortened in Christianity where God is looked upon as Father. But even a father (as was the practice in old days) often requires an intermediary to have dealing with young children, particularly with those who are in sin. That intermediary in Christianity is Christ the Son, the eldest son, so to say, who alone has easy access to Father and enjoys His confidence: we lesser people are to be delivered to Him by Christ. Next in order is the religion that looks upon God as Mother, mother being nearer to us than a father-God: or, one may still have God as Father but yet depend on a mother who is nearer and hope that she alone can deliver him to Father. Nearer still, one might say 'nearest', is God, the beloved, the approach being as of a woman to her lover, or conversely, if that is possible at all, of a lover to his *fiancée*.

Each such approach has different types in another internal dimension. Conjugal love, for example, has three broad types. In one the lover and the beloved are in closest unity of mind, nothing standing between them. In a second form of love the loving woman finds that her beloved is affectionately disposed to another woman (although he might not be cold to her also) and resents this, though loving him all the more. In a third form, in spite of this distance between the woman and the beloved she feels no resentment; and not merely that, she loves him so much that she really enjoys his dallying with other women. Like love other emotions also have sub-types in different dimensions.

All emotions involve a distance which, though in a way overcome from the beginning, is still felt in internal dimension. Necessarily it puts forth a demand that this internal distance be conquered. The ideal situation would, therefore, be one where no distance is felt. To an appreciable extent this is experienced by the lover who through self-surrender has merged her being in that of the beloved. Not that she thereby loses herself—at that stage *she* is he quite as much as *he* is

she. Ideal love is this ever-enchanting seesaw of *she* and *he*, where the end-terms as alternating abdicate their distinction, and what remains over is the love itself.

This ideal love, however, is not the only form of emotional identity. We have a near analogue in youth's first love where to the intoxicated lover everything is love incarnate. Its only difference from ideal love is that it is blind, nature playing a large part in it.

There are people who are God-intoxicated this way from the beginning. Spiritual progress for them lies only in removing the blindness involved, which removed, they are landed in ideal love. At every stage in the progress there is love's seesaw, there is no distinguishment of persons, not certainly of myself, but neither of God also. This ideal love, the absolute Immanence, is the extreme opposite of knowledge's *ought-to-be*—the truth—which is not merely believed as distinct at the beginning but positively distinguished more and more in cognitions' pilgrimage, and is absolutely distinguished and stands by itself at the end. Knowledge runs after transcendence, feeling throbs in immanence.

IV

Which of the three pathways is meant for us in this twentieth century? Somehow or other there is no possibility, in these days, of abrogating the moral path, the path of will and action. *Karmasannyāsa* is not for us who in the modern society are in demand everywhere. For us there is no holiday from active life.

Choice, then, is narrowed. We have to choose between cognition and emotion. Of these, however, the path of cognition, as is commonly admitted, is a difficult one. It is difficult for two reasons. One difficulty concerns the first assurance of truth, and the other is about its direct attainment. We have seen that in cognition the first assurance comes from the authority of *gurus*, scriptures, *etc.*, or to put this in modern terms, the truths flash as certain *a priori*. But the difficulty is that in modern times, when we have lost all vital continuity with our rich past, it is difficult to decide who among the large number of claimants to *guruhood* is a genuine

guru. There is every likelihood of being misled, and we may even be misled to ruination. As for scriptures, our faith in them, frankly speaking, has had landslides, and, to make the confusion worse confounded, there are a hundred and one interpretations of these scriptures, and cheap press and easy egotism of scholars are adding to the number. There were different interpretations, it is true, even in old days. But everyone in those days belonged vitally to a certain community which had from still earlier days accepted one of these interpretations. That vital continuity has now almost disappeared, and faced, therefore, with conflicting claims we feel lost. The only cognitive way left to us is to re-discover spiritual truths by *a priori* intuition. But this is not for the multitude. Even for those who are in this path there is always a lurking doubt that what passes for intuited truth may have been coloured by prejudices and social circumstances. It is not known how many of these intuitionists have undergone the preliminary exercises in self-purification.

So far about the first assurance of spiritual truths. As for knowing these *ought-to-be's* directly as actual existents, this requires an elaborate process of *sādhana*, an esoteric spiritual exercise which is, to say the least, extremely difficult under modern circumstances, even for philosophers, what to speak of commoners?

Contrasted with this cognitive path, the path of emotion is evidently easier to follow. For, it is chiefly a way of the heart. Very susceptible to biological emotions we naturally respond to beauty and art once we have faintly felt the spirit in it. True, the heart's response to higher forms of art requires some practice. But no one knows how that practice leads to the desired result. The leap is always all too sudden : the heart suddenly begins to dance to the tune of the spirit. What is required is just a pointer. Once the hint is seized everything goes on spontaneously. The artist only throws the hint which goes straightway to the heart of others, nobody knows how. In matters spiritual the hint may consist in just a story narrated, often in a small miracle seen performed or even heard reported, and often, again—and this is the strangest of all things—in a name of God uttered, preferably through music and poetry, where the latter is

only an accelerator or something that just creates an atmosphere. *Nāmakīrtana* is a wonderful device to draw a man to emotional spirituality. There may be a philosophy behind it, every syllable of the name may correspond to a deep spiritual truth : indeed, a whole philosophy of *logos* in all details may be brought in to substantiate a particular name. But one who emotionally springs up to it has no knowledge of this philosophy, and even the *logos*-philosopher does not know how to connect a particular sound with a particular reverberation of the heart. The heart's dance in response to sounds has a logic of its own, a logic of feeling, not amenable to cognitive analysis. It is a logic, because it is not all an accident—once the heart has begun dancing one is emotionally assured that it ought to have danced exactly in that way and under exactly those circumstances.

It is no use objecting that this is nothing distinctive of spiritual emotions, that it is equally true of ordinary feelings like anger, hate and love. True, while these feelings last we feel a necessity of this type. But when they are cooled we feel disillusioned. Not so, however, with regard to spiritual emotions initiated by appropriate hints. Even when these emotions cool down under diverse worldly pressure we yet feel that they are of abiding value and that they could be initiated again and again by exactly those hints. Not that they could not have come otherwise. In the region of the spirit there is always a plurality of causes. E may be caused now by A, now by B and now by C ; but we are assured that if A occurs we are bound to have E, and similarly if B or C occurs. Chanting the name of God may be one of the causes ; but when there is this chanting the hearer is bound to leap up to it, if he is in the emotional attitude.

Studies in Ethical Theory *

WE ARE told by the editor that numbers of such studies are published from time to time as suitable contributions are received from members of the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Colorado. The present number consists of eight such studies, all of a high order of excellence, bearing, directly or indirectly, on a fundamental problem of ethics, *viz.* the status and validity of moral statements.

There is always some *human touch* about moral statements, and philosophers, particularly in modern times, are very much concerned about it. There are many who, on this ground, have denied the objective validity of such statements and interpreted them in terms of interests and approvals that are empirically subjective. Others, however, insist on objective assertion and interpret moral statements either naturalistically, or in terms of a higher form of subjectivity, or as involving objective value that is over-natural.

All the contributors have ruled out the fourth alternative in its naked form ; and though E. J. Machle in his "Human Nature and Ethics" and R. Rogers in his "On the Justification of Ought-statements" are dissatisfied with naturalistic interpretations, the additional element involved is never, according to them, wholly over-natural. Machle holds indeed that 'human nature' which in any sense can function in the verification of moral statements is more than 'human nature' of factual description, that it is but 'good human nature', otherwise called 'humane nature'. But the good that is involved stands adjectivally to the factual human nature and, therefore, somehow dissolved in it.

Rogers also holds that any factual justification of an ought-statement invariably involves another ought-statement not to be so justified immediately. But the question of such justification, he insists, will occur, and if one is to avoid indefinite regress or circle one has to admit some *fundamental*

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ought-statement. Rogers, thus, interprets moral statements in terms of value. Yet he allows naturalistic interpretation to the farthest possible extent. One who rejects the possibility of justifying ought-premises, Rogers holds, may nevertheless hold particular ought-premises just as tentatively and as subject to review in the light of new empirical findings or acquaintance with some new area of human experience as does the next person—in particular, just as tentatively as does anyone who makes ought-statements out to be descriptive in nature.

Bertram Morris, on the other hand, in his paper "Ethics & Human Nature" has derived moral relationships from human nature understood naturalistically as psycho-social, the social character being taken as intrinsic to man. As against him, Machle has argued that the *intrinsic goodness* of this human nature has also to be admitted. When, again, Morris refutes the naturalistic fallacy, and other fallacies akin to it, Rogers argues—"Now the criticism underlying the charge of committing naturalistic fallacy seems to me to be the criticism that all naturalistic definitions of 'good', for example, depart from the ordinary usage or usages of that term sufficiently far to make it impossible to regard them as satisfactory real definitions of 'good'."

Morris has undoubtedly started discussion in a masterly fashion, and the other two thinkers may be taken as having clarified some points in his argument, not having really refuted him. The 'social character of man' is undoubtedly natural, whatever over-natural element may be involved in it ; and Machle and Rogers have only pointed to that over-natural element, though, certainly, without dismissing the natural side. That this is so is abundantly clear from Machle's brilliant idea that " 'the humane nature (which he calls *human nature No. 2*) is good' is a *constructive tautology*". It is equally clear from Rogers' refusal to deny naturalistic interpretation altogether.

Both Machle and Rogers have admitted *value*, though indirectly. It is because the admission is only indirect that one cannot be assured whether the value meant is objective or subjective. Value as subjective is a function of the transcendental self. Hence the interpretation of moral statements

in terms of a higher form of subjectivity, the second alternative mentioned above, is not ruled out. Only as true Americans, the two thinkers admit value as immanent, pragmatically or in the Aristotelian fashion, not as transcendent or self-contained.

The fifth contributor David Hawkins, although he professes to be an empirical objectivist, betrays the same American spirit, with only this difference that he replaces transcendent value by asymptotic empirical justification and also by self-imposed barrier. The standpoint involved in moral statements, he holds, is a particular kind of empirical objectivism, missed by all utilitarians. Moral judgments do not *mean* or are reducible to phenomenal consequences, but certainly such consequences are *implied* in that if the consequences were clearly to the contrary the meaning could not go unimpaired. The choice involved in morality, writes Hawkins, is a "corollary of the demand for impartiality". "The essential interest which...qualify such decisions as moral is the interest in a kind of creative enquiry." "The tenability of such decisions has one important implication—namely that the enquiries leading up to them are not permanently closed and that the judgments involved are testable and open to correction." He writes, again—"Lest this be taken to mean that there is some 'moral' realm apart from man in society I would only make the obvious remark that we know of no such realm. The objects of moral judgment are human lives and the conditions affecting them. These objects can be described 'scientifically'...But such judgments are incomplete ; they do not say everything that is to be said on the subject...This barrier is merely self-imposed, and all that is needed.. is that the erstwhile descriptive scientist should concern himself with a moral question."

John O. Nelson, the third contributor, is the only thinker who interprets moral statements, in the manner of modern logical positivists, in terms of empirical subjectivity. He has presented the case very forcefully, but obviously within the limitations of positivism. So far as the form of moral statements is concerned, they, he shows, record only one's approval or persuation. So far, again, as the matter of morality is concerned, though any philosophical enquiry would

necessarily presuppose that "moral goods are arranged in a system, such that some moral goods (the lowest) entail others (the higher)," yet, as a matter of fact, they are autonomous, because actual moral commitment without which nothing can possess moral content for us is at most the effect of a cause, but never deducible by computation from premises. "In moral discourse we use the logical form of inference and deduction as persuasive instruments for reinforcing autonomous moral predictions (just as we might use sneers)."

Such positivistic interpretation is very popular in the present day, and we might be thankful to Nelson for his having presented the case as *persuasively* as possible. We may, however, hazard a criticism. Moral statements do not certainly assert (mean) our psychic approvals or persuasions. These are at most *shown* or *expressed*, *i.e.* used as means. But, then, what is the distinction between *these* used as means and *logic* used as means? If like logic these are means wherewith we know the empirical world, then ethics should rank equally with science. If, on the other hand, logical principles be taken as forming the structure of reality, there is no reason why moral principles should not constitute the essential structure of human acts. There is no reason, for the logical positivists, why logical and ethical principles should not be sailing in the same boat.

The last three articles in the present number of the Studies may go unreviewed. Not that they are not good articles. The performance of all the contributors is excellent (in differing degrees). But the last three articles are, strictly speaking, not on ethics. D. W. Havice, for example, in his "Need for Sound Type Theory in Ethical Inquiry" has only argued for a substantiable typology of personality. He believes that such typology, evidently in the line of psycho-analysis, would greatly facilitate the task of the ethical philosopher, and even the task of the individual who seeks to act ethically. It is evident, however, that the tasks in questions are here facilitated only through over-simplification. W. Sacksteder in his "Human Nature, Science & Philosophy" has discussed what philosophy has to say on human nature over and above what science and common sense say about it. Philosophy, according

to him, is only the analysis (in the modern sense of the term) of scientific propositions, and practical philosophy (ethics) should, therefore, be the like analysis of the science of morals which has for its data "a vast reservoir of knowledge of human nature". Like every science, the science of morals is "delimited by principles which set up for study an isolable and selective system of objects." For every science it is possible that there are alternative systems according as these principles vary, and the task of philosophy is a comparative study of these principles and the systems that result. According as the principles vary moral science also has been built up in different ways, and the task of moral philosophy is, therefore, confined to the comparative study of these principles *vis a vis* the systems that come out as a result. Sacksteder's idea is thus in the positivistic line and stands or falls with positivism.

The last article "What is Truth About Man" by F. Williams is more distant from ethical study than the two preceding. Williams believes that any ethical study as to how, for example, fact and value are related to each other should be preceded by a more fundamental study as to the nature of *knowledge about man*, and he holds that such knowledge is impossible because of "the complex organic interrelations governing human character and conduct". The so-called knowledge about man, is according to him, really the knowledge of this or that facet of man. Williams has touched indeed a very fundamental topic, but raises more questions than he is able to anwer. If some of his predecessors have understood the whole man as the social man, he, instead of dismissing it outright as unmanageable by knowledge, ought to have analysed this social character; and if he—and indeed all his predecessors—were honest reporters he would have per force pointed to something over-natural in man, no matter whether this over-natural element is transcendent or immanent.

A Modern Defence of Orthodoxy

ORTHODOXY IS not fanaticism. There is much indeed that is common to the orthodox and the fanatic, but there is a difference also. Though both stick to their points *unreasonably*, the orthodox is much less uncompromising than the fanatic. While the fanatic will not listen to others' arguments, the orthodox does. He not merely listens, he is sometimes even prepared to concede. He readily sees through others' points of view and would often even admit that they are as strong as his, perhaps in some cases stronger. Yet, however, he would never give up his own point.

This does not mean that orthodoxy is spineless. If the strength of the fanatic lies in steadfast adherence, the orthodox does not, in this respect, lag behind. Concession is weakness only in the context of a rational duel. The orthodox may be called weak that way; but so far as acceptance on faith is concerned he is as resolute as the fanatic. He too would not budge an inch, even though he is conscious that his acceptance is wholly irrational. So far the orthodox, not denying reason, has yet kept it apart from blind acceptance.

The liberal, as distinguished from the fanatic and the orthodox, has an altogether different standpoint. He claims that his attitude is rational from the beginning to the end. Reason, he believes, is the sole guide of man, for reason alone takes us to truth. Blind acceptance may be a biological urge, but it is the prerogative of man to get over it and discover truths that are divine, and, when that discovery is made, to shape life accordingly. Biological urges are to be either rationalised or transcended altogether.

The thesis we shall develop in this paper is that if fanaticism is hellish, liberalism is Bohemian, an aimless nomadic life with no station to settle in. We shall conclude that orthodoxy is at least one best solution of the problem 'reason *vs* blind acceptance.'

That fanaticism is bad goes without saying. It is self-conscious surrender to unreason, which is as bad as desertion. Unreason by itself is no enemy of man. But by deliberately

walking over to its side and strengthening its hold the fanatic has virtually committed suicide. Man is superior to the animal only because he can wield reason. The animal does not reason self-consciously, but it has not also ostracised reason. The fanatic is in this respect worse than the animal.

Liberalism is the extreme opposite of fanaticism. The liberal would admit nothing that is not tested by reason. But he does not know the limitation of reason. The reason that he idolises is reason as *logic*, a principle that demonstrates or organises, not one that supplies data; if data are already there, reason can only confirm (or reject) them and seek to organise them into a coherent system. This implies that prior to the exercise of reason there must have been data which had not so far been accepted through reason. Total reliance on reason would thus yield nothing. It would be empty intellectual gymnastics, almost a useless hobby, to lead to nothing that is stable.

Physicists are the best known rationalists. But they too start with the data of unbiassed observation. These data they just accept. Even extreme physicists of modern times who propose to start with some postulates and construct their Physics through logical and mathematical computations have ultimately to turn to facts of observation for verifying their theories; and these facts, whether started with or referred to at the end, are all data merely accepted, not got through reason. If it be urged that starting from certain postulates and with the help of logic and mathematics they had come to a rational picture of facts, so that the to-be-observed facts are already anticipated by reason, even then these scientists have allowed unreason in two ways. They have started with postulates which are initially unreason, and, secondly, the anticipated picture they are bound to correlate with merely observed facts which latter, as such, are blindly accepted.

It would be no use arguing that the postulates, though initially non-rational, are yet made rational because of the rational system built out of them. It would be equally useless to argue, on the other hand, that the observational facts, whether referred to at the end or started with, are facts of *unbiassed* observation, *unbiassed* meaning rationally chastened. Even granting that the pariah postulate has been Brahminised

through its association with the Brahmin reason, we have not gained much. The entire rational system (including those postulates) that these scientists work out is no more than a nice possibility—a mere theory that has not yet attained the status of *actuality*. That status it attains only when the theory is correlated with observable facts which are unreason. The observation that scientists speak of is indeed unbiassed, *i.e.*, chastened by reason. But chastened or not, it is still observation, not reason. Hence in order that scientific theories claim reality, observation, which is non-reason, has to be admitted.

Further, is there anywhere an absolutely chastened datum, a datum abstracted from all associations? Physicists believe there are. Most of the things that commonly pass for data are indeed alloys, but they claim that through the chastening process of reason they can arrive at pure data. That may or may not be possible in physical sciences. But at least in biological and particularly in humanistic studies—we mean, in History, Ethics, Sociology, Politics, *etc.*—there is no such pure datum. The so-called *human* instincts are never pure data; they are necessary correlates of some relatively simple social patterns which themselves are human creations, however rudimentary, not parts of Nature. Nor are mere animal instincts unalloyed data; for these too develop *pari passu*, and in organic connection with specific animal groups which are not simple parts of Nature. Even if these groups were the starting points, the corresponding animal instincts cannot adequately explain specific human instincts unless we have smuggled in a good amount of construction and interpretation. What modern novelists and psychologists call simple human relations are not most of them simple data.

At least with humanistic studies, then, the so-called data are already, to a large extent, prejudices that accumulated through countless pre-historic years. Liberals, therefore, cannot claim that they have stood aloof from all prejudices. If some prejudices they allow, there is no *prima facie* reason why a few others should not be tolerated. Many of the prejudices accumulating in later historical years may have proved reactionary in our modern social set-up, and many, again, unnecessary. For speedy progress in modern times these may have to be eliminated. But that does not speak for the elimination of

all. Unnecessary institutions may sometimes be tolerated in the interest of decorum or as symbols of continuity with the past. They may even have some aesthetic value.

One cannot thus insist too much on simple chastened data. Three-fourths of our life are covered by data we have inherited from our forefathers. Reason organises them ceaselessly into ever-new patterns in response to social needs. These data, seldom unalloyed, constitute our solid anchorage. It is the stable ground of reality which maintains its identity in spite of, or even having engulfed, the changes forced upon it by social necessity. Reason, so far, is only the principle of organisation —ever a servant, never a master; and the servant should not be allowed to rule, lest tradition might break and with it might disappear all stability. Reason unbased on data moves among empty possibilities, and we are left at a loss to choose from among them.

Choice, we insist, does not depend on reason. It depends in the long run on facts. We have seen how physical sciences, with different postulates, come, through reason, to different alternative rational systems, or sometimes to a general system to be filled in by variables that are facts. Choice from among the alternative systems depends on correspondence with actual facts, and the filling in of the general system is possible only by such facts. Hence choice is determined by facts, reason having offered only alternatives that are equally tenable, or only a general possibility. '*Either-or*' is the crucial problem solved only with reference to facts. Arjuna on the eve of the great epic war was faced with this *either-or* and Lord Krishna solved the problem by means of *svadharma* which is nothing but social heritage.

It cannot be held that reason itself is capable of solving the problem, having assessed the alternatives, one against another, and reaching a solution that way. Such assessment is impossible, for each system is based on a particular set of postulates which sets cannot be assessed against one another. There is no question of objective assessment of postulates. The value of a postulate lies in its capacity to construct a particular system. In plain language, every system is based on a fundamental ideology which is either a mere postulate, as in physical sciences, or accepted as real on mere faith, and therefore non-

rational. The latter is particularly true in the case of humanistic studies.

It cannot be urged, again, that though reason unaided by facts cannot determine which alternative is real, reason aided by facts can do that. For, if reason unaided by facts cannot determine, and if the dermination is possible only when that aid from facts is forthcoming, the only conclusion should be that the determination is made by facts.

Reason by itself, starting, of course, with some postulates, can offer at the most some equally tenable alternatives or only a highly generalised view, both of which are no more than good *possibilities*. The same reason operating in the context of facts does nothing more than organise or rationalise—and in that way confirm or reject—those facts. Of the liberals who propose to rely solely or chiefly on reason we ask one question—which of these two roles of reason do they prefer? If the former, they are only dallying with possibilities having nothing to fix upon—a sort of cheap romantic life bordering dangerously on the extreme of irrationality. This is why in the absence of a fixable tradition or institution, they in spiritual despair often insist arbitrarily upon a form, more fanatically as a rule than one who is soberly orthodox; and the form they insist on is often found to be clannish. This shows that *cent per cent* rationalism is empty, futile and even self-defeating. It signalises decadence, rather than progress, and is bankrupt from the beginning to the end, unless replenished with a new type of content, *viz.*, the metaphysico-spiritual. But one who would go that way would be a philosopher in seclusion who would lose interest equally in all social groups and prefer neither inconoclasm nor formalities. They may, if they like, descend to our world of interests and aversions, but they would never act fanatically this way or that. They would, in other words, be neither fanatics nor liberals, but just the sober orthodox. They would ask people to remain in their fixed stations—their heritage—and yet understand others' points of view through reason. They would advise us to remain firm in our ideology and yet constantly compare it rationally with other ideologies. The idea is that each one's standpoint stands accepted and is so far non-rational, and yet as one among the many possibilities it requires rational substantiation, wherever

possible. Everyone, though firmly placed in his standpoint, will yet defend it rationally as far as possible. His opponent too is in the same way firmly placed, and he too will have to substantiate his view rationally. *Śravaṇa* has to be followed up by *manana*.

But why—it may be asked—should I have to substantiate my standpoint rather than refute it from the beginning or attempt a neutral assessment? In modern sociological and Indological studies, particularly in our country, we often meet with the latter two attitudes. Either the age-long tradition is sought to be refuted from the beginning or a neutral assessment is attempted *de novo*. Why should not these attitudes be recommended?

We reply—we never start in vacuum. Every one of us begins with a heritage which is his proper self. We begin with identifying ourselves with that heritage which is as much our own as our bodies and families. Naturally we should feel like defending, rather than disown it. Just as in social behaviours we cannot begin with internationalism, or even with nationalism, and just as there we start with real groups with which we somehow feel identified and gradually expand it, so is the case with the orthodox. The expansion of a real group into ideal ones like nation and the world-humanity never detracts from the solid base we started with. Such expansion is possible through duty whereby our rights which always remain ours come only to be enriched, never forfeited as in Socialist states. Duties have to be performed only in order that the rights of different individuals and real groups may not clash. Duties are nothing but the principles of organising different rights and different sets of rights, they are not meant for doing away with the rights. Rights are ultimately the social heritage—a beautiful amalgam of nature and culture brought into existence by the non-rational historical force, and duties are the ways of organising different heritages. There is no question of either condemning heritage or starting *de novo*.

Duty corresponds to reason, and right to non-rational acceptance. As in the case of reason and non-reason, so here also duty only organises rights; and as there so here also the organisation may be effected in three possible ways which are

not, however, equally successful. One way of organisation, which ordinarily passes for the only way, is to synthesise duty and right. But, historically, this synthesis has never been effected. Good people attempted it, but only to have ended in sacrificing one in the interest of the other. Hegel's social philosophy is a classical example in this regard—rights have been virtually sacrificed in the interest of an ideal group, *viz.* nation or state. The same example we find repeated in modern Russia. Wars and internal revolts are dialectical consequences of this state of affairs.

There is a second possible way of organising rights. One may concentrate on the principles of duty and discover through philosophical reflection the spiritual truths (*ādhyātmika tattva*) underlying them. Then, when these truths have been discovered, one may descend again to the rights and re-interpret, and therefore re-organise them in the light of those truths. But this procedure is the privilege of only a few philosophers and not understood by the mass of mankind; and what it ultimately aims at is only the replacement of common social rights by rights that are spiritual, so that even here there is no question of doing away with rights altogether—there is only the replacement of some rights by others. Duties are indeed principles of rationalisation. But the spiritual truths underlying them are discovered not through reason, but through a type of intuition which, as such, is non-reason.

The best way of organising rights and different sets of rights has been formulated, though not adequately enough, in the modern doctrine of Peaceful Co-existence which, as will be seen immediately, is another name for orthodoxy. The idea is that I shall continue in my rights—I shall cling steadfastly to my heritage—and yet understand the possibility of other rights and heritages for other persons. The formulators of Peaceful Co-existence have so far correctly represented the doctrine of orthodoxy. But in their formulation there is a serious gap which has to be filled up. They have not seen that my heritage may be antagonistic to that of another, and they ought to show how there can be peaceful co-existence in such cases. In the very ideology of one there may be a necessary urge to engulf others. How possibly can there be peaceful co-existence of a proselytising religion with harmless religions, or of

one proselytising religion with another? How can Communism with its inevitable international phase remain friendly to other social doctrines? How would Panditji keep the wolf and the lamb freely together?

The way we propose to fill up the gap is as follows, and that would go a long way to clarify the notion of orthodoxy.

There is a distinction between two levels—the level of blind acceptance which is our actuality and the level of intellectual comparison and assessment which is only possibility as opposed to actuality. It is only at the level of intellectual possibility that we may remain friendly in spite of bitter theoretical opposition. We may constantly assess our ideologies and compare them, and each may defend his point and attack another. Yet all the wranglings are being enacted in the region of possibilities, as though on a stage. Such staging need not affect our actual life. At the stage-level I may be even defeated; yet I may well continue to have blind faith, at least for some time, in my heritage.

Two questions arise inevitably. One is—can we keep faith and reason in two airtight compartments for an indefinite period? The other question is—even granting that at the stage-level we remain friendly in spite of wranglings, what about the level of actuality? While friendly at the stage-level, will not the proselytising religion still continue proselytisation and, therefore, come in clash with another religion?

There is a single reply to both the questions, and that reply constitutes the essence of orthodoxy. Reason and faith cannot remain separate for an indefinite period. Faith is blind acceptance, *i.e.* nature, and reason is logic. But there are two phases of nature through one of which reason has access to actuality. Nature is not mere acceptance. Along with blind acceptance, there is always in nature a fear of loss, a fear another name of which is natural doubt. Along with my life as an accepted datum I have always a natural fear of death—a doubt that I may not exist. Every acceptance is accompanied by this doubt. What reason does is either to remove or accentuate this doubt. Reason begins with siding with acceptance and its primary function is to remove the doubt. This is why at the stage-level of intellect everybody begins with defending his standpoint. If through

intellectual discussions one succeeds in removing doubts concerning his accepted doctrines, the acceptance will be strengthened all the more. It may sometimes happen that at the stage-level one finds his own doctrine to be as irrefutable as another's. Even then the natural doubt is removed and there occurs nothing to dislodge him from his faith. This is always the case so far as fundamental ideologies are concerned. But often, again, it happens that at the stage-level my standpoint comes to be refuted by another, and the crux lies here.

In such a case not merely are natural doubts not removed, fresh doubts begin to infest our initial faith. Very soon that faith, far from being a comfortable resort, turns into a bed of thorns. The result is that the faith or actuality is now shaken at the foundation. Yet, however, we are not till now dislodged. How can we be, seeing that we must rest on something? If on account of the increasing number of doubts and discomforts we give up our station, that means we are lost. The discomforts here are the pangs of a new birth, but the foetus is still in the mother's body. The light of the outside world has not yet dawned on it.

Even at this pre-conversion stage reason should, and actually does, struggle desperately to defend the old faith, though, dialectically enough, it puts forward for acceptance the other alternative with ever-increasing persuasion. Reason is dialectical only at such dynamic pre-conversion stage; otherwise it is a friend, philosopher and guide.

At the pre-conversion stage we still continue in the old faith, though with considerable hesitation. But sooner or later, supposing reason fails altogether to defend the old faith, the opposing faith rushes into the garrison of our actuality and swamps it. One fine morning we find ourselves converted. All pangs are gone. We feel installed once again in a peaceful atmosphere of stability, and life begins anew.

Thus, there is no compartmental separation of reason and faith. The role of reason in man's life never ceases and faith too is always there. Reason is a loyal sentry at the gate of faith, and yet the sentry has independent judgment. Reason is the judiciary which supports the laws of the state to the uttermost, but immediately as the support fails it prescribes change

of the law. It, however, only prescribes, not imposes, a new law. The new law must be coming from the legislators.

The answer to the question—how two opposing ideologies remain friendly at the level of actuality—follows automatically. If one of the contending parties cannot defend itself and is refuted by the other there will be automatic conversion, though after a period of confusion. Hatred is begotten of fanaticism. Orthodoxy always leaves open the door for conversion and yet keeps itself steadfastly attached to actuality. Liberalism is criminally unrealistic.

There are three stages in the life of the orthodox. First, the blessed stage of mere acceptance where Adam has not yet tasted the fruit called knowledge. The second is a more or less prolonged state where at the level of possibilities there is ceaseless evaluation of what was merely accepted. The career at this stage is chequered, confirmation alternating with refutation, where, again, if refutation gets the upper hand there follows a stage of painful insecurity. The third stage is one of recovery where the orthodox finds himself absolutely secure either in his old view or, if conversion has taken place, in another.

The fanatic has no need of these stages. The three stages are characteristically human, but he does not need them because he has strangled the man in him. We may add that even in this process of dehumanisation he is rarely successful. His life is tragic. Reason inhibited works in the sub-conscious mind, and the confirmed fanatic should be sent to an asylum.

The three stages through which the orthodox passes form a total healthy life. The liberal proposes to eliminate the third and revels in the second which is only the stage of preparation. The second stage is inevitably painful, though only as a means to the third which is stability. But somehow the romantic liberal enjoys it vicariously. Physical exercise is only a preparation for health, but to the gymnast it is of absolute value, and he finds pleasure in continuously straining himself. The liberal is a useless gymnast.

Rabindranath on Religion

I

UNINTELLIGIBLE RITUALS and dogmas have characterised every religion quite as much as intelligible social customs and codes of morality it may have developed, and often along with a philosophic creed and a form of mysticism with which they may not fit in. Rabindranath has a definite attitude toward each of these features of religion.

Unintelligible rituals and dogmas are at best only cohesive principles that hold together individuals of a particular community, marking them off from individuals of other groups. Rabindranath has no sympathy for these. Man, according to him, is essentially universal, and anything that tends to separate one individual from another, or one group from another, tends in effect to deny the humanity of man and is as such anti-religious, unless, of course, religion is something totally divorced from the essential spirit in man, *viz.* reason, morality and love. This, in a nutshell, is Rabindranath's reaction against rituals and dogmas.

One wonders if this total condemnation is not an overdoing. Some of these rituals and dogmas, loosened in the present century from their original settings, may well have an aesthetic value, lending grace and beauty to our daily life. Nor perhaps are rituals and dogmas necessarily anti-universal. They are no doubt valid for particular communities, but may not an orthodox follower of one religion, holding fast to its rituals and dogmas, understand, and have even sympathy for, other religions ? Orthodoxy is not necessarily narrow-mindedness. What matters seriously is whether these orthodox people are fanatics or not. Fanaticism is definitely anti-religious ; and when Rabindranath condemns unintelligible rituals and dogmas, this is only because the line between fanaticism and orthodoxy is very thin.

There is another point for consideration. Supposing we abjure all rituals and dogmas and live a life of mere know-

ledge, morality and love, would this be a concrete life? Of these three love indeed is most livingly concrete, but what is concrete love if it is not love for everything in the world and above? Has not Rabindranath himself claimed that love softens even the edges of evil, error and sin? Year in and year out he proclaims that even worst contradictions are reconciled in the harmony of love and music. Why, then, should poor rituals and dogmas, held so much in esteem by millions of human beings, be simply thrown out? What Rabindranath really meant is that we must not lay exclusive emphasis on them, we must not forget that they are only the lowest rungs in the ladder of religions progress, only the first attempt at concrete formulations in particular social, political and material circumstances.

II

As man grows wiser other steps follow. Intelligible social customs, moral codes and metaphysical creeds develop. In Rabindranath's language, man learns to discover his Soul. He begins to think and understand and organise society more or less on a rational basis. He discovers moral principles of life and struggles to know the world and himself.

Through all these stages the spirit of man—his Soul—manifests itself progressively in better forms of knowledge and action, and when sufficient advance is made the moral principles come to be codified and philosophic creeds systematised as a comprehensive view of life and existence. This is the religion of knowledge and action. Prophets and seers appear on the scene and proclaim these principles and creeds. They enjoin upon their followers to practise the former and intuit the latter. Religion at this stage is moral practice and metaphysical intuition—*Karma and Jñāna.* Not that the old-day rituals and dogmas are all given up, nor that *Karma* and *Jñāna* proceed hand in hand always. History of religion has no uniform course. Rituals and dogmas are often condemned wholesale; often, again, they are retained and even attempts are made to justify the retention. As for moral practice and metaphysical intuition, they are often found at loggerheads, often, again, in unison. But whatever

that may be, the Soul of man, his Spirit or Reason, stands discovered.

What is Rabindranath's attitude to these phases of religion—we mean, to morality and knowledge? He welcomes these, but never as the whole truth of religion. He insists that religion proper is something more. It is an attitude of love, and moral actions and knowledge are its prerequisites. Morality, of course, is a little more than a prerequisite: for Rabindranath, even love has to work itself out in moral actions. But of that later. With regard to knowledge, however, he draws a distinction. So long as knowledge is discursive Rabindranath has infinite sympathy for it, but none whatsoever for the knowledge which is metaphysical intuition. Discursive knowledge prevents love from degenerating into spineless sentimentality. Though love, according to him, is the highest form of religion, he is conscious at the same time that it is not of the nature of blind romantic effusion that knows no mooring. True love, he holds, is creative, and no effective creation can ignore the laws of matter which are known discursively. Creation, as in art, is reorganisation of matter according to its own immutable laws, the freedom of art lying only in the novelty of the reorganisation. If this novelty is the life of art, one must not forget too that the matter reorganised and its immutable laws are objects of discursive knowledge. Discursive knowledge is thus necessary for religion that is love.

Not so, however, is the kind of knowledge which is metaphysical intuition. With a natural claim to finality metaphysical intuition only competes with love, positing the truth it discovers as a self-contained reality, or, if one likes, as self-contained realities, meticulously shielding it from contamination by the debased phenomenal world. Knowledge as intuition is by nature discriminative: it decides by castes and so cannot tolerate love which knows no distinction of status.

Rabindranath has no sympathy for metaphysical intuition. Monists of this school are unable to connect their final Truth with the things of the phenomenal world, and to the pluralists he would say that they blunder more because they have even left their final truths detached from one another.

Despairing of intelligible connection these philosophers have either condemned the phenomenal world (and some have even paraded this condemnation) or promulgated some theory of identity-in-difference. But have the world-deniers realised that once the beautiful concrete world is gone they are only landed in a glorified Nothing ? Is not their ultimate reality—call it Self, God or Brahman—wholly immobile and contentless ? And, further, if it has no connection even with the individual self, why should one take the trouble of running after it ? Those, again, who promulgate identity-in-difference have not seen that it is *cent per cent* an aesthetic formula. For logic identity-in-difference is a naked self-contradiction, at most an *ad hoc* hypothesis, a useless makeshift. But it is perfectly at home in the field of art. Do not different notes in music form a beautiful symphony ? Is it not true that even contradictions are wonderfully reconciled in figures of speech, and do not diverse lines and colours form a beautiful picture ? All this is possible in the field of art only, and that because of creative freedom, another name of which is love.

It would be futile, again, to claim, as some have done, that identity-in-difference really means identity in one way and difference in another or that it has to be admitted in deference to facts which are, as a matter of fact, in identity-in-difference. Rabindranath would reply that if the final objective be some form of unity, this is never achieved by that logic, for, far from looking forward to a unity, this logic rather insists on the difference of the two ways, and it follows that if facts themselves are in identity-in-difference this means that in effect the cognitive approach is abandoned.

As for the pluralists of this group who vote for a number of such self-contained truths, Rabindranath would ask the further question as to how they might connect these with one another. If they ignore the problem of unity they are deliberately closing their eyes to the most significant aspect of reality ; and if they condemn the unity, God alone knows what they are saying. If they mean that there is no intelligible *cognitive* account of this unity, this would be conceding Rabindranath's point. If, on the other hand, they mean that relations are only added from outside to the discrete many, this, instead of removing the difficulty, would only

bring in another, for have not the relations themselves to be related to the discretes? If, again, as many of them hold, relation has to be taken as of a peculiar character, as relating the discretes without relating itself to them, this is either a makeshift or amounts to relinquishing the cognitive attitude altogether—in the latter case a switchover to Rabindranath's point.

Rabindranath, thus, has no sympathy for metaphysical intuition. He holds that the unity in question—in the present case, the spiritual in man, his Soul—cannot be reified. It is not a distinct self-contained reality, but one that is wholly immanent. Comparable to a liquid, it flows ever imperceptibly through different phases of each man, holding these in unity and enlivening them; it flows equally through all human beings to bring them ever closer to one another and to Humanity at large—to the Universal Man—and equally, again, through all creatures, down to the meanest, and no less through things of the inanimate world, exhibiting them as expressions of one Grand Unity, the Universal Soul, another name of which is God. This Grand Unity is not to be hypostatised, it has no separate form of its own, no quality that is not found in different degrees of perfection everywhere. It is ever an immanent Truth, realisable in love and creative joy, as ever dissolved and ever renewed in everything in the world, in every creature and every inanimate thing, but in different degrees of perfection, man being its best expression. This is undoubtedly a form of Pantheism, but one that does not exclude life and soul. For Rabindranath the ultimate Reality is man *par excellence*, because it is only in man who has an inkling of his Soul that the existence of this unity is first felt. Man alone in the whole world of creation finds surging in his bosom an inexhaustible fund of Surplus in the form of Divine Personality which, nevertheless, in its infinite dynamism, refuses to be reified and spreads itself out as unceasing communication of love and sympathy with all human beings, creating and re-creating things of the inanimate world as only instruments for this communication.

Rabindranath's God is, thus, the Grand Humanity in man—the Universal Man, none who is wholly, or even partly, outside of us. He is like the one Water in all waters, the

one Fire in all fires, not indeed an abstract universal, a mere principle of colligation, but a solid concrete unity, one that is usually indicated by a *material noun* in Grammar, as distinct from what is indicated by an *abstract noun.* One may deny that there is one concrete Water in all waters, or one concrete Fire in all fires, but once it is allowed, the relation of this unity with the corresponding particulars cannot but be the closest of all identities, and whatever of difference is found between them is one that has only welled forth from the basic unity. The differents are but free creations, unintelligible for Logic, but quite at home in the realm of art which only a poet and a lover can enter.

III

We have just seen why God cannot be partly outside of us. *A fortiori* He cannot be wholly outside. With a God who is wholly outside there could be no communication too, no religion worth the name. The so-called outside God has to relate Himself with man and thus form a unity ; but then either this unity is superior to God, in which case it alone should be God proper, or God, though outside, should be taken as Himself the unity in question. The former of the two alternatives is absurd, and the latter is precisely what Rabindranath meant by the Universal Man in man, an indissoluble unity of man and the Surplus. Man is himself, in essence, the Universal Man : the two are ever in communion with each other.

Rabindranath's concept of man requires some clarification. Every individual man, he holds, can be viewed in three aspects. He is (*i*) an individual living centre, a spiritual monad, with (*ii*) the Universal Man as the essence immanent in him. But over and above this there is in him (*iii*) the empirical selfish man, the *ahaṅkāra,* with centrifugal empiricality that declares autonomy against the Universal Man. It is the empirical selfish *I*—the *ahaṅkāra*—alone which Rabindranath, in line with the ancient Indian thinkers, condemns unequivocally but hastens, at the same time, to add that this condemnation has nothing to do with the pure individual soul, the spiritual monad. The latter remains

untouched. Resolutely from the beginning to the end, and against all Advaita teaching, he retains the spiritual monad. Religion, according to him, is, even at the end of its journey, as much concerned with the individual centre of spirituality as with God the Universal Man. And these individual centres remain, from the beginning to the end, in the relation of identity-in-difference with God. Every individual man is double-phased : he is an individual soul and yet, in the heart of hearts, he is the Universal God. God works through —one may even say, lives through—these individual centres. There is no transcendent God separate from the individual souls.

This peculiar relation between man and God, a relation which is indescribably intimate and yet involves a creative difference, ensures that man can profitably approach God through love and love only. It is not, of course, the kind of love which demands of the lover absolute self-effacement. Such extreme form of love, if love it is at all, is either cognitive in stuff—hardly anything more than the mere *recognition* that the Absolute is the only reality—or a perverse form of love hinging on a supposed *complete* difference between the Supreme Lord and myself, and also on a gratuitously wrong idea that even the spiritual monad is as debased as *ahaṅkāra*. Love proper is joy incarnate, and self-effacement is the negation of joy, unless it be the effacement of the rebellious empirical self in favour of the pure monad—in Rabindranath's language, the Soul—which of its own nature stands in a joyful identity-in-difference with God. If all individuality is effaced there remains no locus for that joy. The Absolute of Advaita may be perfect joy, but it is joy for that Absolute only, nothing to me the individual. Advaita claims indeed that, the Absolute being the very principle of joy, the individual man who has merged himself in that principle has become one with joy. But should a joy which I have not felt be called joy at all ? Even your joy is nothing to me—I cannot call it joy—unless I have interpreted it in terms of my joy or somehow participated in it or at least felt happy at your happiness. Every joy is, therefore, my joy, though that way it is not prevented from being your joy either.

This is infinitely so for my love-joy for God. My love for Him is as much mine as it is His love for me. And this is more so because we are basically of the same stuff—He is my essence, the infinite Surplus, the Universal Man in me. Even in earthly love between any two persons there must be some bond of identity, and, if so, should it not be infinitely truer of my love of God or, to put the same thing in another way, His love for me? In fact, my love for another man is at all possible just because of the Universal Man that we both are. There are, it is true, other factors soiling all earthly love—I mean factors contributed by the selfish empirical self—as a result of which it gets limited and directs itself inevitably to this or that individual or group. But the more we learn to get away from these factors the further the limit is pushed forward, until in pure spirituality I come to love all individuals, in fact everything that is in heaven and earth; and this is exactly my love for the Universal Man.

This undoubtedly is a form of Pantheism, but not of the distributive type. Love for God is not my love for this and that and that other individual *ad infinitum*, it is no serial love. It is love for a genuine Concrete Universal. It is my love of God self-dissolving into love for every individual.

Rabindranath's religion is more removed from distributive Pantheism than from any Deistic or Theistic religion of love. If love be the ultimate mode of communion, there cannot be a sharp separation between man and God. The loving Deist too must admit some bond of identity between himself and God. The only point where he would differ with Rabindranath is that he would prefer to keep himself a little more aloof from God. We have seen that the Deistic form of love grows out of an unnecessary, and even unjustified, underrating of oneself. The rebellious empirical self, *ahaṅkāra*, is undoubtedly undivine, but not so the pure individual Soul. This latter may not be as perfect as God but is, in love, a friend of His, a partner, even when it serves the Lord. As for the Theists, Rabindranath differs with them in the only point that while they accord a self-containedness and distinctiveness to God, for him the Universal Man, though a living unity, is yet no more than functional: it is the living functional unity, none to be hypostatised as a distinctive per-

son. Rabindranath is against idolatry, not so much because idolaters circumscribe God but primarily because they hypostatise as a person or entity what is really a living function ; and he would equally speak against those who, even knowing that He is a functional unity, yet personify Him. If God is a person, He is ever dynamic, ever dissolving Himself as the indwelling Spirit of all individuals.

IV

The God of the Deists, seated high up in the sky and controlling the destiny of man from above, is as old as man himself and owes His origin either to man's primitive fear of the unknown or to a half-awakened moral sense, the sense, *viz.* that justice will be meted out to everybody according to desert. A twentieth-century thinker, Rabindranath needs no justification against the primitive type of Deism. But the Deism of Law and Justice is a sufficiently developed form of religion which he cannot ignore. And he has not ignored it either. He claims that his religion of love *incorporates* it.

Earlier we have seen how true love as creative has to abide by the laws of nature and how yet for creative love these laws are not overbearing. Stern laws there are, laws sufficiently strong to crush those who do not know them or consciously revolt. But creative love as *using* these laws is evidently superior. The laws are only its instruments with which it shapes the world into a Kingdom of God. Justice too has an honoured place in his religion, more honoured than what is assigned to knowledge of laws, but one equally in the overall context of love. Like knowledge of laws, justice too is, first, a pre-requisite : one cannot turn to God until he is morally equipped. But this is only one side of the story, and there is another side more important. According to Rabindranath, creative love has to work itself out in moral and social virtues. It is nothing if it does not shape the world into a Kingdom of God.

These points require some justification. For, may there not be religion without morality ? Rabindranath's definite answer is 'No'. This is good enough against the degenerate Hinduism of his days which his moral sense could not justify.

But the crucial question is not how he or his senior partners in social reform felt. The more fundamental question is how to know which actions are moral and which not. For has anybody except the antinomians ever agreed that the religion he practises is not moral? Further, what about antinomianism itself? How would Rabindranath meet its challenge?

As to the first question—How to know which act is just and which unjust?—there are only three possible replies. Those acts are just (*i*) which are sanctioned by Scriptures or traditions, (*ii*) which are calculated to conduce to social stability and (*iii*) which I reflectively find as purifying my mind or, at least, as not soiling it, for which, in other words, I do not have to repent. Rabindranath examines the three alternatives and votes for the third.

Scriptures are either revealed texts or their interpretations. Notoriously, however, revealed texts, except in so far as they outline the general purpose of the life of humanity at large or of particular communities, lose their appeal in course of time. There come commentaries and sub-commentaries. But these too differ notoriously. The very emergence of newer commentaries makes it necessary that people holding fast to one mode of life ought to take note of other modes and must have, therefore, the freedom to interpret their own traditions in the way they think best. And why? Either because they have to adjust themselves to changing circumstances or simply because on honest self-examination they discover that some of the old customs no longer purify their mind. Rabindranath prefers the second alternative, and that on no other ground except that it is a modern technique. In older days people were more receptive and obeying than assertive, the modern mind is more assertive than receptive. The modern mind, swearing by individual freedom, finds it difficult to submit to Scriptures or traditions or even to the demands of social stability. It relies very largely on introspective discovery. For a modern mind, whether an action is moral or immoral depends on how one sincerely feels about it, and there is no reason why one man's *sincere* feeling should differ from another's.

There is nothing to say against this except that exclusive emphasis on assertion, even if honest, is perhaps as bad as the old-day exclusive emphasis on obedience. Both assertion and obedience are good virtues, but not to the exclusion of each other. A golden mean has to be worked out, and Rabindranath has done it, though unwittingly, in his life. He has never been an orthodox puritan and had no sympathy for the iconoclasts of his time, and yet he never shook hands with the orthodox.

For Rabindranath, morality is that code of conduct which, not being too divorced from the ancient Indian life, is certified by unbiassed self-analysis, and he sincerely believes that the general idea of our ancient Indian life, suitably adjusted to modern requirements, is the ideal philosophy of life. Morality, so understood, is, according to him, a fundamental pre-requisite of religion.

As for the antinomian form of religion, he would summarily dismiss it on the ground that it is either no religion of love or based on a perverse notion of Divinity. The antinomian, in scrupulous observance of esoteric rites, may gain in strength of mind and may come nearest to his God or Goddess. But the strength he gains accrues all to his rebellious *ahaṅkāra*, and the God or the Goddess he turns to is not the Universal Man. Love for humanity is unknown to the antinomian, and if anyone he loves it is at best his God or Goddess, but what kind of God or Goddess is it, if this love is not transferred to other human beings?

The only form of religion that Rabindranath recognises is the religion of love. But, as we have already seen, he excludes neither knowledge nor morality. If love without knowledge is puerile sentimentality, without morality it would degenerate into base sensuousness. If love is like a graceful body of infinite beauty it must be the body round the stern skeleton of knowledge and morality.

Of knowledge and morality, however, it is morality which according to Rabindranath, is more akin to religion than knowledge. This is not merely because morality is more humanistic than knowledge but more because love spontaneously works itself out in good acts to fellow beings. Knowledge as science is from the beginning to the end an impersonal

search for truth, having no special dealing with man, and metaphysical intuition, though it claims to be the ultimate knowledge of the Soul that is God, proceeds, as in Advaita, by denying the world and individuals. Rabindranath only wonders why this beautiful world and the individual souls for whom it is beautiful should be condemned as illusions. Were knowledge the only approach to the ultimate unity such condemnation could somehow be allowed. But there is another approach that needs no ascetic withdrawal. It is the approach known as the religion of love. Individual persons are indeed rebellious creatures too, they do often stand against God and possess the world as theirs only. From this point of view the world and these individuals do indeed fall asunder from the unity. But may not love hold all potential rebels in the bosom of God? Love alone can hold together hostile elements in a beautiful artistic harmony.

Love alone can do justice to individuals. It is only a loving God that could grant freedom of will to individuals. God could never intend that his creatures should behave like slaves. Between a master and his slaves there is no relation of love. If a master at all loves a slave, it is only so far as the slave is considered a person with a dignity of his own, so far only, in other words, as he is approached as a potential rebel. A slave too cannot love his master except through the exercise of his freedom. It is through love alone, whether coming from the Lord or from themselves, that individual persons, through the exercise of their very autonomy, freely choose to form the Kingdom of God—how, it is only love that knows.

God endowed the individual souls with freedom in order that they may lovingly turn to Him. Paradoxically enough, the very freedom that tends to separate them from God brings them near to Him in love, and sometimes nearer in an intensified form of love. Freedom constitutes the very dignity of man, and it is only as conscious of this dignity that he can love God. But he may, and often does, misuse this freedom and, straying from the path of love, bring in evils and suffer. The greatest paradox in God's creation is that through suffering the individual man realises his folly and turn again to God, this time in love that is infinitely more intensified. This intensified love overflows the loving individual and in its

onrush toward God, the Universal Man, sweeps over all individuals and binds them into one Grand Fraternity, doing good to every one of them. Obviously, there cannot be a fraternity unless its members are morally disposed to one another, and it goes without saying that, therefore, in the Grand Fraternity of all individuals the universal love has to work itself out in various forms of moral action. This Grand Fraternity, the Kingdom of God, is possible through love that only free individuals can possess, but in this Divine Kingdom the freedom of the individuals never runs to rebellious excesses. The world and the individuals are perfectly real, but only so far as they are in this Divine Kingdom. Even the intransigent individual is real in so far as this intransigence, through correction, intensifies our love of God. Evil, error and suffering are thus, in a way, necessary elements in our Divine World.

V

In order to understand Rabindranath's religion of love in all its aspects we have to answer another question of far-reaching importance. It is whether morality, and not love, may not be the final attitude in religion. We have seen that according to Rabindranath morality and religion are related in two ways: (i) morality is a pre-requisite of religion which is really love and (ii) this love has to work itself out in moral actions. Both ways, however, love is the dominant context—religion, according to Rabindranath is pre-eminently love. But the question that may be asked now is whether we may not stop with morality. Why not, in other words, call moral life itself religion? Are there not religions where God is viewed as pre-eminently Justice?

Rabindranath would point to two difficulties. One of these, though of minor importance, is that religion of mere justice dangerously borders upon atheism. Justice is almost as impersonal and overbearing as laws of nature. The more important point, however, against all religion of justice is that morality cannot be the final aim of human life. If morality be only another name for the rules of social stability, there is obviously something beyond it. In every human heart there is a fund of spirituality—the Surplus—which

cannot be reduced without remainder to social requirements. If, again, by morality one means the principle or principles, not of social stability, but of social *welfare* or *progress*, this refers very pointedly to something spiritual in man, and what is this spirituality if it is not the Surplus that overflows every individual mind and gets into touch with every other mind? Religion thus goes beyond morality.

Nor is this Surplus all justice and nothing more. For Rabindranath, this Surplus is fundamentally love, though not denying justice. Rabindranath believes that between love and justice there is a relation of one-sided inclusion only—love includes justice, but not justice love. The spirit which is all moral and nothing else is tough and rigorous and leaves no room for that softer side of the spirit, other names of which are love, forgiveness, grace, *etc.* Complete spirit has to combine both, and it is in love that we find a beautiful combination. While justice, for example, is antagonistic to forgiveness, love permits both. The loving father, while punishing his son, may yet through abundant love persuade him to accept the penalty gracefully as his due, and when he forgives the son, this is because he knows that the son is suffering from a sense of guilt and repenting, repentance meaning not merely that he has already accepted that suffering but also that he is prepared for other external punishments too, and all this quite gracefully. When under these circumstances the father forgives the son this is no denial of justice. Forgiveness is justice dissolved in love. It is this love which Rabindranath extols over cold justice.

Love *vs.* justice is a problem as old as religion. Rabindranath solves it in a way that will meet with unstinted approval from all Bhaktivādins—the Sufis, the Christians and the Vaiṣṇavas alike, except that some of these Bhaktivādins have, in their excessive weakness for love, ignored the role of justice altogether. Whatever that may be, it goes without saying that all Bhaktivādins extol love over justice.

One may ask, however, if these Bhaktivādins, Rabindranath included, have not proceeded a little too fast. For, may not love also find an honourable place in the over-all context of justice? Is not justice often tempered with love? Do not judges in law-courts sometimes forgive culprits and

always keep in mind what are called attenuating circumstances? What is all this if it is not justice inclusive of love? Are there not, again, great religions, with millions of followers, that speak of God as much as justice as yet kind to his creatures? Is there not also a religion, followed equally by millions of people, which is pre-eminently, if not *cent per cent* ethical?

It is no wonder, however, that Rabindranath missed this alternative. One must not forget that he was above all a poet, an artist and a singer—an aesthetic *sādhaka*—who could not but side with love. A particular pathway to Reality, *viz*. the way of love, lay open to him from the beginning, and so he had no need to look for another. All that he has said on love, and indeed on anything connected with the religion of love, is primarily a poet's inspiration, and none of the arguments and analyses he has offered should be considered in divorce from that fountain-head of poetry.

The *poet* Rabindranath is most in evidence when he speaks about Nature. To the question, for example, as to why God creates Nature he replies that the artist God creates it quite as much as other artists do, and for the same reason. If an artist creates a thing of beauty this is equally because it has welled forth from the artist's heart. Similarly with God's creation of Nature, and that in an infinite measure. Rabindranath believes that the entire Nature is a grand artistic creation where every part stands with every other part in a beautiful harmony. He does not require any proof for this: it is the artist's faith in him. Only a lover can appreciate this. Knowledge may discover misfits in Nature and dry morality may meet with obstacles. But in love the rugged edges of discordant elements beautifully dovetail with the rest of the world. Knowledge and morality proceed by parts and metaphysical intuition is a myth, but love begins with an abundant faith in the whole.

If there is a difference between an ordinary artist and the Master Artist, God, it is because while the former is in need of foreign tools the latter creates the tools even from out of Himself. At stages, even the ordinary artist creates such tools, as when a singer creates the sounds along with the melody, and arts can be classified as higher or lower in proportion as there are fewer or more of the foreign tools.

Yet even in song there is something foreign, *viz.* the body of the singer, his vocal cords, the air that comes out and the air outside, *etc.* But to the Master Artist there is nothing that is foreign. If arts are arranged in a hierarchy according to the degree of their freedom from foreign elements, God's creation of the beautiful world stands at the apex of the series.

The above is the explanation of Nature offered by the poet Rabindranath. One must not forget, however, that he had a schooling in ancient Indian philosophy also, particularly in the Upaniṣads, and though he largely succeeded in attuning his poetry to the Upaniṣads and *vice versa*, not unoften the two have run side by side as alternatives. With regard to Nature, for example, we find another account, particularly in the *Santiniketan* series. Things of Nature are, in this alternative view, the articles which God created, of course, out of nothing foreign, in order that individual persons may be made to enjoy or suffer these in proportion to the goodness or badness of their free actions. This is the old Indian theory of Karma and Rabindranath has often connected it with the theory of birth-cycles. Often, again, we come across other accounts of Nature given by Rabindranath. One of these is that the individual soul itself creates a Nature for appropriate enjoyment or suffering. Another account is that Nature is a side-creation by the very love with which man and God approach one another, a creation by means of which this love is rendered concrete and tangible. These are all philosophic theories of Nature, and if Rabindranath has not offered any consistent theory so far, this is because he was less a philosopher than a poet. In spite of his wavering among different philosophical theories he clings fast to the one he offered as a poet, the theory, *viz.* that Nature is a profoundly beautiful harmony welling forth from the very being of God the Master Artist.

VI

In conclusion, we may sum up the characteristic features of the Poet's religion of love as follows:

(1) It is sharply antagonistic to any form of unqualified Dualism. Unity is the keynote of the Poet's religion.

(2) It is equally antagonistic to Advaita.

(3) It is certainly a philosophy of identity-in-difference, but one that is to be appreciated in the aesthetic attitude of love. Love alone can reconcile different or even hostile elements into a beautiful harmony. Hence Rabindranath's religion of love is different from Hegel's and Rāmānuja's—the former being pre-eminently cognitive and the latter as much cognitive as a love approach. Rabindranath is unambigously against cognition as metaphysical intuition, and the cognition which, in his opinion, is a vital pre-requisite of religion is only discursive: it is the scientific knowledge of matter and its laws.

(4) Largely similar to the Bhāgavata form of Vaiṣṇavism, some forms of Sufism and the Christian religion of love, it is yet different from these in certain vital points. He differs with the Bhāgavatas and some extreme Vaiṣṇavas of the Bengal School in not having laid exclusive emphasis on love. The love that he speaks of is one of the strong in knowledge and morality and one, further, which has to work itself out in moral actions. He would part company with any Sufi who would withdraw himself from the world. Withdrawal into oneself is undoubtedly a keynote of religion, but in religion that is love for the Universal Man this withdrawal has to express itself in the form of pure *maitrī* for every thing and being in the world. Withdrawal, for Rabindranath, is no total denial of the world and individuals. Rabindranath's religion differs equally from Christian Theism. To these Theists God is both immanent and transcendent, but Rabindranath has nothing to do with a transcendent God. His religion is not indeed any distributive form of Panthism that denies a unitary God. Rabindranath's God, though wholly immanent, is yet a unity, a Person, the Universal Man—a genuine spiritual unity that yet resists all reification. In this respect it very closely resembles some forms of Sufism.

(5) He is not also for Judaism with its exclusive emphasis on stern justice and morality, nor, for the matter of that, for any religion that does not go beyond ethics.

(6) Orthodox Islam has worked out a beautiful blend of justice with love and its humanistic appeal is abundant, for which it has won converts the world over. Rabindranath

would have infinite admiration for this religion. But the complete or even a partial transcendence of God would be foreign to his elements.

(7) Rabindranath's religion is the religion of Man. It is Humanism from the beginning to the end, but not of the type which is commonly known as such. The present-day Humanism, sometimes called Personalism, is either an empiricist doctrine for which there is no room for the *soul* of man, his spirit, or a blanket theory covering all shades of spiritual philosophy, of which Rabindranath would only agree to a particular form, not evidently to all the forms.

(8) Despite unbounded admiration for Buddhism Rabindranath would stand aloof when it denies God and soul and insists on ethics more than it ought to. As for the Mahāyānas in particular who have dissolved God in infinite humanity and worked out a brilliant synthesis of morality and love, Rabindranath almost swears by them, but parts company immediately as they proceed to deny even the functional unity of God.

The poet's ideas stand unique in the history of religion.

An Aspect of Mallik's Philosophy

[A critical study of the first hundred pages of his book "The Real and the Negative"]

B. K. MALLIK is a first-rank metaphysician of the twentieth century. If yet he is largely unknown to the modern world this is because his achievements have mostly been ill-timed. He has built up a strictly rational metaphysics, but precisely in an age when scientific de-ontology, or sometimes its extreme opposite—spasmodic romanticism—is the order of the day. He is, again, a historian (of philosophic movements) who has penetrated straight to the bottom of dominant ideas, not plodding through bloodless facts and texts; but this unfortunately in an age when people are mad for scientific history. He is also a great humanist, but of a type not to the tastes of modern people: his treatment of the problem of human existence is inevitably bound up with his acute logico-metaphysical studies.

The historian and the humanist Mallik is not our concern here. We are more interested in his metaphysics. But even so, we are not interested in the details that he has worked out through volumes. We shall concentrate only on the first hundred pages of his book "The Real and the Negative" and try to understand him. Naturally, our first task would be to defend him against the powerful de-ontologists of our day.

II

According to Mallik the one defining character of modern philosophy initiated by Descartes is the attitude of uncertainty. The modern philosopher is of a hyper-critical mind, seldom prepared to take anything for granted. He will first examine and then accept. He begins with doubt and proceeds cautiously, and is proud that this his attitude is the only reasonable one and typically modern. Mallik appreciates this attitude, but only to the extent it is justified. For once it is given free

rein it will run headlong to destruction, another name of which is absolute scepticism. Mallik rejects this scepticism on the only ground that side by side with all-round questioning there is in the human heart an inevitable 'dread of Nothing'. Absolute scepticism, as of Pyrroh, or, as some say, though wrongly, of the Nihilist Buddhist, cannot be refuted by arguments. One can only point out that this attitude is self-defeating in that reason that seeks to establish it is after all afraid of facing total Nothing. Reason, after all, seeks to establish something positive, and to pass Nothing as something positive, as what is the ultimate Reality, would only be a verbal jugglery, a contradiction in terms. Absolute scepticism is but reason over-stepping its legitimate bounds and turning delinquent.

The positive that is opposed to Nothing is the Real. Some faith somewhere in the Real is ingrained in reason. This is why Descartes, doubting everything, had to discover the indubitable *cogito,* which shows that this philosopher never meant by 'doubt', unqualified pessimism. Indeed the technique that Descartes employed should not be called 'doubt', for that word has unholy association with scepticism. It should better be understood as the method of placing one alternative over against another, so that the net result would be uncertainty so far. As so understood, the modern attitude which is legitimately called rational is none other than judging every thesis as against a possible (or actual) antithesis as an alternative and never ceasing to do so till the process comes inevitably to an end. Immediately, however, as doubt or uncertainty comes to be understood that way the fact that it is bound to cease stands as evident. For, to quote Mallik, 'if two propositions or terms . . . happen to contradict one another, it is inconceivable that they would do so unless there was a third proposition or term which was equally implied by them'. Were there no such implication the two contrary alternatives, left to themselves, would have annihilated one another and there could only remain the dreaded Nothing. Descartes' 'clear and definite stand that at any rate doubt as a process survives could and must be taken to mean that the positive background of the last instance of doubt was bound to escape the universal wreckage. Even the most sweeping and

comprehensive occurrence of doubt cannot be supposed to reduce human experience to a state of utter and complete nothingness'. It is thus evident that there is Reality over against Nothing. With Descartes this Reality is consciousness (inevitably human consciousness). With Mallik, as we shall find, it is something else.

Methodologically, then, Mallik is in sympathy with the Cartesian Rationalists. But one might ask here an uncomfortable question. It is: Will he have an equal sympathy for the Empiricists? If reason means the critical attitude—the attitude of not accepting anything till all contrary alternatives are repudiated—do the Empiricists lag behind? Is it not true that they too begin with uncertainty and examination and do not accept anything till it 'escapes wreckage'? If they have accepted the data of sense-experience, this is because these are critically found immune. Critically found, because the Empiricists were not un-aware that Descartes and people like him had challenged these data. Despite the challenge they clung to these data on the simple but forceful ground that these do survive. Did not Descartes too, on practically the same ground, permit the Law of Contradiction? Did he not challenge the Law at the beginning but quietly submit before long, for how otherwise could he have made deductions from his *cogito*? Are not the data of sense-experience, one might legitimately ask, equally unchallengeable?

Mallik has nothing against these data. They may well be as inviolate as the Empiricists would have them. He would only ask one question. It is whether they are the only unchallengeable things in the world or whether there is not another thing equally unchallengeable, *viz.* the Law of Contradiction. Mallik, for one, is not concerned with the data of sense-experience. He only proposes to start with this Law of Contradiction, then analyse it and draw out its implications and asks whether this drawing out of implications and arranging them in a system would not be a self-contained study, at least as inviolate as the Science of the Empiricists. It is precisely what is called metaphysics, a systematic study of the pure structure of the universe. Mallik, in his "The Real and the Negative", is concerned with this metaphysics and has nothing to do with Science.

The Empiricists, however, particularly of the modern school, are more obstinate and would refuse to be silenced that way. They would never allow a metaphysics that could be built out of the implications of the Law of Contradiction. Not that this Law has no implications, what they insist on is that this Law or, for the matter of that, any principle of Logic, is a hundred per cent a mere method of procedure, nothing that is meant as an existent fact, Platonic or otherwise. The implications of the Law of Contradiction can at the most be organised into a system of Logic. But Logic is no metaphysics; from the beginning to the end it is a pure method of procedure and absolutely nothing else. What, now, would be Mallik's stand against these uncompromising de-ontologists? He would argue as follows:

A particular Logic as a method of procedure is either one among many alternative Logics, preferred on a certain ground, or unalterably fixed for all time. If one among many alternatives, how is one to decide which Logic is the best? Not certainly on the supposed ground that the best Logic has to fit in adequately with data of sense-experience. As *ex hyphothesi* the Logics under consideration are all *a priori* there is no question of their agreement with sensuous data; and, further, nobody knows for certain what such agreement could eventually mean. The choice rests, therefore, on some other ground: the best Logic would be that which consists of principles that being just adequate in number fit in with one another to form a neat system from out of themselves. But, if so, how possibly could one talk of fitting in with one another and forming a neat system unless the Law of Contradiction or its variant, the Law of Excluded Middle, or, for the matter of that, any logical principle that could be deduced from either, were taken as unalterably fixed for all time? But, again, if they are unalterably fixed they cannot be mere methods of procedure. There must be some reason, inherent in those principles, justifying their unalterability. A mere method is a postulate or convention and so necessarily one among other possible postulates or conventions, there being no method, postulate or convention that does not admit of alternatives. As no mere methods, therefore, the principles of Logic must be existent reals. They are *a priori* reals—in Mallik's language,

possible existents—and metaphysics is the systematic study of their implications.

III

But all difficulties are not yet over. One might still argue that neither Logic nor metaphysics could be so easily developed from out of the Law of Contradiction, for both of them as systematic studies have after all to employ that very Law at every step. The exact nature of the difficulty would be like this :

If the Law of Contradiction be a fact of the Platonic order and if X as another Platonic fact be implied by it in the sense that the togetherness of the Law and not-X would be self-contradictory,[1] should one wonder that this implication is possible through that very Law of Contradiction? This repetition of the Law would inevitably imply X for a second time, which, again, in its turn, would be possible just because of the Law of Contradiction, and so on *ad infinitum*. How, in the face of this infinite regress, could Logic and metaphysics develop out of the Law of Contradiction? (Logic is not our immediate concern, we are concerned more with metaphysics.)

One way out of this difficulty would be to hold—what Mallik, however, would never allow—that the law that is employed is never more than a method of procedure, though the Law from which metaphysics is to develop may be a Platonic existent. But this would be slipping unawares into the arms of the Empiricists: if we are forced this way to take one of these Laws as a mere method, there is no reason why the other too should not be treated that way, for, after all, the two Laws are not different.

The Empiricists thus challenge the very possibility of pure metaphysics. Like any good metaphysician Mallik will have to meet it. But how?

1 Self-contradictory, not impossible. For impossibility refers to material implication. We, on the other hand, are here speaking of formal implication, and by 'formal implication' we do not mean a generalised material implication. Formal implication is, with us, more primary: it is just the fact that the proposition 'S and not -P' is self-contradictory. It is different, also, from such self-contradiction as 'S and not-S', for this latter is a sheer tautology.

He will reject the traditional separation of the *a priori* from the empirical. Empiricism, much as its opposite, the traditional Rationalism, has banked, he would say, on this illegitimate separation. Once it is gone there remains nothing for exclusive Empiricism, and equally for Rationalism, to stand upon. Mallik would never agree that aprioritics are cloistered in a pure Platonic world removed a hundred leagues from debased empiricals. The Law of Logic, for example, are no self-existent Platonic entities. Though *a priori*, they belong from the beginning to the end to this our empirical world. It is because the Rationalists had overdrawn the distinction that the Empiricists have in violent reaction swung round and clean thrown off the deified aprioritics. Otherwise, if these Rationalists were more moderate and had assigned a proper place to aprioritics in the scheme of the universe, there would have been no occasion for the modern Empiricists to have turned so fanatical.

That aprioritics are not separate from the empirical is clear from the fact that once the separation is allowed we are faced with unanswerable questions like 'What is their exact status?', 'How do they stand connected with the empirical?' *etc.* The desperate Kantian view that they are subjective (though necessary) and the modern Empiricist's view that they are mere postulates are only the results of this illegitimate separation. Once the *a priori* and the empirical are separated and it is found difficult to connect them, these philosophers seek to by-pass the difficulty by doing away with the problem altogether. They hold that as these aprioritics are nothing existent but only subjective or linguistic methods of knowing nature there is no question of connecting them with the empirical. As for Mallik, he too would readily admit that there is no such question, but that is because they are not separate at all. Why first separate them and then despair of finding out the connection? That there is after all some connection cannot be gainsaid, for people do speak of empirical data as organised in the way of these aprioritics. Once our philosophers have driven a wedge between aprioritics and empirical data they begin to explain this universally accepted fact by twisting the phrase 'in the way of'. They understand the phrase as meaning nothing but 'according to'. Even when

Kant speaks of Nature as constituted by (subjective) apriorities he meant nothing more than 'organised (better, taken as organised) according to these'. For he never took these apriorities as (subjective) existents; and even if they are taken as existents it would be difficult to conceive how existent subjective processes could combine with data to yield Nature.

So Mallik would never separate apriorities from empirical data. This non-separation, however, does not mean that apriorities are to be understood in terms of the empirical. Apriorities, taken by themselves, may be abstractions, but they are abstractions of a new type altogether. They are living abstractions. Though not existent in an ethereal region of their own, they can yet be conceived all by themselves, *i.e.*, apart from all empirical contents, and, as such, they may even develop inter-relations among themselves. There may, in other words, be a complete theoretical study of apriorities all by themselves. It is this peculiar character of apriorities that ensures the possibility of systematic metaphysics. Metaphysics is a systematic study of apriorities that are taken as existent, and Mallik would say that the existence of the apriorities is guaranteed by their non-separation from empirical contents which unquestionably exist, and the systematic character of metaphysics is due to the intrinsic inter-relations of these apriorities. This system of apriorities has been rightly called (not merely by Mallik but by others also) the structure of the universe.

We have so far presented Mallik's views in the language of traditional philosophy. But somehow or other Mallik is often unconventional in language even. Using the traditional language of philosophy we have said that by themselves apriorities are only 'conceivable, not existents'. Mallik, however, would use another language, though meaning the same thing. He would say that apriorities are possible existents, not actual existents.

IV

We have seen how, starting from the Cartesian attitude of uncertainty, Mallik derives the final inevitable Reality which is opposed to Nothing. According to him, it is the dread of

Nothing that assures us of Reality. Obviously, this Reality and the Nothing are *a priori*. A study of these in their inter-relation, and along with all that is necessarily entailed, is exactly what is called metaphysics. Mallik regrets that modern philosophy which had all the potentiality of developing into a right type of metaphysics yet failed that way because these philosophers had from the beginning confused the critical attitude of reason with scepticism. Mallik feels happy that Descartes had, wisely enough, postulated a positive as the ultimate background of uncertainty but complains that, dogmatically at the same time, he had conceived it as only the *human* mind or *consciousness;* and further, by the time he arrived at it he had so mercilessly denuded it of all contents that he was unable to proceed any further except by introducing *ad hoc* a few other certainties. Mallik does not object to calling it mind or consciousness; only he will not call it *human* mind or *human* consciousness. What, after all is mind? As opposed to other things, it is that about which there is absolute certainty, that which alone exists absolutely. But the mind of which Descartes spoke was wholly indescribable, because it was without any content. Reality, on the other hand, which Mallik proposed to substitute for Descartes' mind, is not without content. Not that it is only felt as having a content, for then Descartes too might argue that his mind also is so felt. The only criterion to decide whether something has a content or not is to see if anything further can be deduced from it. As already said, nothing further could be deduced from Descartes' mind, whereas from out of Reality Mallik proposes to deduce a whole structure of the universe.

Mallik's claim here is extraordinarily original. He agrees with the Behaviourists that what is ordinarily called mind is amorphous in being thoroughly contentless and should not, therefore, find place in any system of philosophy. He would agree with Ryle too that Descartes' mind is a 'ghost in the machine'. But he would never on that account admit that positivistic phenomena are all that are there and that mind is either a wholly misleading concept or only a technique for describing a particular group of facts, called mental. He is not an empiricist. He insists that there are aprioritics, and

Reality, according to him, is the arch-apriority. He is also prepared to call this Reality mind. He argues that people ordinarily distinguish mind as something other than the non-mental, only because while what are called non-mental are always contingent there is inevitably something which we have to admit as unchallengeable. What a lay man calls 'mind' is thus scarcely more than the ultimate unchallengeable. Lay men, however, do not know what exactly this unchallengeable ultimate may be, they only glibly talk of it as mind. Mallik, on the other hand, shows, as we have already noted, that the ultimate unchallengeable is Reality.

If this is the proper account of mind we have here the broadest hint, which Mallik has worked out elsewhere, as to how problems about mind—problems, in other words, of epistemology—have to be properly handled. Psychology and epistemology have first to give way to metaphysics and can only then develop *de novo* from the latter. Subject and object should no longer be our guiding concepts. Before the days of Descartes these concepts were not much in vogue, what to speak of a whole philosophy hingeing on this distinction? It is Descartes who first brought these illegitimate concepts to the forefront and made them the fulcrum of philosophy. Mallik has nothing against the word 'mind', but he would never take it as the subject as opposed to what is called object. For him mind is the ultimate unchallengeable Reality.

Mallik warns, however, that his equation 'mind (consciousness) =Reality' should not be interpreted in the line of Advaita Vedānta. Mind in Advaita Vedānta is still a subject, though ultimate, and as contentless as with the Cartesians. Mallik would only wonder what goods such a vanishing concept could deliver to Advaita thinkers. They cannot deduce anything from it except by introducing *ad hoc* another concept called Māyā, which too, unfortunately, is wholly indescribable.

The Advaita philosophers might argue that though nothing can be deduced from the ultimate mind it is not for that reason without content. It has a rich content, though indescribable because homogeneous: it is what is felt as the essential I. Mallik's reply here would be as emphatic as against the Cartesians. To say simply that I feel X to be a positive content is one thing, to say that it is positive because other truths can

be deduced from it is another, and every rational enquirer will prefer the latter. The former definition of positivity is not rational, it is one about which no rational discourse is possible. Where a rational account is possible why should we turn to mysticism and depend on feeling? Why should man abnegate exercise of reason which is his prerogative? Reason failing, one may turn towards mysticism. But Mallik has offered a rational metaphysics.

Against all such mystic philosophy Hegel's protest is classical: there are footsteps to the lion's den but no footsteps back. What he means is that every philosophical account should be rational, at least as far as possible, and he, as much as Mallik, believes that it is possible to the end. Mallik would only differ on another fundamental issue. With Hegel, Being is itself also Nothing and rational deduction is possible only through dialectical synthesis of the two. With Hegel, in other words, reason is primarily an act of synthesising opposities. Mallik would never agree to this. Reason, for him, is primarily the Law of Contradiction, and Being, as a matter of fact, is not Nothing. Being—or, for the matter of that, Reality—stands ever opposed to Nothing, and the very business of reason is to posit Reality as a triumph over this Nothing. Mallik would gladly agree that deductions from Reality are possible only as that Reality is contrasted with Nothing; but that does not mean that it is a dialectical synthesis of the two.

The dread of Nothing is the motive force of philosophy—Mallik is never tired of repeating this. But he has neither glorified this dread, as some modern Existentialists do, nor spoken of Nothing as the ultimate. Either of these is sheer scepticism the triumph over which is the exact business of reason. Good Existentialists may have utilised this dread just with a view to positing Reality, and good Buddhists of the Mādhyamika school for returning to our normal world with an enlightened outlook. But even these good Existentialists have erred in two ways. Almost in the manner of Advaita Vedānta they have confused Reality with mind, and, secondly, they have often held that once we have had a glimpse of the ultimate mind it would never be possible for us to get over the dread of Nothing. The second error is due to the fact that these Existentialists have either ignored reason or openly condemned it.

As for the Mādhyamika Buddhists, they have never realised that the triumph over Nothing is possible only through getting in touch with Reality.

V

Mallik discovers the structure of the universe neither empirically nor through any form of intuition—mystic or 'intellectual'. His is a very simple method. He analyses the proposition 'Reality is' and finds out its implications, and he does this by means of reviewing the Laws of thought, particularly the Law of Contradiction.

The Law of Contradiction is usually formulated as 'A and not-A cannot both exist'. What exists is, therefore, either A or not-A. Obviously 'existence' here means actual existence, and the Law, therefore, means that both A and not-A cannot be in the state of actuality: one of these has to be destroyed. Evidently if through a miracle A could be destroyed and not-A alone had remained in actuality what we would be faced with is sheer blank, *i.e.*, Nothing. But we have already shown that our reason has a constitutional dread of this Nothing. Hence for no rational philosopher could not-A be actual. What actually exists is always a positive.[2]

This is a momentous conclusion. It strikes at the root of all accounts of negation as actual reality and makes short shrift, at one stroke, of all philosophy that extols Nothing over Reality as the final truth. For a rational being negation can never be an actuality.

Mallik warns, however, that negation is not to be rejected altogether as a chimera. If there were no not-A we could not have the Law of Contradiction itself. Hence there must be some not-A for A to counteract and become actual. A is actually existent and for it to have turned into an actuality there must have been a not-A as a possible existent which it had superseded. Not-A could not have been actual; and yet it was not a zero either, nor a mere word or a concept. It must have been an existent of a type, for A had to fight with it.

[2] 'Not-A' here does not mean B, C or D; it means simply the other of A, sheer negation with no positive content.

Such existence is called by Mallik 'possible existence' or 'possibility'.

The terms 'possible existence' and 'actual existence' may not be happy. But Mallik uses them deliberately to distinguish his view from other alternatives he rejects. These views are as follows :

(*a*) If there are two kinds of existence, possible and actual, there must be some bare existence which is common to them.

(*b*) Actual existence is the only kind of existence and what is called possible existence should better be termed possibility in order that it may not be taken as a form of existence. Possibility as so distinguished from existence would be on a par with the subsistence of modern Realists.

(*c*) Possible existence is the only kind of existence, in contrast with which the so-called actual existence should better be called actuality.

(*d*) Possible existence and actual existence are entirely disparate, with nothing that is common between them except the word 'existence'.

Mallik keeps clear of all the four alternatives. His point against (*a*) is brief and simple. It is that to possible existence and actual existence there is nothing that is conceivably common. The very suggestion of 'bare existence' as common to them sounds absurd from the beginning. There is conceivably no bare existence which is neither possible nor actual existence. Existence is either possible existence or actual existence or both separately, but never neither.

As against the alternative (*b*), Mallik's point is that there is no possibility which is not possible existence. The so-called subsistence of modern Realists is no primary status, it is unintelligible except as presupposed by what is called existent (fact). A subsistent is said to be that which, retaining its autonomy as a bare content, comes to be affirmed or denied, as the case may be. But such talk of a bare content which retains its autonomy even though it is neither asserted nor denied is nonsense, unless it is entertained in some attitude like suggestion, supposal, presumption, *etc.*, and these latter attitudes are always directed to a possible existent. In other

words, a content which is neither affirmed nor denied nor suggested, supposed or presumed is nothing but a dead abstraction, nothing, therefore, from which the existent can be deduced or constructed. Mere subsistence as ontologically more primary than existence is an illogical notion.

Apriorities are sometimes talked of as subsistent. Here too Mallik would reply that the true state of affairs is that they are possible existents. We have already seen that according to Mallik they are neither methods of procedure nor mere subjective processes, nor, obviously, are they nominal abstractions only. They have, therefore, to be taken as somehow existing; and as presupposed by and involved in actual existence they must be called possible existents.

Against the alternative (*c*) stated above, *viz.* that only apriorities as possible existents have existence proper and that the empirical as the so-called actual existents should, therefore, be called mere actuality, not actual existents, he would only repeat, what he has said many times before, that he does not believe in any separation of the *a priori* from the empirical.

Lastly, against the alternative (*d*) that the possible existent and the actual existent are two entirely different types of existent, having nothing in common between them, he would only point out that if really they are entirely different there is no reason why both should be called by the same name 'existent'. This does not, however, mean, Mallik hastens to add, that between them there is something common which by itself is neither. Such bare existence is, as already noted, inconceivable.

But if all the four alternatives are rejected what could be Mallik's own ideas of possible and actual existence? It is that possible existence alone is existence proper and that it is this very existence which later (logically later, not chronologically) becomes actual. Actual existence is but existence become actual. The entire group of actual existents is what is called the concrete world. The *a priori* structure of this concrete world possesses but possible existence.

We must be on our guard here that this concrete world that exists actually should not be confused with what is called empirical. The concrete actual is none other than the *a priori* developing from possible to actual existence—or, to use a

happier expression, from existence to actuality. The concrete actual is from the beginning to the end *a priori*, only changing its status from existence to actuality. Nowhere in Mallik's philosophy is there any suggestion that the *a priori* has suddenly become empirical. This reminds us of Leibniz's distinction between the compossible (the best group of possibles) and the actual. Mallik is never seriously concerned with the distinction between the *a priori* and the empirical. He is concerned with the pure structure of the universe and holds that this structure, evidently *a priori*, passes from the stage of possibility, *i.e.*, existence, to actuality.

For a better understanding of his position we may compare his view with that of Kant and Advaita Vedānta. Kant, much too interested in the distinction between the *a priori* and the empirical, has missed the true distinction between the possible and the actual and confused it, naturally enough, with that between the *a priori* and the empirical. For him, apriorities are transcendentally ideal, *i.e.*, by themselves possibilities only, but become actual when they are brought in some relation to the empirical. Mallik would correct him and say that even as not related to the empirical they can be actual. They become actual just by the time they have triumphed over their possible negations. Kant had no idea of a possible positive being faced with a corresponding possible negative. The only philosopher who came near Mallik is Leibniz, though even he could not see that the possible positive A is faced, in the region of possibility, with the possible negation not-A. Instead, he held that it is faced with another alternative positive possibility. In Section IV we have seen how the fight between alternative possibilities—which truly represents the critical attitude, called reason—is ultimately a fight between Reality and Nothing, and the triumph of one alternative over others is ultimately that of Reality over Nothing.

VI

If Reality has to fight with Nothing in order to triumph over it, this Nothing, we have seen, must have possible existence; and as it can never attain the status of actuality it must ever have possible existence only. But there is another side which

is equally, if not more, important. It is that even Reality must have, at a stage, bare possible existence. As long as it fights with the possible Nothing it cannot be more than possible existent. It attains actuality only when it has come out triumphant. Reality, thus, passes through two stages—possible or bare existence and actual existence. Nothing can never have actual existence.

The Reality that we described in Section II as the last unchallengeable resort is not, however, the possible Reality, it is Reality as actual which has already repudiated Nothing. When Reality fights with Nothing this is at a stage further removed, and it is in this battlefield that Mallik discovers the structure of the universe. Mallik's philosophy, thus, is fundamentally different from that of either Parmenides or Hegel. In this structural field Parmenides discovered Being only and entirely missed Nothing. But precisely here he was mistaken. He confused Being with Reality. Being, with him, was bare existence, that exactly which Mallik calls possible Reality, and Mallik argues that not merely Reality but Nothing also has this possible existence. Parmenides failed to see that only the possible Reality is Being, not the Reality which is actual. He could not see that in that field Nothing is co-ordinate with Reality.

It cannot be said that by 'Being' Parmenides meant actual Reality, not the possible one, and that, therefore, he was justified in having disallowed Nothing, for has not actual Reality destroyed Nothing? Parmenides cannot be defended that way. For even then one has to answer the question—What is the status of non-Being which he disallowed? As neither co-ordinate with Being nor a mere meaningless word it must have had some status in Parmenides' philosophy, and what could this be, if not possibility? And, if Nothing is thus a possible existence, the Reality that seeks to triumph over it—and just so far as it seeks that—must equally be a possible existent.

This struggle of possible Reality with Nothing and its eventual triumph is not also the Hegelian dialectic. Hegel has no idea of the realm of possibility. The series of struggles and triumphs that he speaks of all happen, according to him, in the field of actual existence. He believes that at every step a negation actually resists Reality and the latter in continual

triumph absorbs the negations and gets enriched. Mallik would only point out that struggle in the field of actuality is qualitatively different from any in the field of possible existence. When water opposes fire this is qualitatively different from how not-fire could oppose it, 'not-fire' meaning not water or similar positive things, taken singly or together, but just the formal opposite of fire. Fire which possibly could have been an other is actually the fire as it is only in so far as in the structural field of possibility it has destroyed that other possibility. When Mallik speaks of the struggle between Reality and Nothing he has in view this field of possible existence. Opposition in the field of actuality is always the opposition to one positive by another positive, and the second positive opposes not simply because it is not the first positive, but because it has a positive quality strong enough to annihilate the first. Water extinguishes fire not because it is not-fire—for there are many other things which are not-fire and do not yet extinguish fire—but because of a specific property it possesses.

What is true of actual Reality is true equally of actual philosophy. A particular view of the world is an actual philosophy to me, *i.e.*, a view accepted by me as final, only so far as it has triumphed over possible negation. In other words, it is actual only so far as it has somehow superseded other possible views. Some of these superseded views may well be actual in the sense that they are held by others; yet as they have been repudiated along with other possible views, and exactly in the same manner, they are so far possibilities. Hence their opposition to the view under consideration must have occurred in the realm of possibility.

The views silenced so far have not, however, died altogether. They may have been successfully prevented from becoming actual now, but to a thinking man there is always the haunting dread that one or other of these may one day rise from the grave and strike at his own view. Every one of his favourite views which are actual to him in the sense that he has accepted them as final thus stands in constant danger of possible collapse and struggles constantly to overcome it.

When Mallik uses the term 'Reality' he often means by it philosophy as world-view, and that not unjustifiably. A

metaphysician of Mallik's type will never distinguish between world-structure and world-view: the categories used in a world-view cannot be different from the structural principles of the world. If, now, Reality be identical with philosophy, possible and actual Reality would be but possible and actual philosophy, and Nothing would mean its possible annihilation. In this connection Mallik uses another word, *viz.* 'universe', and says that possible Reality as one universe is perpetually at struggle with Nothing as another universe. He holds also that it is primarily this struggle which is reflected in different forms in different aspects of life. An amazing account of this struggle, both in general outline and detail, one can find in every volume that Mallik has written, and one would only wonder how desperately and with what amount of infinite suffering he struggled through all his volumes to discover the way to peace.

Classical Philosophies of India and the West

CREATIVE THOUGHT IN India ended with Udayana in the tenth century A.D.[1] By "creative thought" we mean serious struggle with the problems of life and existence, as distinct from formalistic clarification of issues already decided. Post-Udayana philosophers of India were pre-eminently formalistic. Occasionally original and always serious, they were more interested in form than in matter. But classical Indian philosophy always had genuine problems that concern life profoundly, and content was always placed above form. Every work, whether original or of the nature of a commentary, whether of a wide range or sectional, had a contribution to the fund of truths discovered. Analysis, proof, and refutation there certainly were, as in all sound philosophy. But these were never apotheosized. Logic was used only as an instrument of discovery. Even inference was employed for the discovery of truths.

Udayana belonged to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. There were other schools in classical India, of course. The very early schools in India are Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Jainism, some forms of Buddhism, and a form of the philosophy of Grammar. Different Vedāntic schools developed later in classical India;[2] and between these earlier and later schools there were the philosophies of the Śaivas, the Vaiṣṇavas, *etc.*, and additional forms of the philosophy of Grammar.

The problems of classical Indian philosophy cannot be neatly formulated as ethical, metaphysical, theological, logical, psychological, *etc.* A precise division of philosophy into these "departments" was unknown to the Indians, as even in the West in earlier days, and if with the Renaissance in the West we find this practice growing and finally being recognized under pressure of work it is still an open question whether such division is desirable.

1 The period may be extended by another century to accommodate Ramanuja and a few others.

2 The Upaniṣads were not works of systematic philosophy.

Ethics and metaphysics are inextricably connected. Problems of existence arise because of man's consciousness of freedom. If man were a mere item of Nature, he would have no problem at all. Questioning Nature presupposes transcendence; he who questions has stepped aside and is conscious of that transcendence. Equally free is one who answers. This consciousness of freedom has degrees, of course. Though conscious of freedom, one may not yet feel an interest in it. As a free being one may turn to Nature in a theoretical or a practical attitude, either to study it or reorganize it in a way that is not possible for a mere item of Nature. This is what man does. But one may also turn toward the very consciousness of freedom, and then four possibilities present themselves; (1) he may try to realize this freedom in the theoretical attitude; (2) he may, in the theoretical attitude, re-interpret Nature; (3) he may try to realize freedom in the practical attitude, realize himself, in other words, as free will dissociating himself from Nature; or (4) he may, in the practical attitude, realize himself as freely willing by reorganizing Nature according to his self-conscious free will.

If freedom as such were the keynote of ethics, all philosophy would be ethic-centric. Often, however, we are told that the freedom that ethics considers is only freedom of will. If so, the self as cognitive freedom would go over to another discipline to be called metaphysics, and there might be some good ground for separating ethics from metaphysics, provided freedom of will is entirely independent of cognitive freedom. Classical Indian and classical Western philosophers[3] interpreted freedom in both senses, but except the Mīmāṁsakas and the earlier Buddhists, none in India understood ethics in the second sense. The Advaita Vedāntins and the Sāṁkhyas insisted more on cognitive freedom and regarded freedom of will (*vairāgya*, detachment) as only ancillary.[4] The Śaivas held that the two freedoms are the inward and the outgoing aspects of the same self at a superior level of purity.[5]

3 We mean philosophers prior to the eighteenth century.

4 Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol I (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1956), section on "Studies in Yoga Philosophy," chap.1.

5 *History of Philosophy—Eastern and Western*, S. Radhakrishnan, *et al.*, eds. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952), Vol. I, pp. 374, 384, 387-389, 404—406, 410.

According to Rāmānuja, the two freedoms are intertwined.[6] The Yoga thesis on this point is not univocal.[7]

None of these philosophers separated ethics from metaphysics. Even when the emphasis is on cognitive freedom, the moral act, which so far is subordinate, is understood as what is necessarily conducive to this freedom and, therefore, as in some way inspired by it. Thus there is no independent ethics. Neither is metaphysics independent of ethics. Metaphysics, we have seen, is born of the desire to attain freedom self-consciously, and this is equally the fountain-head and the ultimate objective of ethics. Attainment of complete freedom is called *mokṣa* (liberation). Details of ethics emerge only when metaphysics is applied to empirical conduct.

The Mīmāṁsakas and the early Buddhists, however, were exceptions. The latter, for reasons to be seen later, discouraged metaphysical speculation, almost as modern positivists do, and prescribed ethics alone for the spiritual amelioration of man.[8] The Mīmāṁsa procedure was different.[9] Unambiguously it subordinated cognition to act. The fundamental attitude of the spirit (the self as free) is to act in accordance with ethical principles (*vidhi*); and, if it is said that inquiry into the nature of these principles is cognitive, the Mīmāṁsa philosopher would offer two replies. First, this inquiry is only for the purpose of using those principles in acts, and, second—and this is the more important point—since every one of these principles is an injunction, in the form "Do this" or "You should do this," they do not already exist to be discovered in knowledge. Their very being is but potential realization in concrete acts. Even metaphysical truths are relevant only in the context of some act—actual or possible. The extreme Mīmāṁsakas held that the knowledge which is said to reveal these truths is itself a subtle action. It is difficult to find a parallel to this in classical Western philosophy. A near analogue is American pragmatism.

Nor did Indian philosophy distinguish between logic and psychology (of knowledge) except occasionally. It classified

6 Cf. the theory of *jnānakarmasamuccaya* (knowledge-*cum*-will approach).
7 Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, *op. cit.*
8 M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1951), pp. 136-138.
9 Cf. Saṃkara's commentary on *Brahma Sūtra* I, i. 1, 2, 4.

and analyzed in detail different ways of knowing (*pramāṇa*) and demonstrated their interconnections. But this was more psychology than logic. Even inference—and another method closely allied to it, but not always distinguished, *viz.*, postulation (*arthāpatti*)—was understood primarily as a method of discovering new truths, not a way of proof or disproof (confirmation or rejection).[10] Not that the concept of proof was unknown to these philosophers. Rather, they, particularly Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsa, and Advaita Vedānta, developed it in meticulous detail.[11] But the main problem here was whether the provedness and the rejectedness, *i.e.*, truth and falsity (*prāmāṇya* and *aprāmāṇya*) of a cognition, are or are not additional characters or that cognition and also whether the knowledge of this truth of falsity, as the case may be, is or is not caused by the very same factors that cause that cognition.[12] Except in these theories of truth (*prāmāṇya*) and also in another concept, *viz.*, *tarka*, that is, mere corroboration,[13] there is little of "logic" in Indian philosophy. "*Tarka*" as mere corroboration, is always subordinate to and, therefore, less in importance than discovery.

If logic is concerned only with inference, we have seen how much of it was permitted in Indian philosophy, and in what way. In the West, however, it is often concerned, in addition, with judgment and concept, which are also regarded as the work of reason. Even in this sense logic was not wanting in classical Indian philosophy. Every concept there was carefully analyzed, classified, and compared with other concepts. The Indian mind was constitutionally logical in this sense. Clarity was a keynote of Indian thinking.

Throughout, however, logic, whether of inference or of judgment and concept, was only applicative and, therefore, subordinate. Indians never developed logic by itself into a self-complete theoretical study. There was never a formal logic as an independent study, although, as already said, the

10 M. Hiriyanna, *Indian Philosophical Studies* I (Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1957), pp. 65-70.

11 S. K. Maitra, *Studies in Philosophy and Religion* (Calcutta: Chakravarti Chatterjee & Co., 1956), pp. 151-164.

12 We find a parallel discussion in Logical Positivism.

13 S. Bagchi, *Inductive Reasoning—A Study of Tarka and its Role in Indian Logic* (Calcutta: Sri Munsichandra Sinha, 1955).

Indian mind was constitutionally logical. Some distant analogues to formal logic are, however, found in the study of pure language by the Grammarian philosophers, Mīmāṁsakas, and many Śaivas. But these were hardly comparable with the Aristotelian type of formal logic.

It will not be far wrong to say that what the aprioristic thinkers in the West call "thought" is what these Indians would call pure language. Pure language, according to these Indian philosophers, is autonomous and universal. It is pure in the sense that gross sounds which clothe the spoken language, and the images which accompany it in the mind when it is spoken, are not merely accidental; according to many of these thinkers—and they have argued out their case—these sounds and images (and, according to some, even concrete things of the world) are self-concretions of pure language. Words have either semantic or syntactical import. That the word *W* means the fact *F* in the world is indeed a matter of convention, but that a word means *some* fact is certain *a priori*. This meaning is only *a priori* anticipation of facts, which facts, therefore, are not so far independent of pure words; and these meanings may also be classified *a priori*. And the same is true with regard to words that stand for syntactical relations. Particular words conventionally stand for particular factual relations, but there are also *a priori* anticipations of relations, which relations are, therefore, *a priori*.[14] This semantic and syntactical study of pure language corresponds somewhat with the traditional Western logic of terms and judgment. But, first, this was never an independent study, being always in the interest of (ethics and) metaphysics, and, second, no logic of the formal syllogism was ever developed. The entire study of pure language suggests the old Western doctrine of *Logos*, and, to some extent, Kant's theory of the *a priori*; and, if thought and pure language are taken as identical, it may be said that this particular Indian line of thinking suggests the entire rationalistic tradition in classical Western philosophy.

Other Indian systems, however, were unsympathetic, and sometimes even hostile, to this philosophy of pure language.

14 Three stages of *vāk* (speech) were recognized. They are *vaikharī* (gross), *madhyamā* (intermediate), and *pasyantī* (pure). Some stretched this philosophy to the limit and admitted a fourth stage, viz., *parā* (ultimate). S. Radhakrishnan, ed., *History of Philosophy—Eastern and Western*, Vol. I, pp. 374, 412-418, 422, 423.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Yoga (and, therefore, we presume, Sāṁkhya also) unceremoniously abjured all transcendental philosophy of language,[15] and Vedāntic systems quietly ignored it. Averse to all transcendental philosophy, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika studied language *de novo* and developed a new grammar in line with its own metaphysics. It is only the philosophers of the Mīmāṁsā school, in the whole tradition of orthodox systematic Indian philosophy, who adhered to pure language. But they could do this only because of their central interest in the status of ethical principles (*vidhi* and *niṣedha*) which, according to them, had their only source in Scriptures that had to be properly interpreted. Naturally, they never considered formal logic.

Classical Indian philosophers, then, were never sufficiently interested in formal logic. With regard to material logic, however, the situation is different—they had abundant interest in that. But, even so, their attitude was fundamentally psychological. This will be evident from the following:

"With the probable exception of a few Buddhists, Indian philosophers hold that induction is a matter of perception. With the Greeks also, as is evident from Aristotle's treatment of it, it is intuited, and in modern Western logic we find the problem resuscitated. Modern Western thinkers have asked whether induction is a form of inference, and, if so, how. They naturally tend to treat it as inference—though not formal. They call it inference because observed cases—positive or negative—somehow form, according to them, a ground for the general proposition, and this ground, they point out, increases or decreases in strength in accordance with the number and quality of the cases observed. But Indian philosophers, almost in line with Aristotle, have argued that the observed cases are only psychological aids to the discovery of the general connection (*arundhatī-nyāyā*), not a logical ground, and added that these cases can at most be taken as contributing to the psychological strength of our conviction regarding the general proposition. The strength, they hold, increases in proportion as the chance of possible error dimi-

15 *Yoga Sutra* I. 42; *Yoga Bhāsya* I. 42, paragraph 2; also *Nyāya Sutra* I. 4, in S. Radhakrishnan and C. A. Moore, eds., *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

nishes. Diminishing the possibility of error is not logic. Whatever is asserted—perceptually or non-perceptually—is asserted absolutely. Chances of error, unless they are substantiated, need not logically concern us, for that would lead to unfounded scepticism. The logic of probability, if it is logic, is only the logic of error: we mean there are degrees of error, not of truth. If logic is a criterion of truth which is positive, not merely of the absence of error, it either coalesces with discovery, which is an absolute assertion (until contradicted), or is the logic of confirmation through the traditional forms of inference."[16]

Though Indian philosophers did not care much for what in the West is called logic, they were particularly sensitive to the truth (or falsity) of cognitions. But they understood this truth as either confirmedness (of which we have already spoken) or merely the fact that the cognition concerned had not been contradicted (*abādhita*). When they meant the former, we have seen, they admitted logic, though as subordinated to psychology. When they meant the latter, however, it was all psychology from beginning to end. True, even psychologically they were not content with the simple fact that a particular cognition had not been contradicted. They also prescribed psychological precautionary measures in order that contradiction might not occur. Specifically in the case of induction, they prescribed that it must be known as unconditional (*nirupādhika*), and they carefully defined the limiting condition (*upādhi*). If by "logic" one means the study of prescriptions for correct knowledge, one has to admit that here at least the Indians had developed a logic. But logic proper is something more: the norms it deals with are either over-empirical or postulates. The only logic, if it is logic, that the Indians developed in connection with induction is parallel to the associational logic of Hume and J.S. Mill.

II

Classical Indian philosophers (with the exceptions already mentioned) did not divide philosophy into air-tight compart-

16 A passage quoted from my "Indian Concepts of Knowledge and Self"—Fifth Instalment, in *Our Heritage*, Research Bulletin IV, 2.

ments like ethics, metaphysics, psychology, and logic. Philosophy, for them, was a unitary study developing different kinds of problems but dovetailing the solutions in the over-all context of the realization of freedom.

If, as with Plato and Aristotle, philosophy is said to have originated in wonder and if some later Western thinkers have substituted question or understanding for this wonder, Indian thinkers are unanimous in believing that the origin of philosophy is man's urge for realizing freedom. Mute wonder leads nowhere, and question and understanding are possible only through some consciousness of freedom.

Consciousness of freedom is *ipso facto* reflective. Different grades of this consciousness may therefore be taken as stages in the development of reflection. At whatever stage, the business of reflection is to distinguish elements which prior to that reflection were given in a complex. At the lowest stage, where reflection is no more than empirical analysis, what is distinguished in a form is generally felt as having been already known in that form, though indistinctly. But even this empirical analysis often develops difficulties, as when the tic-tic sound of a clock is distinguished only after it has ceased, or when a picture-puzzle is solved after some exercise of attention. In such cases it is difficult to assert that what is now distinguished in a certain form was already known in exactly the same form. Different sciences, including psychology, have tried to overcome these difficulties and have succeeded at least partially. But at a stage of reflective analysis some elements may come to be distinguished which are not, at that stage of reflection, felt as having been previously known in that exact form. Space, time, number, logical forms, and the different categories that metaphysics is said to deal with, including the categories of self and God, belong to this group. The analysis which distinguishes these may be called philosophical. But immediately with the separation of philosophical analysis from its empirical counterpart, a new problem of crucial importance arises for philosophy. The real for us, unless we are sophisticated, is the actual empirical world, called Nature, including the world of mind. If the elements distinguished by philosophical analysis are not felt as having been known in Nature in the forms in which

they are now distinguished, they cannot be called real. But, since we are as yet unable to deny them, their status is peculiar. They only demand to be real—they are felt as what ought to be real only, but are not real as yet. As such, they may be called idealities or demands. Also, they necessarily seem a part of the reflective consciousness that distinguishes them, though they equally appear to claim objectivity of their own. As they are not real and yet are not complete unrealities, they cannot be spoken of impersonally. Like the false snake which cannot be spoken of except as the snake-as-it-is-for-me, these idealities may be referred to only as what they are for me.[17]

This is the predicament in which philosophy finds itself initially, and from which in various ways it has tried to extricate itself. The history of philosophy, in India and the West, is the story of these attempts. Broadly speaking, there are four such attempts, and one or two may have sub-types. One attempt is to treat these ideal structures as transcendent objects. Even though they now have existence in the distinguishing reflection, they, we are told, nevertheless demand transcendence, i.e., some kind of independent status as objects. In the West, Plato and all philosophers who follow him accept this alternative. In India, we find it in Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Śaivism, the philosophy of Grammar, and some forms of Buddhism. In India, however, these transcendent objects are not those recognized in the West. They are not always space and time, and never number, logical forms, and the categories admitted normally in Western philosophy. The idealities (*tattvas*) which these Indian philosophers recognized are either material, as in Sāṁkhya and Yoga (and also in some forms of Buddhism), or forms of pure language, as in the philosophy of Grammar, or both, as in Śaivism. The material idealities are (1) five *mahābhūtās* (gross elements, viz., earth, water, fire, air, and ether-as-the-essence-of-sound), (2) five *tanmātras* (subtle essences corresponding to these), (3) eleven *indriyas* (sensibilities), including the principle that unreflectively associates sensations and is called mind (*manas*), (4) the half-reflective ego-sense (*ahaṁkāra*), (5) thought as the princple of reflection (*buddhi*), and (6) the

17 "Me" means the distinguishing reflection.

inchoate primal stuff at the root of all these (*pradhāna*). None of these *tattvas*, including *manas*, *ahaṁkāra*, and *buddhi*, is subjective in the proper sense of the term; they are all objects (*jaḍa*), because they are known (introspectively, as the case may be) as other than the knowledge that is revealing them.[18]

III

So much for the first attempt to get out of the initial predicament mentioned earlier. The second attempt is exactly its opposite. It is to hold that idealities demand merger with pure consciousness. In the West, the first clear mention of pure consciousness is found in Neo-Platonism and, long after that, in Descartes; and, when this consciousness is preferred as the true (or final) essence, this is always on the ground that it is a clear and distinct essence. There might also be other essences, clear and distinct, but none so clear and distinct as consciousness, so that their clarity and distinctness might be taken as borrowed. It is this notion that lies at the root of all idealism, whether it be that of Berkeley or Kant or Fichte. Different idealists have only been in disagreement, each in his own way, as to why and in what sense consciousness is most clear and distinct, and in their understanding of the nature of consciousness. Empiricist idealists take it as only psychic events—the mental states—and add, at most, a substratum to these, a substratum which, too, is understood as only a more enduring event. But the Kantians and Fichteans understand it as over-natural, as that which is never an object, like mental states or their enduring substrata, but ever subjective, an autonomous act that, running through the mental states, holds these together as systematic objects. Kant took it as a cognitive act; Fichte identified it with will.

Roughly corresponding to Berkeley and the Kantio-Fichteans, we have in India the Vijñānavāda Buddhists[19] and the

18 The knowledge (introspection), however, which reveals the *tattvas* nos. 3, 4, and 5, particularly no. 5, is subjective in the proper sense of the term. It is called *puruṣa*.

19 As interpreted by the Hindus. Genuine and full-fledged Vijnanavāda was undoubtedly transcendental (though different from Advaita Vedānta). We are not referring to that.

Advaita Vedāntins. Both preferred the subjective on the ground—only one among many—that while the object is contingent, consciousness is indubitable. But, while to the Vijñānavāda Buddhists the subjective was equivalent to mental states, the Advaita Vedāntins, treating these as objects (mental objects revealed by pure consciousness, called *sākṣin*), insisted on autonomous pure consciousness as subjective in the proper sense of the term. This pure consciousness is never an object, but ever subjective. They defined the subjective as that which is reflectively self-illuminating (*svaprakāśa*).

The Vijñānavāda Buddhists also differed with Berkeley on some important points. Unlike Berkeley, they took the very mental states as self-revealing (*svaprakāśa*), and did not believe that these are known by a self. The second point of difference is that they never denied externality. With them, externality, even as externality, is subjective, so that, according to them, there are two kinds of mental states (*vijñānas*)—external (*pravṛttivijñāna*) and non-external (*ālayavijñāna*)[20]. This reminds us of Kant's doctrine of space (externality) as subjective and time as the form of internal sense.

The Advaita Vedāntins would never have admitted that mental states as such are self-illuminating. These states, it is true, are noticed immediately as they occur. But that does not prove that they are not objects (to introspection). They are objects with a kind of primitive self-evidence, and all depends on what this primitive self-evidence really amounts to. Sāṁkhya believed that it is due to the dominance of a peculiar character, called *sattva-guṇam* which tends to make whatever object it belongs to incandescent. Advaita Vendānta, not denying this, adds that it is only the unreflective stage of introspection which, as genuine, however, is always reflective. Introspection (which is *sākṣin*, pure consciousness) stands at this stage as undistinguishedly fused with mental states, much like fire in a red-hot iron ball. Not that it is implicity

20 *Alayavijnāna* is not the *sākṣin* (pure consciousness) of Advaita Vedanta. It is indeed the inner I-feeling, but never a definite self-contained being. Conceived as dissociated from mental states it is wholly indefinite, but as the inner tone of these states it renders them relatively more subjective. In other words, it as undeniable is yet wholly exhausted in these states. Kant's transcendental apperception as pure subjective act is very nearly of this status, except that he would draw a distinction between pure sensibility and thought.

present there. "Implicit" is a vague word. What the Advaita thinkers meant is that it, in its full character is present, though undistinguished, i.e., covered by nescience (*ajñāna*);[21] and wherever there is nescience there is confusion.

To reflective introspection, mental states are presented as objects. Relative to extra-mental objects, these mental states may be called subjective, but the introspection itself, relative to these states, is at least more subjective. Advaita adds that behind this introspection there is no further introspection that might hold it as an object. This would involve a *regressus ad infinitum*, and also, as a matter of fact, there is no introspection of introspection. Hence introspection as such is subjective in the proper sense of the term.

Between Kant and Advaita Vedānta there is a difference. Kant did not take pure consciousness (reason)—the transcendental apperception and its various forms—as by itself real (existent). Pure consciousness, he held, is real by itself only when as will it stands realized. Otherwise, as theoretical (cognitive), it by itself is only a transcendental presupposition, "transcendentally ideal." The attitude of Advaita Vedānta is different. If an essence is reflectively distinguished, it is distinguished as demanding a reality of its own. True, the reality we started with is Nature, yet, since it is distinguished from out of this Nature, the reality it demands cannot be that Nature again. What is demanded is a transcendent reality. Kant, too, could not deny it and actually spoke in its favour in his metaphysics of morals, where, however, it was all a will-approach. The Advaita Vedāntin would wonder why the cognitive approach (*jñāna-mārga*) to the over-natural should be banned. Like pure willing, there is equally the possibility of pure cognition, and pure cognition is first self-illuminating, and, second, refers freely to object-in-general, which, as not Nature and not this pure cognition itself, is wholly indefinite (*anirvācya*). Once this indefinite object-in-general (*ajñāna*) is admitted, it is of no value to admit another independent object, viz., Nature, which is not merely to be bracketed, but, as reducible to, i.e., as wholly intelligible in terms of, this object-in-general, is nothing for one who would realize pure cognition.

21 Reflection alone posits it as distinct introspection.

As a transcendental philosophy, Advaita Vedānta has a merit rarely to be found in any similar system in the West. These Vedāntins were fully aware of the distinction between actuality and demand (ideality or essence). A demand is what ought to be, but not yet is. Philosophers try to realize it as an actuality, though of a higher order. But, in the meantime, in other words until they have realized it, they remain wedded to different orders of natural actuality. This is the as-yet-unavoided solid existence of their life, which, though an evil, must be submitted to. This, called "provisional reality" (*vyāvahārika-sattā*), must be made the best use of wisely so long as one has not transcended it. That ultimately it would come to nothing was assured to these Vedāntins; they could either infer this or learn it from the scriptures. But in the meantime it has to be put up with, and in such a manner that the onward march to the final realization may be not merely not hampered but positively accelerated. This can be done best if in this provisional life we observe the rules of correct cognition and conduct. These rules are not mere working hypotheses; they also contain shadows of the ultimate reality. They are the forms the ultimate reality assumes (and that freely and falsely) in the context of the empirical reality of cognition and conduct. These rules vary as the contexts vary. There are various stations in life and therefore various rules appropriate to them. This is the Indian theory of station and its duties (*adhikāra.*).

IV

The third way of coming out of the tangle mentioned earlier is to treat the demands (essences) as subjective and objective at the same time. This solution, again, is of two kinds: one is the way of dualism and the other the way of monism. So long as philosophy is transcendental, dualism is a difficult view. It is difficult to accept two independent absolutes. Yet, Descartes in the West and Sāṁkhya and Yoga in India were transcendental dualists.[22] Where the Cartesians were at pains to relate their two absolutes and

22 Kant, with his subjective reason and the thing-in-itself, may also be included in this group.

Leibniz offered the ingenious theory of pre-established harmony, Sāṁkhya and Yoga understood the relation only teleologically.[23] The subject (*purusa*) and the object (*pradhāna*) do not, according to them, influence each other; the latter moves and develops into this rich world in order only that the subject may experience it in appropriate ways.[24] This idea of the subject's experience was not implanted by the subject in the object. Indeed, the object could have no idea until it had developed into *buddhi* (roughly, what Western philosophers call mind). The idea as even the nisus of the very primary development is to be likened to one that serves as the guiding principle of biological movements. It is the *telos* of a movement, wholly spontaneous, neither coming from outside nor consciously present in that which moves.

So much for the question whether the two absolutes—subject and object—influence each other or not. Sāṁkhya and Yoga recognized another relation between them.[25] When the absolute object—the primal stuff (*pradhāna*)—has developed into *buddhi*, there appears a relation of identity between this new form and pure subjectivity. Everyone feels that his mind is himself, the subject. At lower stages also there is the appearance of such identity. The subject, on the one hand, and the senses and the body, on the other, appear identified with each other. Sāṁkhya and Yoga, and also Advaita Vedānta, regarded this identification as a false appearance. The subjective and the object are entirely disparate: one is never an object but always the self-illuminating subject, while the other is never a subject but always revealed, or to be revealed, by (and also to) this subject. Hence there could never be a real identification of the two.

Whatever be the defects of this philosophy of Sāṁkhya and Yoga, it is not less intelligible than the philosophies from Descartes to Leibniz. These philosophers in the West were equally at pains to relate thought to extension and devised

23 M. Hiriyanna. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 273, 274, 281; *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy—Sāṁkhya Kārikā* LVII.

24 The appropriateness is determined by the desert of the subject acquired through his deeds in the previous cycle of life. This is an important aspect of the Indian theory of *karma*.

25 M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 293, 294; *A Source Book of Indian Philosophy—Sāṁkhya Kārikā* XX.

all sorts of hypotheses for this purpose. The Sāṁkhya-Yoga account is not merely another such hypothesis: it can claim an additional merit in that it refers to concrete experience and elucidates itself by means of clear analogies.

Prior to Descartes, there was not much of subjectivity in the West. This is why the problem in the present form did not generally arise in pre-Cartesian Europe. But even in those earlier days there was another problem that was equally difficult of solution. It concerned the relation between essences (ideas=idealities) and Nature. Fundamentally, this was also a major problem for the pre-Kantians, Kant, and the post-Kantians. These latter only confounded the distinction between essence and Nature with that between pure subjectivity and object.[26]

V

In section IV we have considered the dualistic systems of transcendental philosophy. There were philosophers, however, both in India and the West, who understood essences as monistically subjective-objective. With all their differences, Spinoza and Hegel belonged to this group, and Schelling also in a way; and if in Spinoza the attributes of thought and extension do not belong to Substance he too falls in line with Schelling. In India, we find such monists in many Śaivas and the Vedāntins of the schools of Bhāskara and Rāmānuja.[27]

If in Spinoza's system the attributes of thought and extension do belong to Substance, this would be a form of inclusive monism. But can they so belong? Pure consciousness (thought) as never an object (extension) and object (extension) as never pure consciousness (thought) exclude each other. Such mutually exclusive entities could belong to a third entity if, and only if, they had something in common, if, in other words, there were some higher class under which they could be subsumed. But it is doubtful if pure consciousness and object stand under a higher class, and a more serious point

26 Descartes was probably the first confounder. It is through hi sinfluence that the word "idea" came to mean subjectivity.

27 For Bhāskara, see Yogendranath Tarka-Vedānta-Tirtha, *The World as a Real Modification of the Absolute, in Our Heritage* 1. 2.

is that most of those—Spinoza, for example—who believe in this common character have held at the same time that these also belong to it as attributes or, as some of them hold, as parts. There is definite antagonism, so far, between the two, and so their unity is impossible. Whatever unity there appears to be is only a semblance.

Hegel in the West and philosophers of the Sāṁkhya, Yoga, and Advaita Vedānta schools in India were aware of this antagonism. But, while this had led the Indians to dismiss all unity of pure consciousness and object as illusory, Hegel, undaunted, proclaimed a unity of contradictories. A saviour for about half a century (and still so considered in some quarters), his days are now over, particularly the days of his dialectic.

Other philosophers of the monistic group now to be considered either ignored the antagonism or struggled to disprove it or prescribed a condescending indifference that borders dangerously on nihilism. Leibniz was one who was guilty of ignoring the antagonism involved. With his concept of knowledge as a creative act, he believed he could silently pass over the antagonism. But this was deliberate over-simplification. Schelling—and, if Spinoza is understood in a certain way, he, too—proposed indifference as a method of transcending the opposition. But as this indifference is neither consciousness nor object it is hardly more than a blank. If not exactly a blank, it is at least the quintessence of indefiniteness. The Mādhyamika Buddhists in India and China held this view. Their view is technically known as Śūnyavāda.

Others, however, struggled to show that there is no opposition. Rāmānuja is one of them. Consciousness, according to him, is self-illuminating. But he so carefully defined this self-illumination that consciousness was not debarred from being an object. He started with the fact that a past consciousness of mine or another man's consciousness is only remembered or inferred as an object, and held that even Advaita could not have its theory of eternal pure consciousness unless this consciousness were known as an object, whether of introspection or of inference. According to him, the self-illuminating is that which by virtue of its existence stands

revealed to its own locus.[28] (The locus of cognition is the self.)

Rāmānuja could overcome the antagonism only because his notion of self-illumination was conveniently naïve. He hardly went beyond what Alexander called "enjoyment," beyond what we earlier called "primitive self-evidence of mental states." Like the thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, he assumed that there is no consciousness-in-general other than mental states, and yet, unlike them, he took these states themselves as self-illuminating. The fundamental error in his theory is that reflective introspection was not distinguished from primitive self-evidence of mental states. Once it is distinguished, it, as the Advaita Vedāntins claimed, posits itself in at least problematic autonomy; and, once it is so posited, the mental states cannot but be taken as objects, not themselves self-illuminating.

We find another attempt to deny contradiction between subject and object, in a way, in Cartesianism and explicitly in the philosophy of Bhāskara. Their idea was that, whether there is a contradiction theoretically or not, it is a fact that the two do stand related. While the Advaita Vedāntins, like the Eleatics in ancient days, would therefore reject this so-called fact as an illusion, and while Hegel would, on the other hand, hold that therefore there is no clash between the contradiction itself and the fact, the Cartesians and Bhāskara[29] put up with this strange unity as a divine mystery. How far these philosophers were justified depends on how far the infinite capacity of God could be stretched, whether, in other words, he could be used to work out even contradictions.

The Śaiva[30] claim was more rational. The way in which the Śaivas analyzed knowledge revealed a new phase, a self-transcending aspect, of consciousness, which Kant and Hegel, and in modern times Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, and Royce, might have profitably incorporated if only to render their theories more plausible. The analysis is as follows:

[28] *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, pp. 546, 547 ; M. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 387, 388.

[29] Bhaskara tried, of course, to substantiate his thesis logically.

[30] We mean those Śaivas who were monists of the type we are here considering.

There is no knowledge that is not of some form of speech (*vāk*), gross or subtle,[31] and speech is the only (cognitive) situation where we are aware of the subjective proper. In speech, again, we are aware equally of that which is spoken of, that which is meant; and this meaning is apprehended as a function of speech itself, as its intention, not as something which was already known, for every knowledge is speech. Speech, now, has various stages of purity—through various stages it dissociates itself from its accompaniments, viz., sounds, images, etc.—and at each higher stage it reveals itself as the essence of the lower. Yet, at every stage, including the highest one, its self-transcendence, the meaning, the intention, continues. The subtlest speech, undoubtedly the subjective par excellence, has, therefore, the inevitable self-transcendence which is objectivity at the subtlest.

If Śaivism is an intelligible attempt to understand transcendental demands as monistically subjective-objective, there is another attempt which, though along a different line altogether, is probably more intelligible. It is to take the subjective unambiguously as will. Kant did this in the second *Critique*,[32] and Fichte developed it into systematic metaphysics. In India the Mīmāṁsakas are the only champions of this view. With them, the transcendental demands are only principles of work, principles which have only to be made real. As these principles are necessary (*a priori*), their only import is that Nature must be re-organized according to them. The phrase "according to them" does not imply that they subsist Platonically. They are not already real (*bhūtavastu*) to be known. Their only status lies in being worked out, and before they are worked out they have no being. That we have to reorganize Nature according to these principles does not also presuppose that there was already a Nature which happens next to be reorganized. The very status of Nature is to be so reorganized. It is only pragmatically relevant, which means that cognition is no more than instrumental to will. (The Mīmāṁsakas sometimes held that cognition is even a form of

31 The corresponding Western doctrine is that all knowledge is judgment. The merit of the Śaiva theory is that speech is a simpler and more comprehensible concept than judgment (thought).

32 With Kant, of course, will was an act of withdrawal. So he is out of the picture in this section.

will.) Neither the principles nor what is called "given Nature" can subsist alone. What so subsists is the reorganized Nature, which is subjective-objective.

As we have already said, this doctrine is, in fundamentals, similar to American pragmatism, but with one serious difference. The Mīmāṁsakas held that knowledge is only ultimately instrumental to will. One may provisionally blink at this instrumental character and, remaining interested in cognition as such, develop cognitive science and metaphysics. But ultimately it will have to be given up, or the entire cognitive study is to be translated into the language of will. The Mīmāṁsā position is, in this respect, the exact opposite of that of Advaita Vedānta. Metaphysics of will is really ethics of conduct at bottom, and for Advaita Vedānta this ethics is to be surrendered finally for cognitive metaphysics. Rāmānuja attempted a synthesis of the two, but it was as naïve as his other attempts.

All the Indian thinkers who were for understanding the transcendental demands as monistically subjective-objective preached the principle of identity-in-difference (*bhedābheda*) in some form or other,[33] and, much as we find in the West, discussed at length whether it was logically tenable or not. Much as in the West, again, we find that once the principle of identity-in-difference was admitted from the transcendental point of view it came to be too easily used as a master-key to unlock even empirical mysteries.

VI

In the history of philosophy, in both India and the West, we come upon still another attempt made by a good number of philosophers to get out of the tangle mentioned earlier It is deliberately to deny the transcendental character of the demands. This attempt has assumed two forms. Some have denied only the transcendental character but admitted the demands (at least many of these) inevitably as actuals that can be arrived at through the simple process of inference.

33 Rāmānuja, it is true, openly abjured *bhedābheda*, but when he did this he had in mind the *bhedābheda* of the Mīmāṁsakas. He admitted substantive-adjective unity (*viśiṣṭa*) in inspite of difference (*bheda*).

They recognize neither the ought-to-be character of these demands nor any kind of transcendental intuition. Metaphysics of the so-called over-natural is, for them, a matter of inference. There are others, again, who deny the demands altogether and treat them as either postulates or only crude, though commonly accepted, linguistic forms, or merely instrumental to science and common life—in any case, not of any metaphysical import. Modern logical positivists, as well as philosophers of the school of Analysis and the pragmatists of America—and one might add Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill, and Comte—belong to the latter group. Among Indians, the early Buddhists were probably the only philosophers who might be classed with them. Either they dismissed the demands as moonshine, or some of them, many later Buddhists included, regarded them as wholly indefinite and therefore unamenable to philosophy and, for that matter, to any serious discipline. Some Cārvākas and the philosophers called Vaitaṇḍins carried this line of thinking to the extreme point. All of them, however, it should be noted, offered staggeringly subtle arguments and analyses.

In classical Western philosophy it is difficult to find one who might belong to the first group mentioned above. But in India there were many. All Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, the Vedāntins of the Mādhva and Rāmānuja schools,[34] and the Mīmāṁsa philosophers so long as they developed provisional cognitive philosophy belong in this group. Sāṁkhya also, as distinguished from Yoga, proclaimed that its task was to argue to the over-natural *tattvas*.[35] We consider later the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher as typical of this group.

Corresponding to the transcendental (sometimes called phenomenological, sometimes intuitive) method in the West, we had in India reliance on scriptures or sources of similar authority. But Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika did not rely primarily on such sources even when supersensuous truths were concerned. It always argued out its case strictly on the basis of chastened perception and thorough inference. It went even to the extent

34 The different solutions of this problem raised earlier are not mutually exclusive. The corresponding schools of philosophy may therefore overlap, unless, of course, one solution is the exact opposite of another.

35 Cf. Pulinbehari Chakravarti, ed., *Yuktidīpikā* (Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing & Publishing House Ltd., 1938), opening verses nos. 1 and 15.

of justifying authority itself by means of inference.[36] Through these methods—perception and inference—it developed a systematic theory of knowledge and metaphysics, every point of which was free from the mystic touch. As in all good empiricism, it was held that everything is an object in the sense of being revealable by cognition, which, in its turn, is also an object in the same sense—it is equally revealed by introspection. Nothing was recognized as purely subjective, as self-illuminating. It was admitted, however, that knowledge stands in a unique relation to the content revealed by it, on account of which it was called subjective, and the thing revealed an object. Hence *pramāṇa*, the (cognitional) instrument of discovery, was regarded as equally an object among objects, though only used in a way, much as weights, which are things, are used as measures for weighing other things. This general standpoint was developed into elaborate theories of perception and (material) inference, the overwhelming details of which were every inch rational. Some of the details that might be edifying to modern Western thinkers are the theories of indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and determinate (*savikalpa*) perception, which roughly correspond to the modern notions of acquaintance and perceptual judgment,[37] the theories of induction and causation, and the analysis of language. This analysis of language and similar analyses, though along other lines, by the Mīmāṁsā thinkers and the Grammarian philosophers[38] were as self-complete as modern semantics in the West.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is equally thorough, well-knit, and solid, and developed through perception and inference. All entities of the world—internal and external—were classified under several categories, with the constant warning, however, that these categories as such are only nominal groups, nothing being transcendent, and some not even empirical universals. Entities of the world are either substances (*dravya*), or attributes (*guṇa*), or motion (*karma*), or universals (*sāmānya*), or inherence (*samavāya*), or final uniqueness (*viśeṣa*),

36 This was in sharp contrast with the attitude of the Vedantins and the Śaivas.

37 Indian thinkers would generally call it judgmental perception, insisting that it is perception involving thought, rather than the converse.

38 We may add Indian rhetoricians.

or negation (*abhāva*).[39] Each of these concepts was then analyzed as thoroughly as conceivable, and all metaphysical questions were allowed to crop up and be dealt with accordingly.

VII

Almost all problems—ethical, metaphysical, religious, psychological and logical—which were tackled in classical Western philosophy, and many more that are dealt with in the modern West, *viz.*, positivistic reduction of complex concepts, the study of semantics, phenomenological study, *etc.*, were treated as thoroughly as possible in classical India. True, some of the important problems of Western philosophy did not even strike the Indians. These are the problems of formal logic, the detailed study of all phenomenological or *a priori* presuppositions, particularly those idealities that are connected with formal logic, and the philosophical problems that have emerged out of the modern development of science. But this was quite natural. Classical Indian philosophers were superbly interested in value (*puruṣārtha*), particularly in what they considered the highest value, *viz.*, freedom (*mokṣa*), and discussed only those problems that emerged from this interest. This explains why formal logic and the transcendental presuppositions directly connected with it were excluded. In Indian philosophy we seldom meet with the notion of apriority and its implications. Their place was occupied by verdicts of scriptures. Naturally only those of the apriorities were considered which were found in scriptures.

So far as the empirical or positivistic outlook is concerned there is scarcely any serious difference between Indian and Western philosophies, except that modern science and its implications were unknown in India. Indians had their own science, evidently inferior to the modern, though based on different postulates altogether.

When we consider transcendental philosophy, however, we find a basic difference in approach. The transcendental philosophers of the West were all seer-speakers. They, in

39 S. Bhaduri, *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics* (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1947).

whatever manner, first discovered apriorities and then expressed them, systematically or unsystematically. In India, on the other hand, the dominant attitude was that of a hearer, a learner, intent on discovering apriorities, but not having yet discovered them or discovered them fully. This is why they relied so much on scriptures. Even to acquire a right to listen to scriptures they had first to undergo a training such that the truths to be discovered would not be distorted, and, also, that one might not submit blindly or be hypnotized. This listening, technically called *śravaṇa*, was understood as already constituting transcendental intuition, though in the making. But even this was not considered enough. The hearer was required to go on continuously substantiating the truths, half realized, by means of arguments *pro* and *con*. (This second process was called *manana*.) But this was again to be followed up by a third process, *viz.*, that of deep concentration, called *nididhyāsana*, which was to serve a double purpose. It was to dissipate the philosopher-hearer's subconscious doubts, if any were still left, and, secondly, a sustained deepening of concentration was considered capable of disclosing deeper implications and ultimately the whole system of relevant apriorities. This last process, known as *jñānasādhana*, was a process which Plato hinted at and Kant developed to a degree and which is in modern times treated in all seriousness by Phenomenologists, and vicariously by many Existentialists. This logic of the transcendental was elaborated in detail by the Yoga of Patañjali, and all Indian transcendentalists, unless they had in the meantime swung over to feeling and will philosophies,[40] practically adopted this Yoga method.

The discovery of transcendental truths was, thus, also self-demonstrative: the inner dialectic of these apriorities evinced a system of their own. Indian philosophers were conscious, however, that this logic was esoteric and valid only for the initiated. When, therefore, they turned to expressing them they never shrank from public demonstration through common logic. True, some of the Indian thinkers, Sāṅkara, for example, insisted that the supersensuous cannot be proved by

40 Many Indian philosophers, thorough rationalists until the end of *manana*, had so swung over at the last stage. Nyāya Vaiśeṣika had done that, and Rāmānuja partially. Patañjali openly suggested it as an alternative.

ordinary logic, reminding us of Kant and Hegel. But they added that empirical logic may at least be corroborative (*anugrāhakatarka*) by way of half establishing even supersensuous truths and refuting contrary views.

Except for this reliance on testimony (*śabda-pramāṇa*), and that only by transcendental thinkers, there is hardly any serious difference between the philosophical attitudes in classical India, on the one hand, and those in the West, on the other. As in the West, we find in India almost as many types of philosophy as are conceivable. If Indians had spoken of the Law of *Karma* and cycles of birth, these, if substantiable, may add to the fund of Western philosophy, and if unsubstantiable, may be ignored without much loss, except for ethical speculations in India.

The traffic, however, need not be one-way. The old Indian philosophy may equally be enriched by (1) formal logic, (2) its development into the transcendental study of a whole system of idealities, (3) science and (4) philosophy of science. The introduction of newer materials either way inevitably means newer outlooks, and there may occur clashes here and there. But truth has to be faced, and skill in philosophy lies precisely in proper adjustment.

Rational philosophy is never local. But it may be that particular peoples have particular bents of mind, particular likings for specific types of philosophy. This liking may be rational, the product of age-long thinking by a particular people; it may also be irrational, determined by historical circumstances. It may even be that the different types of philosophy are, in fundamentals, genuine alternative possibilities, and the choice from among them is therefore not irrational but merely existential. Philosophy may be local in any of these senses. It is doubtful, however, if even from this point of view there is a philosophy specifically Indian: India has through millenniums developed almost all types of philosophy. The only point in which the historical Indian philosophies stand in sharp contrast with the science-inspired philosophies of the modern West and which, therefore, is (erroneously) taken as the distinctive genius of Indian thinkers is that their philosophies were dominantly anthropocentric. But was this not also the characteristic of Western philosophies until the days

of Descartes, with of course, the doubtful exception of the half mythical pre-Sophistic philosophy of the Greek world? In India too, there was an exception in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The last point to note is that whichever way philosophy proceeds —anthropocentrically or not—each complete philosophy has equally to face the problems of man and existence, in whichever order proves most appropriate and productive of truth.

An Outline of Indian Philosophy

I

TILL THE middle of the eleventh century, as long, in other words, as there was vitality, philosophy in India was basically a speculation on *ideal life*, no mere theoretical study of truth as it was in the West. Ideal life meant a stage freed from all bondage and, therefore, from suffering too, for at the root of all suffering there is bondage of some sort or another. This ideal life may be called Freedom, other names of which are, in Sanskrit, *mokṣa, mukti, kaivalya, nirvāṇa, etc.* Creative Indian philosophy is thus oriented from the beginning to ideal life or Freedom.

This does not, however, mean that Indian philosophers have not developed profound theories and worked out subtle analyses. Theories in different systems of Indian philosophy are as profound as, and analyses often much acuter than, any found in Western philosophy, and the way our philosophers have applied techniques of inference was amazing. But at the centre of all these profound and subtle performances there was the controlling concept of ideal life as Freedom.

This over-all practical motive has left a distinctive mark on the content of Indian philosophy, sharply distinguishing it from its counterpart in the West. Our philosophers were never after theories for the sake of theories and this prevented them from developing that science which is called Formal Logic in the West and any metaphysics growing *out of* it. The Logic that our forefathers developed was all methodology, no science of Platonic-Aristotelian forms; and there was no question, consequently, of what is called in the West pure metaphysics or ontology that grows out of Logic. Indian metaphysics is almost a matter-of-fact study of reality, conducted in a thoroughly intelligible manner to the end. It is candidly admitted that reals are either perceived or inferred from perceptual data or known through some other legitimate process of mediation, and if in a good number of cases they are accepted on faith because we have these from respectable

sources, we are instantly reminded that either we have to substantiate these, as far as possible, through normal methods of inference and the like or, in case such normal methods fail, we have to try to grasp the truths *intuitively* through esoteric exercises and never stop till these are grasped. There is no talk anywhere, in Indian philosophy, of *thought* or *Reason*, as opposed to sense-experience, and none of the forms or categories that are called *a priori*. If Indian metaphysics has thus been a matter-of-fact study, Indian epistemology is none other than detailed psychology of knowledge or a branch of the matter-of-fact metaphysics, nothing of a mysterious brand like Kant's Critique or Husserl's Phenomenology.

So far as pure Logic, pure metaphysics and the mysterious theory of knowledge are concerned, Indian philosophy is thus decidedly handicapped. But that is because our philosophers were never for a hundred per cent theoretical study. This defect, if it is a defect at all, was, however, more than compensated by their uncompromisingly austere application of Logic, a type of austerity as yet unknown in the West, so far as philosophy is concerned, and also by their carrying conceptual and linguistic analyses to the furthest limit of subtlety, a feat which even philosophers of the modern school of Analysis have not yet achieved.

So far I have spoken of the general attitude of Indian philosophy till the middle of the twelfth century. Soon after that, however it ceased to be creative. Philosophy somehow lost its practical mooring, and though the intellect of our philosophers remained as sharp and analytical as before it could not alter the frame-work of each system and the bold reliefs built through centuries and milleniums. The intellect, ever active as before, literally revelled in niceties of theoretical analysis and expression, and though theory soon outstripped the practical motive it could not carve out a new path for itself as in the West. This state of affairs continued till late in the nineteenth century when Indian philosophers, faced with a new type of philosophy, *viz.* the Western, swerved for the first time from the age-old line chalked out for them.

The Indian philosophy we are talking of in this essay means only this creative philosophy that developed in India

till the middle of the twelfth century, and neither the late Indian philosophy of the period of decadence nor the philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth century thinkers of our country.

II

The central motive of Indian philosophy is to define ideal life which is Freedom and formulate ways and means to achieve it. The branch of Indian philosophy which is concerned with these ways and means is known as Yoga or the philosophy of Sādhana. Though practical *par excellence*, it contains revealing observations on the constitution of the body and different aspects and attitudes of the mind, including observations as much on the pure self which is consciousness *par excellence* as on what is called 'the unconscious' in the West. Except, however, in Patañjali's Yoga the study is not as systematic as it ought to be, and even in Patañjali's Yoga the method is little more than discovery through esoteric introspection, and cataloguing, and at most arranging the discovered mentals in a sort of hierarchy. This part of Indian philosophy dealing with the details of ways and means for the attainment of *mukti* may not be of much interest to students of philosophy. But *yoga* understood in another sense—*viz.* as a kind of supersensuous intuitive grasp of *tattvas* (essences)—is of importance, philosophically. It is known as *jñāna-yoga*, and its importance depends on how the ideal life that is Freedom is understood. If this ideal life be something that I do not now possess but have to work out, *jñāna-yoga* would just be a way of extrinsic *sādhana* and not, therefore, of much philosophical importance. But a good many Indian thinkers—and their voice is often dominant—have held that freedom is something which I do now possess but which remains undisclosed till the ignorance that covers it is removed either by ratiocinative knowledge to be followed by *yoga* as intuition or by this intuition directly. In either case *yoga* is the final method of knowing metaphysical truths.

With regard to this *jñāna-yoga* as the final method we are reminded, however, at every step that it is meant only for those who have mastered ratiocinative philosophy. By

ratiocinative philosophy we mean the attempt at knowing reality through normal channels like preception, inference and the like. There may be certain truths which resist these normal methods, but it would be no use for Tom, Dick and Harry to claim that they have discovered them through esoteric intuition. For, first, such intuition is often a dupe unless the one who intuits has been sufficiently trained, and, secondly, one may at all submit to this training only after he has been convinced that these are truths and can be discovered by means of that type of intuition. Hence for Tom, Dick and Harry to have that initial conviction they must first have these from respectable sources—like saints, experts, scriptures, sciences, uncontradicted tradition, *etc.* and then try to have as much of rational conviction through arguments, *etc.* as possible. Only then can he submit to esoteric exercises to have that final intuition.

III

Indian philosophy is at its best in argumentative development of concepts and construction of systematic theories. To every problem regarding a concept all possible solutions have been offered in different systems of Indian philosophy, and each philosopher has done his best to substantiate his view, remaining all the while, however, alive to what others have said or might have had to say. The foremost of the concepts studied in all these systems is that of Freedom, and as this Freedom as the ultimate desideratum is freedom of the self or, as some would like, the self itself as Freedom, the second central topic for Indian philosophy is the self.

Except for the materialist Cārvākas who have since the earliest days challenged all spiritual philosophy in one form or another, the self to Indian thinkers has always been understood as something other than the physical body. There are at least three simple arguments for this. They are:

(*i*) Everyone speaks of an *I*, but none means by it the physical body, for while this physical body undergoes all sorts of changes, even to such an extent that nothing of the old may remain there recognisable for all time, there is something in the mental life which cannot so change, for how

otherwise could there be recollection, recognition or any kind of identification of objects?

(*ii*) Though sometimes by the word 'I' I may mean (my) body—as when I say 'I am tall'—I soon perceive, however, that it is also felt as *mine*: I say "This body is *mine*". This latter proposition is more authentic than the former, if only for the reason that it is more reflective. Even in case it were not authentic it could throw sufficient doubt on the primitive identification of the body with what could be meant by the word 'I'. The proposition "The body is mine" is, however, quite intelligible. It means that there is something on account of which it could be called *mine*, which, in other words, claims to own the body and is not itself owned by anything of the same sort—for we never use the expression 'my I'. If in analogy with the phrase 'my body' I may sometimes use the expression 'my self', I immediately feel, however, that the adjective 'my' here is not more removed from the substantive 'self' than the adjective 'its' in a phrase like 'its identity' is from the substantive 'identity'. All the difference that there is between 'my' and 'self', as between 'its' and 'identity', is linguistic *cent per cent*, nothing more. That, therefore, which owns the body and is not owned by any further *I* is the self.

(*iii*) Between the knower or knowing as subjective and all other things of the world as objects there is an absolute distinction, which is self-evident. The subjective is that which is privileged to certify its own existence: for proving its existence it does not require certificate from the outside, it is self-evident, *svaprakāśa*. But for the existence of an object we need an extrinsic certificate and it comes from knowledge. The object is believed to exist because I know it. That which is subjective, because self-certifying, is either itself the self or an intrinsic character of the self.

Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāmsā, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, different schools of Vedānta and even Buddhism and Jainism are agreed that the self is different from the physical body, and they extend the same arguments to show that it is different from the senses (*indriyas*) too. While, again, each sense can know (if it could know at all) only one kind of quality—colour or taste or smell, etc.—with or without the thing that

possesses that quality, that *thing* is generally known with various kinds of quality, and this proves that there must be something beyond senses. That which thus is beyond the senses is the self.

So far all are agreed, except, of course, the Cārvākas. Profound differences, however, begin from now. Is there anything which is beyond the senses and which yet falls short of selfhood? Most of the Indian systems admit such intermediate entity and call it *manas*, *antaḥkaraṇa*, *ahaṁkāra*, *buddhi*, *citta*, etc. Some like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā, Viśiṣṭādvaita etc. admit only one such intermediary, others two or three, and even the names used have not always the same connotation.

Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, for example, recognising only one such intermediary, call its *manas* or antaḥkaraṇa; they understand by it *inner sense* which, parallel to the outer senses, acts as an instrument for the self to perceive objects, perception this time being internal and the objects either mental states or, if non-mental objects too, these through knowledge I have of these. Through *manas*, in other words, I perceive my joys and sorrows and when I perceive cognitions that take place from time to time, I perceive also through these cognitions their objects too—for every cognition is perceived as the cognition *of some object*. The latter, i.e., perception of cognitions is called 'introspection', and Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika tell us that it may well be perception of an object-as-known as much as of a cognition-of-an-object. In all these cases, whether it be the case of the perception of joys and sorrows or of cognition of an object or of an object-as-cognised, *manas* is the instrument of perception. This is one function of *manas*, according to Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and a few other Indian systems. *Manas*, according to them, has quite another function too: it prevents more than one mental state from taking place for the same self at one and the same moment. This function of *manas* may be likened to what is called *attention* in Western psychology, but with this difference that while attention implies singleness of the *object* known, *manas*, in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is to account for the singleness of a *mental state*—one mental state at a time for each self. It is not easy to see why in deference to the different functions just narrated,

viz. internal perception, including introspection, and accounting for the singleness of a mental state, one should not admit *different* principles intermediate between the self and the external senses. But Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tells us, with what justice one has to perceive for himself, that the account it has offered—one principle with different functions—is more economical than 'different principles'.

Sāṇkhya, Yoga and some Śaiva systems have admitted two more intermediaries, over and above *manas*. They are *ahaṁkarā* and *buddhi*, together called *antaḥkaraṇa*. It is extremely difficult to describe in English the distinctive functions of *ahaṁkarā* and *buddhi*, there being no appropriate, or even roughly adequate, English terms to represent subtle differences and fine nuances. But the complex thing, called *antaḥkaraṇa* is very near what is called 'mind' in Western philosophy. Very near, be it noted, not exactly the mind, because while in the West the word 'mind' stands as much also for the self, the Indian philosophers under consideration would keep apart the self and *antaḥkaraṇa*. The difference, roughly, is that between *object* and *subject*. The particular cognitions and mental states that arise from time to time—cognitions and states that are understood in these systems as modes of *antaḥkaraṇa*—are objects in the sense that they are objects of introspection or of internal perception in general, and as for the entire *antaḥkaraṇa*, it too is a equally an object, as discovered in self-consciousness. In the situation 'I know myself', the myself which is known is an object, it is what may be called *objective* self, different in stuff and status from the self proper which is subject *par excellence*.

Subject proper is negatively defined as that which can never be an object, even to introspection, and, positively, it is that which needs no extrinsic certification for its existence. If non-mental objects are proximately certified by cognitions of these and if these cognitions and other mental states are certified by introspection, this introspection to which all mental states and *antaḥkaraṇa* itself stand as objects, is, in its turn, self-certifying. Had it required extrinsic certificate from another introspection there is no reason why this second introspection should not have presupposed a third, and so on; but then, in the absence of a final certification, even

outer objects should have been condemned as uncertified. Some Buddhists have on this very ground stopped with mental states and denied even the first introspection. But this is uncalled for. The first introspection is a fact, there is no uncertainty about that. Primary mental states are clearly certified as objects by this introspection and cannot therefore, be themselves self-certifying.

The only thing which as self-certifying is pure subject is this introspection that reveals mental states and, through such mental states as are cognitions, reveals the objects too of these cognitions. This introspection as the only subjective is called witness consciousness (*sākṣim*) and as in no way affected by the mental states, except as revealing them when they occur, is so far free. Corresponding to different mental states of an *antaḥkaraṇa* there need not, therefore, be different introspections, and further, not merely is the oneness of this pure subjectivity immediately felt, some philosophers have definitely demonstrated that the category of *difference* does not apply to it. Thus to each *antaḥkaraṇa* there corresponds one *sākṣim*. This is the view held by Sankhya and Yoga. Advaita Vedānta has proceeded a step further and on two grounds insists that there is ultimately one pure consciousness even though *antaḥkaraṇas* may be many. They insist, first, that if the logic of difference does not apply to introspection corresponding to different mental states, it does not, equally, apply to the subject corresponding to different *antāḥkaraṇas*—there is thus one subject even though *antaḥkaraṇas* are many. Secondly, they point out that if even as referring to mental states a *sākṣim* may somehow remain unaffected by this reference—its *sākṣihood* being constituted by just a sort of free reference—it means that of its own nature it must be autonomous, i.e., absolutely free. In other words, though it has somehow referred to mental states it need not have done that. As thus intrinsically non-referring it is pure consciousness, and nothing else.

Whatever be the difference of views, in this respect, of Sāṅkhya and Yoga, on the one hand, and Advaita Vedānta, on the other, in one point they agree. It is that consciousness is no attribute of the self but is the self itself. In other words the self is no substance, if substance is to be distinguished

from attributes. If, however, by substance one means a permanent standing entity, the pure consciousness of Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Advaita Vedānta may well be called a substance. For, certainly as neither an attribute nor an act or a function it is a permanent standing entity. Here lies the difference between these philosophers, on the one hand, and Kant, Gentile and the Vijñānavādi Buddhists, on the other. These latter understand by 'self' pure consciousness as an act, and the Vijñānavādi's *ālaya-vijñāna*, though agreeing largely with the Advaita Vedāntin's pure consciousness, is never a *standing* separate entity but, even as autonomous, distributes itself among mental states. Some Buddhists deny self altogether and are content with the series of mental states. Others, mainly of the Vaibhāṣika School, do not deny it altogether but yet take it as wholly indefinite. To the Mādhayamikas it is neither assertable, nor deniable, nor both assertable and deniable, nor neither of these two.

Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā, Viśiṣṭādvaita and some other types of Indian philosophy, which are all arranged against the Buddhists in that they admit a standing permanent self as substance, do not however equate self with consciousness. The self, according to them, is a substance to which consciousness belongs either as an attribute or as essence. While Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika regard consciousness as an accidental attribute of the self, consciousness or knowledge sometimes occurring and sometimes not occurring in the self, for Viśiṣṭādvaita consciousness is an essential feature of the self—the self never failing to be conscious; and for the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas the self is as much conscious as non-conscious, i.e., in part conscious and in part non-conscious. Consciousness and that which has it are subjective, and so whatever is non-conscious is an object. For the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, then, the self is in part subject and in part an object. This, according to them, is evident in the situation 'I know myself', where the *I* that knows is the subject self and the myself known is the self as an object. In order to avoid the alleged contradiction of the same self knowing itself as an object these Mīmāṁsakas claim that *in part* it is subject and in part an object, and do not accept the Advaita and Sāṅkya-Yoga theory of the so-called objective self being a totally different entity, viz.

antāḥkaraṇa. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, however, hold, yet another view. There is no absolute difference, they hold, between subject and object. Everything, according to them, is an object, because it is knowable; and if consciousness or knowledge and, if one likes, the self that is capable of having knowledge, are called subject, this does not mean that they are no objects at all, for both knowledge and self are objects of introspection. Even this introspection, according to many of them, is an object to a second introspection, and so on. There is nothing that is self-revealing in the right Advaita sense.

The self, according to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika is a substance which is conscious in the sense that sometimes consciousness takes place in it, or that it is *capable of having* consciousness; but if consciousness alone is taken to be conscious, then the self might be branded non-conscious. As a matter of fact, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards the self as conscious. The proposition 'I know' would mean for Nyāya and Vaiṣeśika the simple fact that in the substratum, called self, there has occurred a conscious state, viz. a cognition. Feeling, will, etc., though mental states, are not forms of consciousness, for consciousness, according to practically all Indian systems, except the Buddhists, is nothing but *knowledge*. The awareness of these mental states (which are other than cognition) is nothing but introspective knowledge of these states, and the so-called unreflective awareness of mental states is all a myth, according to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, all a myth. Be it noted here that Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Advaita interpret reflective awareness of mental states (even including cognitions) as the revelation of these by the *sākṣin* and by unreflective awareness of these they understand a sort of confusion of the *sākṣin* consciousness with these states, due to which these states appear as conscious much as ripples on the surface of a lake appear glittering on account of some false identification of these with the moonlight.

The Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas hold a view which is intermediate between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, on the one hand, and the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Advaita views, on the other. Knowledge, according to them, is a property of the self and stands in no need of revelation by another knowledge, called introspection. It reveals itself as it occurs and in the very process of revealing itself reveals also the object that is known

and the self that knows. This, of course, is unreflective awareness of that knowledge, and of the self and the object of that knowledge too. What is ordinarily called reflective knowledge is neither a grade removed nor qualitatively different. It is that unreflective awareness getting more intense or clearer.

With Rāmānuja also knowledge as the essential attribute of the self is self-revealing and so is the self to which it belongs and to which it reveals its object. If this self-revelation means subjectivity, both knowledge and the self are subjectives. But this does not mean that they are not objects also. They are objects, say, to memory—I may remember my past knowledge and remember myself as I was in the past. Like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers he too does not find any antagonism between subject and object. But he differs with them in a central point. It is that knowledge or consciousness is not an accidental character of the self, and that, therefore, like knowledge, the self too is self-revealing. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's *cetana* and *caitanya* are with Rāmānuja self-revealing, but not forfeiting their objectivity.

IV

The self as the central category, thus differently understood in different Indian systems, has always, except for the Cārvākas, been distinguished from the physical body. We have seen whether over and above the physical body, something called mind or *antaḥkaraṇa* has to be distinguished from the self. Those who draw this distinction call this intermediate something *subtle body* as opposed to the gross physical body. The nature of this subtle body we have already studied with reference to different systems. They are called bodies of the self, as distinct from extra-bodily objects of the world, only because between the self and each of these bodies there is a peculiarly close relation—a relation so close that we are not satisfied with saying merely that the self is lodged in the body, we are led also to identify them. Often I call the body myself and treat it as myself. Even if with some effort—though this is extremely difficult—we can at a level of realisation dissociate the self from the physical body, its dissociation from the subtle body, called mind, is infinitely more difficult and can be accom-

plished either through Yoga directly or through God's grace or through some happy *upadeśa* of a *guru*, or through scriptures, but in all these latter cases decidedly *after yoga*. The confusion of the self with either of the two bodies originated from *ajñāna* (or *avidyā*) which has been understood in widely different ways in difference systems, by many as sheer lack of discriminating knowledge and by the Advaita Vedāntin as a positive function or even as a positive entity.

Mukti or attainment of Freedom, *i.e.*, realisation of the self as self proper, is possible either through the removal of this *ajñāna*, if *ajñāna* is positive, or through direct knowledge of the selfhood of the self and its distinction from the body. For the Advaitin, removal of positive *ajñāna* is all that is required: it is *ajñāna* that kept the self covered till its removal and when it is removed there is nothing further to achieve. *Ajñāna*, according to them, can be removed by *aparokṣa jñāna* as a *vṛtti*. There is much that they said to establish that *ajñāna* is positive.

Those, on the other hand, who believe that *ajñāna* is sheer lack of knowledge hold that for *mukti* we must have positive knowledge of the selfhood of the self and its distinction from the not-self, and this knowledge that is required for *mukti* must not remain indirect to the end but has to mature into direct knowledge—*aparokṣa jñāna*. Even this, they sometimes hold, is not enough for *mukti*. *Mukti* has often been understood as cessation of all suffering, and as *janmāntara* (rebirth or cycle of births) is another accepted doctrine in Indian philosophy, many a philosopher has interpolated between the final knowledge and the cessation of all suffering a number of other steps.

V

The subtle body apart, there is no distinction in stuff between the gross body and things of the world. They are made of certain elements, *viz.* earth, water, fire, air and ether. The body and the extra-bodily thing differ only in use. The body is the refectory through which extra-bodily things have to pass in order to be experienced or, if one likes, enjoyed. The refectory may itself also be experienced but it does not require another refectory to pass through.

The five elements have each a distinctive attribute, and

bodies and things made of these elements in different proportions have these attributes in different magnitudes of explicitness. This distinction between substance and attributes, once made, gives rise to several questions : (1) What is a substance, what, in other words, is precisely meant by the term 'substance' and (2) what, similarly, by the term 'attribute'? The second question leads inevitably to another question, *viz.* regarding distinction between attribute and other features of a substance. The other features that there may be are *actions* of the substance, the *universal* that inheres in it, *etc.* This last in turn raises the questions—(*i*) what exactly are meant by the terms 'action', 'universal', *etc.*, (*ii*) whether even individual attributes and actions can have universals inhering in them, and (*iii*) whether there may be individuals corresponding to which there is no universal? These questions gave rise, in course of time, to subtler and subtler metaphysical questions as to whether there is at all any universal, whether, in other words, the universal is not a mere name or an image in the mind, how, in case one admits real universals, these are related to the corresponding particulars, whether the relation in question is like other relations or unique, *etc.*, *etc.* Their treatment of these problems has been as acute as could be, and in their growing zeal for the study of categories the Indian thinkers brought in no time the category of absence—the negative—in the field of their study and analysed it and its relation to the affirmative in a masterly way. There were also brilliant studies of the concepts of identity, difference, subject, predicate, *etc.*, *etc.*

This analytical study of the categories, though a comparatively late product in Indian philosophy, was a favourite subject for all Indian systems, but was specially developed in Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā, Buddhism and in later works on some forms of Vedānta.

Alongside this systematic study of categories there developed in Indian systems a superbly analytical study of the ways of knowing, on the one hand—a marvellous methodology with enough of epistemology and psychology, and, on the other hand, speculative, though largely reasoned out, cosmologies and cosmogonies. All kinds of theories were developed—theories of creation out of nothing, of spontaneous combination of atoms, spontaneous evolution out of an incohate primal stuff,

combination of atoms or evolution of the primal stuff according to the *karma* of the *jīva* and through the instrumentality of the will of God, *etc.*, *etc.* An excellent theology too was developed. There were all types of speculation about the nature of God, about his relation to individual selves, on the one hand, and the Absolute, on the other, if any such Absolute different from God could be admitted. All sorts of arguments for proving the existence of God were offered and discussed threadbare, and in systems like Mīmāṁsā, classical Sāṅkhya and Buddhism these proofs were refuted and systematic attempt was made to deny the existence of God.

Naturally, as much in this context as in connexion with the origination of knowledge, the concept of causality was taken up in every system and studied in thorough details.

The central concept of Indian philosophy was Freedom or *mukti*, and closely connected with it were the concepts of self and not-self and the proper and improper relations of the two. God in some systems, like Vedānta, Śaivism, philosophy of Grammar, *etc.*, was also understood as directly involved in the concepts of self and *mukti*, *mukti* being often understood as nothing but Godhood of the self—there being no ultimate difference in stuff between the self and God. Cosmology or cosmogony was to an extent of the nature of mythology and is, therefore, not of permanent interest to the students of philosophy. What beside the study of self, *mukti* and God are of abiding interest are the methodologies and different pyschologies of knowledge developed in different systems and the extremely acute analyses, in different systems, of concepts like substance, attribute, action, universal, inherence, negation, causality, difference, whole-part, space, time, change, permanence, *etc.*, and the theology developed in India as much as its refutation. Of immense interest are the theories of truth, validation of knowledge, error and invalidation, over which all the systems fought with one another.

As already noted at the beginning, the Western problem of sense-experience *vs* apriorities did not occur at all to Indian thinkers, except very sporadically and that too without much conscious thought of it. Idealism *vs* Realism was also no important problem, except when the Vijñānavādī Buddhists were to be challenged. Except these Buddhists all Indian

thinkers were realists: even the phenomena of illusion, hallucination and dream could not swerve them from the path of realism. The theories of error they developed were different, it is true in different systems, but all were aligned against the idealistic theory of the Vijñānavādī Buddhist. This is a strange phenomenon, seeing that it is only recently that the Western thinkers have found interest in realistic theories of error.

Systematic Ethics, as it is generally understood in the West, was not much developed in India. There were profound metaphysical dissertations, it is true, on the ideal of Freedom, and much of actual concrete duties in their interrelation in Dharmaśāstras and Smṛtis, but not much, at least nothing systematic, on the ideal life in this our common everyday world and the rationale thereof, none practically on the freedom of will, theories of punishment, progress, *etc.* Startlingly enough, however, a few other problems were tackled in a way that a modern thinker could immensely profit by. Semantic and syntactical study of ethical judgments *vis a vis* judgments stating facts was of absorbing interest to the Mīmāṁsakas (of the two different schools), Naiyāyikas and Grammarians, and parallel with their many excellent observations—and all in a systematic manner—on fact-stating judgments, we find in their Syntax and Semantics of ethical language amazing observations on motive, intention, action, value, *etc.* This Semantics *cum* Syntax of ethical language, mostly worked out by the Mīmāṁsakas, was throughout tied to the central idea of life, *viz.* freedom from suffering, which, the Mīmāṁsakas believed, could be attained, at least to a large extent, by *karma.*

The Concept of God in Indian Philosophy

I

INDIAN PHILOSOPHERS have asked the following questions about God :

1. Does God exist ?
2. If 'Yes', can His existence be proved by means of argument ?
3. If by means of argument, how to formulate it ?
4. If God is not to exist, is it because His existence is not necessary to account for anything in the world, or because the very concept of God involves some absurdity somewhere, or is it because there is something wrong somewhere in the theistic arguments themselves ?
5. What exactly is meant by the word 'God'? What, in other words, are the attributes and functions of God ?
6. Assuming that God exists, how exactly should we relate Him to individual selves and the world, and what should be an individual's way of approach to Him ?
7. If there is God, how should one account for so many evils in the world ?

II

Systems of Indian philosophy are sharply divided on the question—Does God exist? The Cārvākas, the Buddhists and the Jains, and even the Sāṅkhists and Mīmāṁsakas in the Hindu fold, stoutly deny His existence. The Cārvāka denial is intelligible: they are unqualified materialists. But how the Buddhists and Jains who tuned their philosophies to a high level of spirituality could deny God is almost an enigma, and infinitely more bewildering, historically, is the aggressive atheism of the Sāṅkhists and Mīmāṁsakas. These latter—the Mīmāṁsakas decidedly—were ardent champions of the Vedas, and they never at least rebelled against minor gods and goddesses; but when it was a question of the Great God, the omniscient creator and destroyer of the world, they violently resisted. Somehow in India atheism could put up with high-pitched spiritual philosophy—a type of compatibility which

it is difficult for the Western people to allow. The Buddhists and Jains and the Sāṅkhists and Mīmāṁsakas were not all positivists or humanists; their religions, though largely ethical, were as spiritual as a religion could be, and they did not fail to recognise higher and higher levels in spiritual progress.

The Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṁsa denial of the Great God proves yet another thing. It is that the minor gods and the Great God are not citizens of the same world. They need not be of the same stuff and different only in degree. Regarding the nature of minor gods there are all kinds of theories in Indian philosophy. According to some, they are only the individual souls that are eternally free. Others hold that the minor gods are the souls that have attained freedom (*mukti*) through struggle. With some, again, they are the souls that are *almost salvaged* and are only waiting for final redemption, or those who through the merits accruing from good deeds done in their human life have obtained for whatever period a right to the citizenship of the Paradise. Perhaps minor gods, understood in these different ways, are only *different classes* of minor gods; and if so, we may add that Indian thinkers have recognised another class of minor gods. Perhaps best in the hierarchy, these gods are the spirits that preside over and inform different classes of natural processes, not creating anything out of nothing but only governing the movement of things that are Nature's.

The Great God, the kind omniscient creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world, is neither a mere presiding or informing deity—for He is, in addition, a creator and a destroyer, which the minor gods are not—nor a finite soul eternally free nor one that has attained liberation through struggle. Even if one considers Him as a mere presiding and informing deity of the world, one must not ignore the fact that the world as a whole is not like Air as a whole or Water as a whole. The original wholeness of Air or Water is somehow guaranteed by the fact that the words 'air' and 'water' are *material nouns*, which the term 'world' is not. If the world is at all a genuine unity, its unitary character comes only from the self that dissociates itself from it. The Great God is thus qualitatively different from the minor gods. There would, then, be nothing wrong, if one should recognise a plurality of minor gods,

called '*devatās*' and yet deny the Great God, called *Īśvara*. One may also, for the same reason, admit both without contradiction. Polytheism, properly understood, need have no clash so far with monotheism.

The Vedas have admitted both minor gods and the Great God. This is quite intelligible from the point of view just delineated. This does not, of course, mean that there may not be other intepretations of the Vedic pantheon. Max Muller's henotheism is one such interpretation. One may also understand many of the minor gods as just symbols—*pratīkas*—of the Great God, and this certainly is a fruitful way of interpreting the Paurāṇika and Tāntrika gods and goddesses. The many shapes and colours and other qualities of the Paurāṇika and Tāntrika gods and goddesses may also be understood as regional apriorities or pure material essences of empirical qualities and functions.

III

Unless otherwise indicated, the word 'God' (with capital G) will from now stand for the Great God. The first and the most central question that one may ask about this God is—what is the evidence for His existence? The question can be answered in three ways. Those who are mystics refer, in answer, to their own experience; others point to some inescapable faith, harboured in every human heart; and still others, more rationally minded, offer arguments. All these types of evidence are found in Indian systems, separately or together. Some of the Bhaktivādins, particularly of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava School, have banked almost entirely on their esoteric experience and stoutly denied the possibility of rational evidence. The only other thing on which they have partly relied is the alleged inescapable faith. For while the Sufis have relied entirely on their private experience and denied the possibility of intelligent communication with others, all the kinds of communication they allow being unintelligible from the beginning to the end—a silent mood, some small gestures in mystic curves, some nonsense syllables or disjointed words or stray pieces of eloquent rhetoric—Indian Bhaktivādins have always insisted on *intelligent* communication. They

refer invariably to the faith we listeners possess. This communication is to an extent *rational* in that the faith we possess is common to all human hearts, so that to everything that the God-intoxicated man tells us our hearts somehow respond. We feel that what they say they have realised is what *ought to be* and what, therefore, we *ought to* realise. The listener, already grounded on a kindred faith, is convinced from the beginning that the truths he hears about, however ineffable, are what *ought to be*, though not something actual for him immediately. If this is true of faith in general, it is true equally of faith in the scriptures. Scriptural truths are those which sages have realised and in which we listeners have somehow some faith from the beginning. Many of these truths that we find stated in the scriptures may be substantiated by means of logic, but some resist such substantiation to the end. In the Vedas and Upaniṣads, for example, we often find contradictory characters attributed to God, and logic cannot manage these. But if we have genuine faith in the scriptures, even contradictions cannot shake it. We continue in our belief in the existence of God and the most that we can say is that God's nature is incomprehensible by *reason*.

Faith is thus both rational and irrational—rational in that it is a common point of reference and we common people can follow to whatever extent what the sages say they have realised; and irrational in the sense that the object of this faith may well be largely unamenable to rational comprehension. There are others, again—more rationally minded than the Bhaktivādins—who fall back upon faith on the rational ground that God and the like entities which as objects of faith are, *ex hypothesi*, absolutely supersensuous cannot be inferred by means of reason. They hold that that alone can be inferred which is capable of being sense-perceived, at least under imaginable conditions, and point out that we cannot imagine any situation where God and the like entities could be sense-perceived. True, the Vaiṣṇavas, Tāntrikas and Paurāṇikas have held that God can be perceived in a supernatural way as possessed of supernatural forms. But the philosophers we are considering here might retort that there is a limit to supernaturalness. Nothing would be gained if the supernatural be equated to the unimaginable. Śaṅkara belongs to this

school of thinkers.

IV

There are many among Indian philosophers who are full-fledged rationalists. They are seriously after proving the existence of God on wholly rational grounds, and their voice was so dominant that others too who were not *cent per cent* for rational proofs were compelled to develop these.

As in Western philosophy, Indian thinkers offered on different occasions different proofs for the existence of God. Four of these may be considered as representative. In one of these God is shown as the intelligent cause of the world, in another as the mover of *adṛṣṭa* (unseen merits and demerits), in the third as the positive limiting case of the continuous increase of knowledge (and power), and in the fourth as one who connects appropriate meanings with corresponding words.

The first proof is this :

This phenomenal world is an effect, hence it must have an intelligent cause; there must, in other words, be one who has consciously brought it into existence. As, now, one who consciously brings something into existence must have adequate knowledge and power for this, the same thing must be admitted with regard to one who is responsible for this grand phenomenal world. He must have knowledge of all that happened, is happening and will happen in this world, and necessarily the power too to make all these happen. This is just another way of saying that one who is responsible for this grand world is omniscient and omnipotent. In other words, He is exactly what we mean by the term 'God'.

There are many points, in this argument, worth thorough scrutiny. First, why should the cause of an event be intelligent, i.e., conscious? Western thinkers are completely at a loss to understand this, and even in India the Sāṅkhists and some older thinkers like Svabhāvavādins, long extant, challenged this. These Sāṅkhists and Svabhāvavādins, much in line with Western thinkers, claimed that natural processes are spontaneous and do not require any conscious agent. This is not necessarily a denial of all causality. By 'spontaneity' here is meant absence of a conscious agent. They deny

that there is really any conscious agent behind a natural process or event that appears to happen spontaneously ?

Others, however, notably the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers who are mainly responsible for the theistic argument under consideration, have taken up the challenge. They point out that if the first principle of logic is to try to interpret the doubtful in terms of what is accepted as definite, the so-called spontaneity has to be understood as at bottom due to some intelligent authorship. That some effects have intelligent authors is a fact admitted by all. The question now is about other events which, some claim, are spontaneous. But are they quite sure that these are really spontaneous? The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinker, for one, has challenged them. Can they silence him by referring to *indisputable* cases of spontaneity? They cannot, because there is no such indisputable case. A case is indisputable when both the contending parties accept it. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinker will accept none of the cases which the spontaneist might point to. The spontaneist has, on the other hand, admitted, quite as much as his opponent has done, some cases of intelligent authorship. As intelligent authorship is thus a definite indisputable principle, at least in some cases, and as in none of the cases pointed to by the spontaneist the principle of spontaneous origination is definite or indisputable, and as that which is indefinite and doubtful has to be interpreted in terms of the definite and the indisputable, it follows that there is no escape so far from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika denial of spontaneity. It may be noted that most of the Hindu thinkers are on this point on the side of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

The second point to note regarding this theistic argument is that it has nothing to do directly with the traditional Teleological Argument in the West. Indian theists have nothing indeed against the Teleological Argument, and they may well accommodate it in their general theistic argument. But they have no special fascination for it. Rather they are infinitely more worried over disteleology than their Western partners.

Whether, however, this theistic argument is similar to the traditional Causal Argument in the West, and, if so, to what extent, is an important problem. The Causal Argument, as it is understood in the West, is of various forms; but under-

neath all the variety there is the common problem of proving a first cause, itself uncaused, of the world. Considered in this light, and, of course, so far only as *efficient* cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) is concerned, the argument does not differ in spirit from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argument. For the latter too is about the uncaused efficient cause of the world. The only difference, so far, is that the Western Causal Argument speaks nothing of the intelligence and allied attributes of God.

The Indian theistic argument is about the uncaused first cause of the world. In both the arguments—the Indian and the Western—the world is taken as an effect, and the question now is: Is this justified ? What evidence is there that the world, considered as a whole, is an *effect*? Kant argues that there is no such evidence, or that there is as much evidence for it as against it. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, and others in India, have tried hard to discover the effect-character of the world. Whatever be the details, two lines of their argument are immediately evident. One is their repeated reference to the common Indian belief that the world as a whole is periodically destroyed and then reorganised, in both the cases according to the combined *adṛṣṭa* of all individual selves. 'Destruction' here means disintegration into elements that are eternal and reorganisation presupposes that the elements had been persisting in existence—there is no question of total annihilation or creation out of nothing. The theory of periodic disintegration and reorganisation, though largely an article of faith, was, however, sought to be substantiated by logical arguments by many Indian thinkers, notably by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Here also we need not enter into subtle details.

We may note in passing another important argument, offered by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, for the effecthood of the world. It is that the world is an effect because it is of perceptible size, and anything of perceptible size is an effect because it is made of parts. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has shown, through an excellent application of logic, that even what is of the smallest perceptible size is again divisible, this time into parts of non-perceptible size, called dyads, each thing of the smallest perceptible size being made up of three such dyads—and each dyad again divisible into two monads, called atoms. The world

thus is ultimately made of atoms which, therefore, are its ultimate material cause. The contact of triads, or better, of things of bigger sizes, is its *asamavāyi kāraṇa*, and at least one of the efficient causes (*nimitta kāraṇa*) is the omniscient, all-powerful conscious agent, called God, other efficient causes being *adṛṣṭa*, space, time, etc.

V

For the atheists in India the concept of God is invalid or at least gratuitous. They have attacked the theistic argument, mentioned above, from three sides. Some of them, we have already noted, are spontaneists, and we have seen how the theists have tried to meet their challenge. Another atheistic challenge, coming from the Mīmāṁsakas, Buddhists and Jains, is that there is no evidence whatsoever that the world as a whole is periodically destroyed or reorganised anew from elements. If the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers have offered subtle arguments to defend this article of faith, the Mīmāṁsakas, Buddhists and Jains have not lagged behind. They even go so far as to hold that there is no evidence whatsoever that the world as a whole is an *effect*. According to them, it has been continuing since time immemorial, and though there is constant internal change it never amounts to total disintegration or reorganisation *de novo*.

The third point of these atheists against the theistic argument is that the argument, if valid, ought to establish a God *who has a body*, a proposition which is acceptable neither to these atheists nor to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers. Why the God of this argument should have a body is clear from the fact that no intelligent author can bring anything into being without the help of his body. This atheistic challenge has disturbed the theists profoundly. Some of them, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, have employed all their logical skill to show that the body is not logically necessary for intelligent authorship and have even referred to a clear case of such authorship without the help of the body, as when I move my body itself. But though some have in this way met the atheistic charge squarely, others, notably the Vaiṣṇavas of various schools, have not hesitated to allow a body for God, a body, however,

which, according to them, is not made of nature's stuff. They hold that it is a kind of supernatural (*aprākṛta*) body, describe it in different ways and relate it differently to God the self. Some have even gone so far as to discover a whole house, even a city—all supernatural—to accommodate God and his associates and devotees. There are some, again, who sincerely believe that the whole world is His body. These are all excellent postulates of devotional approach to God, tenable as far as they are conducive to *bhakti* ; but with what logic it is for the readers to find.

The atheists have further asked the question as to why God should at all find it necessary to disintegrate the world or reorganise it anew. In the West also theologians have asked the same question about creation; and the answers given by Indian theists, whether they are Naiyāyiks or Vaiśṇavas or Advaitins, are as varied as in the West. Four good answers given by the Indian theists are—(1) It is *of the very nature of God* that He should reorganise anew or destroy the world periodically; (2) the question of motive arises only where something is done *with an effort,* but God's activity regarding this reorganisation and destruction is spontaneous; (3) God does all this *for the good of others only,* not for anything regarding Himself, and philanthropic acts have no definite occasioning motives; (4) these activities of God are all a *sport* (*līlā*). Indian atheists, however, have challenged all these answers on the ground that every one of these would speak as much for the goodness of God as against it, for in the world and for individual selves there are so many evils, and God must be held entirely responsible for these. Indian theists were fully alive to this charge and tried to meet it in various ways. The best they said is that though God acts out of the fulness of His nature, He yet acts according to moral deserts (*adṛṣṭas*) of others. This points to God's natural respect for the moral law, which respect is as much a part of God's rational nature as His respect for natural laws. Indeed, it would be meaningless to argue that God in His infinite freedom could go against either natural or moral laws. To act in infinite freedom and to act perfectly according to reason are the same thing. Reason cannot *bind*, the so-called bondage of reason is just another name for freedom from all other bondages, and the so-called pressure of reason

is just what is called freedom, unless, of course, freedom is understood as licence. God, in short, is constitutionally *justice incarnate,* and all *kindness proper* is perfectly compatible with justice. Forgiveness that goes beyond justice is not generally favoured by Indian thinkers, except, of course, by a few Vaiṣṇavas. All Indian theists believe in God's grace, but except the few Vaiṣṇavas, none has put forward a claim to *unjust* grace. This sharply distinguishes Indian theists in general from Christian theists. God allots to individual selves happiness or suffering strictly in accordance with their moral deserts. This is the so-called Moral Proof for the existence of God. The Indian Moral Proof reminds us of Kant's attempt at reconciling Categorial Imperative with pleasure and pain.

Indian atheists have often argued that for moral deserts of individual selves to mature into happiness or suffering God's intervention is not necessary—moral deserts, in other words, spontaneously mature into these, according to them. According to the Indian theists, however, this would be relapsing into the old theory of spontaneous movement, which they have already refuted.

The last main charge which Indian atheists have levelled against theism is that there cannot be an omniscient being. How can one possibly know in detail all that has happened, is happening and will happen? The type of omniscience, guaranteed in inductive generalization, is at most the knowledge of all things *merely as instances of a particular universal*, not as definite self-contained particulars in all their detailed individual characters. If all events and things in the world could at all be known, they could be known only through and merely as instances of some over-all universal, never as self-contained definite unique particulars. But this type of knowledge of all events and things of the world would fall short of the omniscience claimed for God.

The theists, however, reply that the type of omniscience they have claimed for God, the knowledge, *viz.* of all particular things and events, each in its particular self-containedness, is *per force* to be admitted, as it is a necessary corollary of their main theistic arguments, the causal one. If God be taken as a cause of the world, one is bound to call Him omniscient.

There is another excellent argument in Yoga for the omniscience of God and it looks like the Ontological Argument of the Western thinkers. The argument is this :

If A is more knowing than B, B more knowing than C, C than D, and so on, this necessarily points to one who is *most knowing* ; now, as a matter fact, there *is* this hierarchy in the world; it follows necessarily that there must be one who is most knowing, that is, omniscient. In other words, the fund of knowledge which a person possesses can at all be compared with that of another, and one of these called richer than the other, only if the two stocks are measured by means of a standard which is the richest stock, otherwise called omniscience, to which one of the two stocks is nearer than the other.

This is a nice argument. Yet we must note that Vācaspati Miśra, himself a theist, has in his exposition of it, proposed a counter-argument that goes in favour of the atheist. It is that when of two things one is called heavier than the other the theist should on the same ground admit that there must be something in the world which is ideally the heaviest. But nobody has admitted this, which goes to prove that there is something wrong in the argument for omniscience. The idea is that comparative measurement is possible with reference as much to a maximum standard as to any smaller conventional unit, often one which is sufficiently small.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Yoga have offered yet another argument for the existence of God. It is based on their study of the relation between standard words and their meanings, and Udayana and Vācaspati Miśra have developed it in detail. It is held that the relation between words and their appropriate meanings is possible only through the eternal will of God. There is much that is profound in the argument, but it may not convince a modern student of philosophy, as it largely depends on two assumptions, viz. (*i*) that Sanskrit is the only best language and (*ii*) that the Vedas and the Upanisads are infallible. Besides, we cannot forget that even the atheistic Mīmāṁsakas have developed a Semantics which is no less developed than the one we find in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

VI

The question as to the number of special attributes that God

possesses has been of immense interest to Indian thinkers. That God is omniscient, just, in a way kind, and even omnipotent in the sense that he has organised the entire world and can break it up periodically into its elements or primal stuff, is almost a unanimous decision. Whether he possesses any other special attribute or attributes has also been discussed by many. Though much of this discussion is technical theologically, one point in it may be of general interest. It is whether God may have *wish* and *will* and, if so, whether these, say, the wish and will to reorganise the world or to destroy it, are eternally in Him or whether these are only occasional.

The point is this: Were this wish or will of God eternal, there would be constant reorganisation and destruction of the world, which, however, is not a fact; and were it occasional one could not but deny a motive behind—a position equally untenable, because God in his infinite fulness cannot have a motive. This is why some people have denied wish or will of God altogether. There are many, however, who, while recognising this wish or will as only occasional, have yet held that there is no contingent motive behind it, the only occasions for God's wish or will being the maturing of the *adṛṣṭas* of individual selves. There are others, again, who hold that God's wish and will are eternal, but with what logic it is difficult to see, unless they, as some of them have openly averred, identify these with the eternal knowledge that God possesses.

The most interesting problem in Indian philosophy of religion is the one concerning the relation between God and individual selves, on the one hand, and between God and the world, on the other. So far we have studied God as the *efficient* (*nimitta*) cause of the world. Two questions immediately arise. They are—(*i*) Is God the efficient or any other type of cause of *individual selves* also, and (*ii*) is He also the *material* cause of the world?

The reply to the first question is, for all Indian theists, a clear 'No'. For, no Indian, not even the atheist, believes that individual selves are created by God. Individual selves, according to them, barring, of course, the view of the Cārvākas whom we are not considering here, have never begun to exist, and, according to many, never cease to exist either. These two theses are at the foundation of all religions that developed in

India and sharply distinguish these from every other great religion of the world, and yet the two theses are only articles of faith, rarely substantiated by arguments. This does not, however, in any way weaken the basis of Indian religions, for if, according to other religions, individual selves are God's creation, this too is only an article of faith, equally unsubstantiated. Rather in favour of the Indian theory something, not very absurd, may be said. It is as follows :

The absolute certainty of 'I'—for no one can ever say he is not—points in a way to the eternity of the self. For that alone can be called contingent—as what, in other words, was once *not* and may one day cease to be—the existence of which can be even sportively denied or doubted now. The existence of 'I' on the other hand, cannot be even doubted now. It follows that it never was not and will never cease to be.

Any way, individual selves as not contingent are not caused by anything. God, therefore, cannot be taken as the cause of the self. The world, however, is, according to all theists, so caused. The difference here between all Indian theists, on the one hand, and some Western theists, on the other, should be noted. Some Western theists hold that the world was created out of nothing. Indians do not hold this view. The primary stuff of the world, no matter whether it is atoms or an incohate and homogeneous primary stuff, is, according to all Indian theists, co-eternal with God. When the Advaita Vedāntin or some Indian Grammarians and Śaivas speak of the world and even of individual selves as coming out of mere Brahman—the ultimate Absolute—this is from quite another point of view to which we shall soon turn.

VII

So far we have spoken of God as the *efficient* cause of the world. The question now is whether God may not also be its *material* cause. Barring the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers and Mādhvas, almost all Indian theists hold that He is as much a material cause as the efficient one. Their view is that the primal stuff and even individual selves—though co-eternal with God—were nevertheless in Him from the beginning. This, of course, is no denial of all difference between them. Some difference

of some sort there always is even between a part and the whole of which it is a part. A part may, again, be of two kinds. Always real and originally dependent on the whole, it may yet dart out of the whole and continue independently, as a spark does in relation with the flame of which it is a part, or as a leaf may get dissociated from a tree and continue to be. Or, to consider another possibility, it may remain always dependent upon the whole and may yet be falsely taken as independent, as in the case of the ripple on a lake. In both the cases, some unity in spite of difference is admitted, a unity which is either merely original or continuant also. This unity in spite of difference has been understood differently in different Indian systems. Bhāskara, Nimbārka and the Bengal Vaiṣṇavas unequivocally admit identity-in-difference. They hold that the differents develop out of, i.e., are the *pariṇāmas* of the original unity in which these differents had remained dormant; and against the possible objection that the idea of *pariṇāma* goes against the law of contradiction they hold, first, that God who has infinite capacity may easily put up with contradictions, and, secondly,—if the first reply sounds much too irrational—that we, finite mortals, should not dare master all the secrets of God's nature. Regarding the question whether when A changes into B, A has not wholly ceased to be, yielding place to that B—whether, in other words, when God (including the world and individual selves as an incohate lump) has changed into the world and individual selves He in His own character continues to be—their reply is a clear affirmative, a reply which is much clearer than we find in Sāṅkhya. As against Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Sāṅkhya holds that when A develops into B (*i*) this A, though unrecognised in that state B, nevertheless continues and (*ii*) when through a sort of *sādhana* A as A comes to be recognised, B has ceased to be—has, in other words, relapsed into A. Bhāskara, Nimbārka and the Bhaktivādins, on the other hand, hold that even when through *sādhana* A is recognised, B continues alongside it and as its essence. Whether this is logically justified or not is not always a serious consideration for these thinkers. . They often hold, as already said, that God in His infinite capacity can put up with all kinds of contradiction or that for one to challenge the secrets of God would be a piece of blasphemy.

Rāmānuja and his followers are the only Vaiṣṇava monists who have not proceeded this way. They are definitely against all talks of identity-in-difference. Between God and individual selves, or between Him and the world, there is, according to them, clear *bheda*, and if between A and B there is *bheda*, there cannot be *abheda* also. Yet in deference to monism to which all Vaiṣṇavas, except the Mādhvas, are somehow committed, they recognise a synthetic unity of A and B wherever B functions as an adjective of A. They hold that the world and individual selves are adjectives of God, and God forms a synthetic unity with these. Not only this, in all such cases the substantive is always the essence, so that the synthetic unity is more aligned to this essence than to the adjectives. One might almost say that God *is* the synthetic unity.

While all these Vaiṣṇavas insist on monism in spite of the clear difference between the factors concerned, the Mādhavas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers argue that where there is difference there cannot be any form of identity. God and individual selves are quite different things, and things of the world are equally different from these and from one another. There is nowhere a talk of any kind of their identity. This does not, of course, preclude the possibility of close relations, on some occasions, between some of these factors. The relation may even be very close, as between a substance and its attribute, or between an individual self and its body. But even the closest of such relations falls infinitely short of identity, so that when through some such close relation a synthetic unity has been formed we do not acquire the right to align the unity with only one of the factors concerned, rather than with others. There should be no talk of identity in any such case. They hold that some of these Vaiṣṇava monists have blundered at another point also. According to these monists, the world and individual selves were primarily parts of God and later developed into independent or pseudo-independent things. But no whole can possibly be co-primal with parts. The whole being an effect of the parts must be temporally after these. According to the Mādhvas and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, then, God cannot be the material cause of the world, and certainly not of individual selves.

With regard to this problem, however, the view the Advaita

Vedāntins have offered is wholly different from what others have said. They distinguish between two points of view—one lower and the other higher. Take, for example, the case of a cloth and its threads. From the lower point of view the cloth and the threads are somehow both different and identical—different because the purposes served by them are different, and identical because the cloth cannot be imagined as something other than the threads, supervening on them from above. From the lower point of view, then, they are both different and identical. But, certainly, from the correct point of view which is higher in epistemological status, one of these—the identity or the difference—has to be sacrificed. While Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika prefers sacrificing the identity on the ground that it can be replaced by some other form of close relation, Advaita Vedānta proceeds the other way about. The non-difference of the cloth from the threads is, in their view, so evident that they stick to it and interpret the apparent difference as due to different *vyavahāras*. Mere identity or non-difference, then, is here the ultimate truth. The truth here is the threads, and any feature of the cloth which is not absolutely identical with the threads is all an illusion.

Like the Vaiṣṇavas above, the Advaitins also are somehow committed to monism when they talk about God, individual selves and the world. They interpret this monism from the two points of view just discussed. From the lower point of view, God as the material cause and the individual selves and the world as somehow adjectival to Him are in the relation of identity-in-difference. But the difference is only apparent, *vyāvahārika*, and has to be abjured as all an illusion; and as a material cause as essence is always to be preferred to its effects as accidental, along with the difference these effects also, *viz.* the world and individual selves should be condemned as false. It must be noted, however, that these latter are not condemned wholesale; they are condemned only so far as they are different from God. God as the continuing essence is the only truth. But here too some further pruning is necessary. God in relation to the world and individual selves, even though the relation is all false, is one thing, and apart from this relation, *i.e.*, purely as in Himself, He is quite another thing. As in that relation He is the creator, destroyer, kind, graceful,

etc., and also one to be approached through love, devotion *etc.* Hence these characters also have ultimately to be abjured as false. The only ultimate truth is God as He is purely in Himself; and, so considered, He is nothing more than Pure Existence—Pure Consciousness—Pure Bliss. He is Pure Existence, because everything else has been sacrificed as illusion. He is Pure Consciousness, because He is the essence of individual selves, and such essence is pure consciousness, everything else being due to its relation with two kinds of body, *viz.* the gross and the subtle. He is Pure Bliss, because there is no occasion for any suffering, all suffering being due to one's relation with other things, whereas beside this pure God, called Brahman—*nirguṇa* as opposed to *saguṇa* Brahman, God being understood as *saguṇa* Brahman—there is nothing else. This *nirguṇa* Brahman is pure consciousness, not merely as being the essence of individual selves but also as the essence of everything in the world, for if in one way the essence of the world is pure existence, it is in another way pure consciousness: common to every thing in the world there is *prakāśa.*

If the Advaitins have in the above account described God or Brahman as the material cause of individual selves, he has obviously understood the term 'material cause' in a new sense. If 'cause' implies that which is *earlier in time*, and 'effect' that which is *later*, Brahman or God is no cause at all of individual selves, for according to all Indian thinkers individual selves have never begun in time. Obviously, then, by 'material cause' they have meant something else. They have meant *essence, inner truth, etc.* Brahman, according to them, is the essence or the inner truth of individual selves, whatever is *extra* in them being all a false appearance. And when *God* is taken as the material cause, practically the same thing is meant: God also is the essence of individual selves, because He is nothing but Brahman itself, only understood in reference to individual selves (or to the world). That the Advaitins have understood the word 'material causes' in the above sense is more evident when they take God as the material cause of the world. The world of which God is generally taken, in Indian philosophy, as the cause (efficient or material) is the world reorganised or recreated after a periodic destruction. Indian philosophers have never spoken of a first creation;

rather, according to them, the chain of creation and destruction is beginningless. Hence when in Advaita Vedānta God is taken as the material cause of the world, they never meant that the world for *the first time*, *i.e.*, unpreceded by any prior destruction or creation, came out of God—for there is no such *first* coming into being of the world. They could only mean that every other *later* world came out of him according to the combined *adṛṣṭas* of individual selves. But even this they could not have meant when they spoke of *Brahman* as the material cause of the world. Brahman who is absolutely devoid of *māyā* cannot create. If, then, Brahman is still called the material cause of the world what they mean is only that Brahman is the *essence* or the *inner truth* of the world.

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